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This study of American constitutional theory and practice offers a distinctive 
perspective on the interminable war powers debate, a view away from formal 
constitutional settlement and towards a deliberative constitutional politics for war. 
Contemporary war powers scholarship centers on the question of how the rise of 
discretionary executive power and receding legislative influence over the use of 
military force should be constitutionally evaluated and addressed. This dissertation 
shows that underlying the conventional divide between congressionalist and 
presidentialist interpretations of the Constitution are competing theories about how 
such a balance of powers is to be politically constituted that have important 
implications for the interbranch politics of warmaking. The predominate framing of 
the war powers debate has been from the vantage point of legal constitutionalism—
centering on constitutional interpretation, statutory clarification, and ultimately 
judicial review to clearly establish the authority over the use of military force. After 
describing the theoretical promises of the formal entrenchment of the separation of 
powers, an examination of constitutional practice reveals this approach to be a 
contemporary construction that has tended to undermine the purposes to which it 
aspires. The dissertation then turns to consider a more fully political 
constitutionalism, a conception with roots in the American founding and which has 
seen a revival in recent scholarly discussions. Political constitutionalism 
accommodates continual discord over the proper boundaries of institutional authority 
in war and the inevitability of some executive discretion as inherent and potentially 
salutary elements of the political order. The analysis shows that the warmaking order 
that emerges from such a constitutional politics should not entail anything goes, but 
instead can be judged by the extent the branches engage in recurring interactions that 
amount to systemic deliberation, a standard drawn from the political form of the 
constitution itself. This study concludes with a sketch of how processes of legal 
constitutionalism might be integrated into the deliberative interbranch warmaking 
politics aspired to by political constitutionalism and a view towards the broader 
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Reconstituting the War Powers Debate 
 
The evaluation of political practice is, at bottom, the evaluation of the 




How should the United States decide for war? This question lies at the root of 
ongoing discord and concern about the constitutional distribution, balance, and 
exercise of the war powers, focused in particular on the rise of discretionary executive 
power and receding legislative influence over decisions to use military force.
2
 One 
indication of the unease is the voluminous scholarship on the war powers that has 
appeared in the previous few decades,
3
 to which a new wave of analysis has just 
recently begun to respond.
4
 A great deal of the former effort has been legal in nature, 
written by lawyers and those who study law, including law school professors,
5
 former 
                                                
1
 Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, 79. 
2
 As Mark Brandon describes it, “the story of American constitutional politics…in the 
context of military conflict has been one of steady erosion of Congress’s power to 
prevent, confine, or even direct military action and of steady accretion of executive 
discretion and control.” Mark E. Brandon, “War and the American Constitutional 
Order,” 23. 
3
 A small, but representative sample of prominent scholarly book-length treatments 
includes: Ely, War and Responsibility; Fisher, Presidential War Power; Koh, The 
National Security Constitution; Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign 
Affairs; Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace. A similar representative sample of 
scholarly articles and chapters in edited volumes would not do justice to their 
numbers. 
4
 Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution; Zeisberg, “The Relational Concept of War 
Powers”; Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority; Thorpe, 
The American Warfare State. 
5
 Ely, War and Responsibility; Koh, The National Security Constitution; Tushnet, The 




 and legal researchers,
7
 while the latter scholarship has emerged 
from other academic traditions.
8
 The debate on the proper ordering of warmaking is 
not new but has persisted since the very birth the republic,
9
 and the focus on war 
powers as a matter of constitutionalism has always been a primary aspect of the 
discussion.
10
 Despite the wide variety of contemporary interpretations of how the use 
of military force is to be conducted under the U.S. Constitution, a broad consensus 
has emerged that in practice executive power has been ascendant on matters of war 
since the last half of the Twentieth century in ways unseen throughout most of United 
States history. Sharp disagreements have emerged out of this consensus in the 
scholarly discussion, however, on how best to evaluate and address this development.  
                                                
6
 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency; Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace; Powell, 
The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that there is a 
regular exchange between the legal academy and the government. 
7
 Fisher, Presidential War Power. 
8
 Zeisberg, “The Relational Concept of War Powers”; Kleinerman, The Discretionary 
President; Thorpe, The American Warfare State. 
9
 As we will see, political arguments over the proper boundaries of institutional power 
in war occurred during the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution and have 
persisted in varying degrees through to the present. Edward Corwin argues that the 
term “war power” was popularized, if not coined, by President Lincoln, who derived 
it from combination of the “Commander-in-Chief” and “take care” clauses of the 
Constitution. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution, 16.  
10
 Constitutionalism is an “essentially contested concept,” whose predominant 
contours have varied widely throughout the history of political thought and continue 
to be a matter of scholarly debate. Differing approaches to American 
constitutionalism are at issue, and will be explicated, throughout the analysis of the 
war powers that follows, but constitutionalism can be generally understood as: “a 
distinctive form of government…[wherein] constitutions structure ordinary politics in 
ways that framers and their progeny hope will promote justice, stability, and 
prosperity.” A constitution can thus be roughly understood as that which orders—
structures reliable patterns of—ordinary politics towards certain broad purposes. 
While “sometimes constitutions promote goals directly….more often, constitutions 
structure governing institutions in ways thought to privilege desirable outcomes.” 
Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts”; Graber, A New Introduction to American 
Constitutionalism, 12–13. 
 3 
Broad questions remain under dispute: Is this development constitutionally 
sound—is there a gap between constitutional theory and practice for war? What 
accounts for it? What is to be done about it? How are we to understand the American 
constitutional model for warmaking? Answering these expansive concerns requires 
attention to critical sub-questions: What is the constitutionally permitted extent of 
executive discretion over the use of military force? What is Congress’ proper 
constitutional role in warmaking? When is congressional authorization required and 
in what form should such authorization consist? Is there a Constitutional standard for 
the decision to initiate force? While the common frame for such inquiries treats them 
as legal matters, the practicability of the answers to them reside upon a more complex 
political substrate: How is the balance of powers of the warmaking order to be 
determined—set, judged, and maintained—over time? What role should legal 
processes play in ordering a deliberative and effective warmaking process? What role 
should other political mechanisms play in its ordering? In short, how should 
discretionary executive power to initiate military force be reliably constrained—
subject to principle—in a constitutional republic? These last questions bring into view 
the critical point that while the debate over the war powers often centers on 
constitutional interpretation and legal analysis, at its core it is a question of 
constitutional design and constitutional politics.  
At the most general level, there exits a persistent divide between 
congressional and presidential partisans regarding the power to go to war.
11
 While 
there is widespread acceptance of an executive power to repel sudden attacks on the 
                                                
11
 Zeisberg, “The Relational Concept of War Powers,” 168. 
 4 
United States, the longstanding debate on whether and to what extent a president may 
initiate hostilities absent congressional authorization remains a heated one. 
Congressional partisans hold that active legislative participation in warmaking is a 
Constitutional necessity, and argue for a requirement of explicit legislative 
authorization for the use of military force save for a small set of specific and exigent 
circumstances.
12
 Under this view, presidents may order military action to protect 
citizens and American military forces at home and abroad from imminent harm, but 
any military actions beyond a defensive response to an immediate threat should 
involve consultation with, and the positive assent of, Congress. In all but the direst 
circumstances, Congress’ proper role is to deliberate and decide on any use of force, a 
role predicated on its ultimate authority to unleash the dogs of war that will then be 
commanded in the field by the executive. In short, Congress is to be the gatekeeper to 
war. In those rare situations where a threat is so immediate that legislative 
authorization cannot be secured prior to a response, it must be retroactively obtained 
at the earliest possible instance.  
In contrast, executive partisans insist that presidents have greater latitude to 
initiate aggressive military action under the Constitution. While they acknowledge an 
essential constitutional role for Congress in warmaking, executive partisans argue that 
the Constitution establishes the president as the lead actor in the realm of foreign 
affairs generally, and in the initiation of military force in particular.
13
 Under this 
                                                
12
 Adler, “The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking;” Ely, War and 
Responsibility. 
13
 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace; Powell, The President’s Authority over 
Foreign Affairs; Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution. 
 5 
view, Congress’ proper place in the process for use of martial force lies in its 
authority to provide the means for war, in particular its power to raise an army and 
navy and appropriate funds for their maintenance and continued use. Though these 
powers provide Congress with a capacity to influence national security and 
warmaking, the decision to use aggressive military force is to reside largely, if not 
solely, with the executive.
14
 
Leaving the analysis of approaches to the war powers as a simplistic 
dichotomy of partisanship for one of the political branches can make participants in 
the debate bristle,
15
 and a strict institutionally instrumental approach to the topic 
obscures more than it enlightens. While the practical effect of instantiating the variety 
of scholarly treatments of the war powers may rightly be categorized in terms of 
institutional partisanship—the overarching result being a justification for and 
encouragement of either a greater legislative or executive role in the initiation of 
                                                
14
 As Philip Bobbitt puts it, Congress has the “first and last word” when it comes to 
warmaking: it can decide to create and fund the military and it subsequently decide to 
decommission it or specifically prohibit its use in a particular instance, but in general 
the decision to use the existing military lies with the executive. See Philip Bobbitt, 
“Review: War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s ‘War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath,’” Michigan Law Review 92, no. 
6 (May 1, 1994): 1390. 
15
 For example, Louis Fisher and David Adler argue that they are constitutionalists 
and that it is the U.S. Constitution that is a Congressional partisan when in comes to 
the power to initiate war: “On matters of war, the Constitution Sides with Congress.” 
Fisher and Adler, “The War Powers Resolution,” 18; See also Fisher, “A 
Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs,” 1060–1061; Adler, “Constitution, 
Foreign Affairs and Presidential War-Making,” 948–949. Of course many 
commentators on all sides of what has been characterized as institutionally partisan 
divide make claims to constitutional fidelity. In many ways this interpretive 
disagreement over constitutional meaning is the war powers debate, or at least it is 
how it has been commonly conceived. The implications of the ongoing institutional 
partisanship, and the primacy of a legalistic approach for understanding and 
addressing the war powers, are discussed below. 
 6 
military hostilities—breaking down the constitutional arguments and models of each 
camp to a more refined granularity and a greater theoretical depth reveals important 
differences relevant to the prospects for constituting—establishing and maintaining—
such differing visions for the American way of warmaking. Upon closer inspection 
the common categories of institutional partisanship not only split over what the broad 
balance of authority to initiate hostilities is supposed to be,
16
 but they also splinter 
over how their models for the use of military force are to be constituted in practice. In 
short, underlying the common war powers debate over the institutional balance of 
power are competing theories about how such a balance of power is to be politically 
constituted. These distinctions have important implications for the viability of the 
competing models for warmaking and for their political evaluation and prospective 
reconstitution.  
The predominate framing of the war powers debate has been from the vantage 
point of legal constitutionalism—centering on constitutional interpretation, statutory 
clarification, and ultimately judicial review to clearly establish the authority over, and 
the powers related to, the use of military force. This viewpoint holds the rule of law 
as a preeminent value for republican government: public power must be precisely 
authorized and governed by law.
17
 Clearly delineating in law “who can do what, and 
                                                
16
 That is, whether they might be categorized as partisan towards congressional or 
executive authority over warmaking. 
17
 Judith Shklar termed the worldview that rule following is a distinct moral good 
“legalism,” and criticized it as inapt to, and distorting of, many aspects of politics. 
See Shklar, Legalism. For related critiques of legalism in the American constitutional 
order see Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, 97–98; Silverstein, Law’s 
Allure, 3. The promise and perils of legal constitutionalism for the war powers is 
taken up in detail in chapter 3. 
 7 
how” is to guard against arbitrary, factional, or tyrannical government and ensure 
predictability, fairness, and propriety—aspiring to a government of laws and not of 
men.
18
 Of particular concern is the constraint of executive power, deemed the “most 
dangerous branch”
19
 because of its direct control over the organized means of violent 
force. Under a primary version of this legalistic approach, formally settling 
foundational questions, such as who has the authority to begin offensive military 
force, is one of the primary functions of a written constitution and constitutionalism.
20
 
Accordingly, the Constitution’s precepts in regards to warmaking should be clearly 
established and then upheld and implemented by all parties in accordance with the 
rule of law: abided by the political branches, reaffirmed by judiciary in any dispute, 
and entrenched in the public’s understanding of their constitutional order. From this 
perspective, the unsettled state of the war powers—constitutional ambiguity and the 
seemingly interminable competing claims to constitutional propriety, sometimes 
called a stalemate,
21
 with each institutionally partisan camp asserting its view of the 
                                                
18
 This last phrasing mirrors John Adams’ adaptation of the longstanding aspiration of 
the republican political tradition. Harrington, following Machiavelli and Cicero 
before him, looked towards establishing a political system that is “an empire of laws 
and not of men.” 
19
 See for example, “The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents, 
and the Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power”; Flaherty, “The Most 
Dangerous Branch.” 
20
 Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”; Zeisberg, 
“The Relational Concept of War Powers,” 168. Zeisberg terms this the ‘settlement 
thesis,’ which she rejects in favor of a more politically grounded approach to the 
constitution of the war powers, discussed in chapter four. 
21
 For example, H. Jefferson Powell describes the usual war powers debate as “a 
shrill, bootless exchange of briefs.” Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign 
Affairs, 25; See also Treanor, “Fame the Founding and the Power to Declare War.” 
 8 
proper balance of power under the Constitution while discretionary executive war 
power
22
 continues and expands—is highly problematic
23
 and calls for remedy.
24
  
The foundational proposition of legal constitutionalism that law is the 
standard to which government should be held leads directly to a heavy emphasis on 
the judiciary to resolve this unsettled state of affairs. For law to rule, under this view, 
there must be a sole authoritative interpreter to which all others defer.
25
 And given 
corresponding views that courts are the proper custodians of the law and legal 
                                                
22
 Benjamin Kleinerman offers a succinct definition: “Discretionary executive action 
claims authority in the absence of [well-established and well promulgated] laws or 
even in disobedience of them.” Kleinerman, The Discretionary President, x. For a 
classic statement, see John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Article 164. 
23
 Gordon Silverstein describes legalism as when a political or policy issue gets 
framed as a struggle between “the rule of law” and “the abuse of power.”  Silverstein, 
Law’s Allure, 8. Discussions of executive discretion in warmaking then are premised 
on concern over arbitrary control over the state’s martial power, where arbitrariness is 
understood as the exercise of power in the absence of, or contrary to, law.  
24
 While a commitment to the rule of law is often the key driver of a view towards 
settling the constitutional debate, a corresponding rationale is that ending the ongoing 
dispute can engender more productive disputes over policy—that is, settlement will 
focus debate on the wisdom of a particular use of force. For the former view, on the 
priority of the rule of law, see Adler and George, “Introduction,” 6. For the latter, see 
Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, xv–xvi. Of course, while 
many Congressional and executive partisans agree that a settlement of the 
constitutional debate over the war powers would lead to better policy, they disagree 
on what that settlement should entail. Congressional partisans insist that “collective 
decision-making”—and thus a settled requirement for Congressional authorization 
prior to the initiation of warfare—is key to the development of wise policy. Executive 
partisans counter that the “functional superiority” of presidents in terms of 
information, expertise, and dispatch make it the proper site for decision-making on 
the use of force, and thus should be unfettered of legal constraints. Compare Adler, 
“Constitution, Foreign Affairs and Presidential War-Making,” 957 and Powell, 97. 
Thus it is important to note that the emphasis of settlement is never an argument for 
mere legal settlement, that is, that any settlement of the debate will do, but rather for a 
particular model of warmaking of which legal settlement is a necessary element, 
bringing us back to the debate once again. These issues are discussed further in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
25
 Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.” 
 9 
reasoning, and that the Constitution is higher law, it follows that the Supreme Court is 
to be the ultimate site for resolving the debate regarding institutional authority over 
the initiation of non-defensive military force.
26
 Where the written Constitution is not 
specific and clear enough to settle, or keep settled, foundational distributions of 
institutional power, it the Court’s role to tie down any open-endedness over time, 
defining and entrenching the basic structure of government through case law. 
However, while many scholarly contributions to the war powers debate can be 
understood at least in part as briefs designed to sway any prospective decision by the 
Supreme Court on matters relating to war,
27
 it has not made a definitive ruling on the 
authority to initiate force, continuing the constitutional ambiguity and propagating the 




                                                
26
 A concise summary of this formulation of constitutionalism, from a critical 
perspective, can be found in Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, 98. 
27
 That is to say they are pitched at the level of constitutional interpretation. While 
many contributions to the ongoing debate can arguably be characterized as being 
directed at a broader audience in addition to the Court—including members of 
Congress, presidents, political advisors, the commentariat, as well as towards swaying 
the constitutional sense of the citizenry—they still aim to replace the contemporary 
contestation over the war powers with formally entrenched settlement. That is, they 
not only seek to bring about a political consensus on the proper constitutional process 
for the initiation of military force, a necessarily contingent ordering, but they also 
seek to end the dispute—and thus bind future political actors—through legal means. 
The ideal is to unify constitutional meaning and practice, for the foreseeable future if 
not in perpetuity, in order to return the focus of political actors solely to the particular 
policy choice at hand. The logic of formal settlement points towards the Court as 
ultimate constitutional interpreter, and thus the focal point for such efforts. While 
pragmatic considerations have spurred a broader approach, the view towards legal 
settlement—and the Court as its steward—remains pivotal. 
28
 Though the commonly held view that the Court has largely abstained from a 
definitive ruling on the constitutional allocation of authority to initiate force, as well 
as from interventions in foreign policy generally, is generally correct, its role in the 
 10 
A second track of legal constitutionalism follows from concerns over the 
relationship between persistent legal ambiguity and executive discretion, as it aims to 
establish a formal settlement of the war powers debate through the use of statutory 





 are efforts at constitutional construction
31
 that seek to replace the 
contestation-inducing, discretion-enabling ambiguity of the written constitution with 
rules designed to regulate the future behavior of the executive branch. In general, 
framework statutes aim to temper the contemporary tendency towards broad 
executive discretion within wide zones of legal indeterminacy by establishing clear 
legal guidelines for policymaking, eliminating ambiguity and narrowing zones of 
discretion to the extent possible.
32
 Statutory clarification and regimentation are to 
                                                
construction of the contemporary working constitution of the war powers has hardly 
been neutral. Through related decisions it has sent signals that have shaped the 
expectations, available means, and actions of the political branches in their struggles 
over the power to initiate force. See Silverstein, Law’s Allure, 209–242; Silverstein, 
Imbalance of Powers. For a discussion, see chapter 3. 
29
 William Eskridge Jr. and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes. 
30
 Tulis, “Constitutional Decay and the Politics of Deference”; Or as Mark Tushnet 
describes: “The constitution outside the Constitution consists of statutes enacted by 
Congress.” Tushnet, Why the Constitution Matters. 
31
 Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 1–19. Both tracks of legal 
constitutionalism, judicialization and statutory regimentation, can be understood as 
efforts of constitutional construction. The form of any construction, and particularly 
how it is to be maintained—its boundaries created, monitored, judged, enforced, and 
revised—is closely connected to an underlying view towards the proper form of 
constitutionalism, a key element of the analysis that follows.  
32
 They thus seek to close Constitutional “grey holes” with highly specific statutes. 
For a description and expression of concern over legal black and grey holes see 
Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law; for an argument that they are inevitable, see 
Posner and Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, 89. One way to understand the claims 
of some executive partisans is as an argument for the legitimacy of Constitutional 
“black holes,” areas of pure executive discretion formally established and entrenched 
 11 
bring executive power under the rule of law where the constitutional text, and the 
constitutional practice it has engendered,
33
 has failed to do so.  
In the area of national security, and particularly for the use of military force, 
vague clauses of the Constitution—such as those vesting the President with “the 
executive power” of the United States,
34
 as “Commander in Chief” of the armed 
forces,
35
 and that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”
36
 matched 
with Congress’s powers to raise and regulate the military and to “Declare War”
37
—
have engendered the ongoing debate described above and have also provided space 
for the construction of constitutional orders
38
 particular to warmaking.
39
 Framework 
                                                
by the written constitutional document, and thus not properly constrainable through 
ordinary law. 
33
 The proper role of prior practice in the construction of the constitution of the war 
powers, and thus for the legitimacy of executive constraint or discretion in 
warmaking, is a persistent point of debate in the scholarly literature. Of primary 
import is whether, and what contours of, past practice should be understood as 
precedent, legitimating a construction. But how a precedent is viewed depends on 
whether one looks through the lens of legal or political constitutionalism. The 
tendency here again is towards legalism, with past practice held to properly influence 
how the judiciary—as proper custodian of the Constitution and legitimator of any 
construction—will rule. From the vantage point of political constitutionalism, the 
nature and import of precedent differs depending on the perspective of the branch of 
government. The topic of past political practice and its relationship to legal and 
political entrenchment—that is, to constitutionalism rightly understood—is taken up 
in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. 
34
 U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1. 
35
 Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1 
36
 Art. II, sec. 3. 
37
 Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11-16. 
38
 It should be noted here that there is a recurring critique of works that utilize the 
terms constitution and constitutionalism in relation to politics not directly tied to a 
written constitution. Examples include Adrian Vermeule rejecting as overly broad 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s discussion of “super-statutes” as constitutional, as well as 
Jacob Levy’s review of Richard Bellamy’s Political Constitutionalism, where he 
argues that Bellamy’s equation of political constitutionalism with majoritarian 
political rule renders his notion of constitutionalism virtually meaningless. See 
 12 
statutes such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973, as well as recent proposals to 
replace it, aim to construct a new constitutional consensus on the process of 
warmaking, bolstering the rule of law through law. Where a question such as “how 
the United States should decide for war” is not convincingly answered by reference to 
the written constitution, or by a decisive ruling by the Supreme Court, the approach of 
legal constitutionalism insists that any ambiguity be settled through comprehensive 
and carefully drafted framework legislation. Such legislation seeks to prospectively 
delineate the extent of executive discretionary authority in warmaking and specify the 
requirement of, and procedures for, further legislative authorization for any military 
action beyond what is sanctioned as a standing matter.  
                                                
Vermeule, “Review: ‘A Republic Of Statutes: The New American Constitution’”; 
William Eskridge Jr. and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes; Levy, “Political 
Constitutionalism.” What follows relies upon and explicates a conception of 
constitutionalism—the ordering of ordinary politics—that is broad enough to include 
elements of the political order even beyond framework statutes, but not stretched so 
thin as to include everything that might be considered political, and to entail that 
everything—and anything—goes, particularly pure decisionism. At its most general, 
the political constitution can be understood as a complex ordering of politics that, 
expanding on A.V. Dicey’s description of constitutionalism, includes not only “rules” 
but anything “which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the 
sovereign power in the state” and, as Mark Tushnet describes, “rests on aspects of the 
nation's political structure—some rooted in the Constitution, others not—that 
are…recalcitrant to change. Dicey, Law of the Constitution; Tushnet, “Political 
Constitution of Emergency Powers,” 1462, emphasis added. 
39
 The war powers debate might be best understood as competing efforts at 
constitutional construction. However, a critical and under-examined element of that 
struggle is the form that such attempts at political ordering and entrenchment 
commonly take. How any constitutional construction is to be enforced and maintained 
over time is key to the potential for its success, and durability. This is a question of 
political constitution, of which legal constitutionalism is one kind, with its own 
inherent tendencies and limitations. Chapter three questions the efficacy—existing 
and potential—of legalistic constitutional constructions of the war powers, while the 
subsequent chapters develop a view toward the prospects of more politically 
grounded constructions. 
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However, while executive power is to be clearly authorized, and thus 
constrained, by settled law, this approach to the construction of the war powers runs 
into recurrent limitations in its capacity to tether presidential discretion to initiate 
military force. Statutory mechanisms become the subject of interpretive debate to an 
even greater extant than the written Constitution, as there is often contestation over 
the constitutionality of their provisions as well as what they are to entail as a matter of 
ordinary law. Partisans of the executive branch argue that a framework statute such as 
the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional restriction on the presidential power 
established by the written Constitution,
40
 while the slightest ambiguity in the statutory 
language can be exploited to make a case for greater executive discretion under that 
same law.
41
 The constitutional ambiguity and contestation that the statutory 
framework was to settle, by constructing a constitutional consensus, is instead 
replicated on a more distinctly legal plane. Statutory framework legislation can thus 
create its own legal black and grey holes, constructing a legal scaffolding that, due to 
the power of unilateral executive action
42
 and departmental interpretation,
43
 can end 
up enabling the executive discretion it aims to constrain.  
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Resolution. 
41
 Wang, “Whatever Happened to the War Powers Act Controversy?”; Ackerman, 
“Obama’s Illegal War in Libya.” 
42
 Moe and Howell, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power.” 
43
 Paulsen, “Most Dangerous Branch.” Departmental interpretation—of the 
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One response of legal constitutionalists to this prevalent weakness is to push 
for greater judicial defense of the rule of law
44
—reliable clarification and 
enforcement through case law that insists on clear legal authorization for executive 
action, narrowing the bounds of executive discretion to the extent possible. A related 
alternative is a view towards drafting exceedingly precise statutes—so clear and 
explicit that the clauses would be difficult for executive lawyers to interpret away and 
easier for courts to enforce. However, there are significant reasons to question 
Congress’ contemporary capacity and motivation to enact such finely tuned 
legislation.
45
 And the judiciary has not eagerly welcomed such a robust role, either as 
promoter of a thick conception of rule of law—with its attendant strict separation of 
powers
46
—through the development of Constitutional common law or in regards to 
the construction and maintenance of comprehensive statutory regimes.
47
 Ultimately, 
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45
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that can be legislated for in advance—novel circumstances necessarily will arise. 
Others have to do with political circumstances particular to the United States 
Congress as presently constituted—for example the underlying motivations of 
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47
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rulings that construct a legal ecosystem amenable to executive discretion in the 
absence of clear and active Congressional opposition. These tendencies and their 
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the approach of legal constitutionalism to the constraint of executive discretion—a 
focus on better law and a stronger judiciary—must contend with the persistence of 
contestation over constitutional and statutory meaning and the realistic prospects for 
constitutional settlement enforced by courts and abided by the political branches.
48
 
This pushes to the forefront of the debate the inevitability of some executive 
discretion
49
—action in the absence of, or contrary to, law—particularly in the area of 
national security, but also the fact that law is only one kind of check on public 
power.
50
 Perhaps more importantly, adherents of the approach from legal 
constitutionalism to the war powers debate must grapple with the very real possibility 
that a primarily legal approach to constraining executive discretion not only can 
engender, through law, that which it seeks to proscribe, but that a predominating 
legalism enervates and displaces other political mechanisms that might better contest 
                                                
implications for the viability of legal constitutionalism as a model for constraining 
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of a constitutional amendment to instantiate a robust conception of legal 
constitutionalism specifically for the use of military force, see Martin, “Taking War 
Seriously.” 
49
 This is the nub of the first half of the provocative argument found in Posner and 
Vermeule, The Executive Unbound; For an argument in favor of the rule of law 
project in light of the inevitability of discretion, see Shane, “The Rule of Law and the 
Inevitability of Discretion.” 
50
 Thus while “[l]aw has its limits,” “informal enablement and constraint of power are 
at least as important as the formal aspects embodied in the rule of law.” Lazar, 
“Making Emergencies Safe for Democracy,” 507, 509; While this is particularly 
pertinent to discussions of “states of emergency,” it holds true for any area of 
executive discretion, even in less exciting recesses of the administrative state. For a 
further discussion of the inevitablity of constitutional flexibility, see Lazar, “Why 
Rome Didn’t Bark in the Night.” 
 16 
and constrain discretionary executive war power. When taken as the preponderance, 
if not the entirety, of the constitutional system, legal constitutionalism—which aspires 
to discipline the exercise of power with the rationality of formal processes—
undermines the political foundations of a constitutional order where the exercise of 
power is reliably subject to deliberative constraints.
51
 
An alternative approach to the war powers is from the vantage point of 
political constitutionalism,
52
 which takes the enduring nature of competing claims to 
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Republic,” 224-225. The contours of this broader conception of political constitution 
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constitutional authority—and thus some measure of executive discretion—as not only 
given but desirable, and places this dynamic central to its model of constitutionalism. 
Eschewing the absolute primacy of legal settlement and judicial supremacy for 
limited government, this approach holds that in a republic, as a matter of political 
fact, there will necessarily be contestation over policy as well as the translation of 
written constitution into constitutional practice. Under this view, the design of the 
U.S. Constitution reflects and reinforces this tendency, establishing and harnessing 
such contestatory forces to discipline power with power in a fashion that promotes the 
public interest. In Madison’s classic formulation, “ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.”
53
 This is particularly so in the area of national security, where 
the written constitution has been aptly described as “an invitation to struggle for the 
privilege of directing American foreign policy.”
54
 The prospect of the use of force 
abroad not only stirs up divergent views regarding the wisdom of any particular 
martial action—over specific goals and the appropriate means to achieve them in light 
of developing circumstances—but also over the proper contours of the warmaking 
order within which such deliberation, decision, and reevaluation takes place. This 
politics of war largely centers on the primary branches of government and its 
elements are intertwined, as each branch will have a unique perspective to on 
questions of policy as well as on the apposite institutional roles in the decision 
process for war, while also having constitutional bases to assert their respective 
                                                
in relation to the war powers—with the warmaking order understood as unique kind 
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positions. These bases are claims based in constitutional interpretation as well as 
structural ones arising from the basic characters of the institutions the Constitution 
calls into being.
55
 The perennial war powers debate is thus both a sign, and element, 
of a constitutional politics of warmaking that emerges from the constitutional design. 
However, despite the growing body of scholarship that purports to reject a 
legalistic approach to the war powers,
56
 there remain significant disagreements within 
this emergent approach on how the political constitution of the war powers is to be 
understood. Such differences have important consequences not only for evaluating 
the contemporary working constitution, that is whether the constitutionally structured 
politics that ultimately yields the decision for war functions well, but also for the 
prospects for reconstituting a deliberative constitutional system for war given 
contemporary conditions.
57
 While the view towards a political constitution where a 
the precise contours of a flexible warmaking order are determined politically—at root 
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raises the question of the role of the Constitution in deliberative democracy, 
particularly whether certain constitutional processes are a precondition of deliberative 
democracy or whether a strong theory of deliberative democracy demands that 
constitutional processes must also be the subject of democratic deliberation and 
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Mansbridge, see Deliberative Systems. 
 19 
an emphasis on the political enablement and constraint of executive discretion—is 
found in select works of executive and congressional war powers partisans alike, the 
former comprise the bulk of the proponents of such a view.
58
 This trend is due in part 
to view among many legislative war power partisans that the constitutional 
interpretation they offer should be a normative trump that settles the ongoing dispute 
through the processes of legal constitutionalism described above. But it also stems 
from an important practical factor: the existing overall conditions of the 
contemporary constitutional order are favorable to permitting broad discretionary 
executive power to initiate war. At present, constitutional flexibility in the area of 
warmaking bounded by existing political checks entails executive dominance over the 
use of military force. Corwin’s “invitation to struggle” has become Koh’s “why the 
President almost always wins in foreign affairs.”
59
  
One thin variant of political constitutionalism hews to a strict realism, 
allowing few constitutional strictures that can aid in the evaluation of either a 
particular decision to use military force or the broader ordering of such a warmaking 
process. Beyond the fact that some formal participation on the part of both Congress 
and president is required for the use of military force, and a generalized notion that 
contestation can result from this, at its core it is a view that the use of military force is 
and should be determined by whatever the president can get away with—anything 
                                                
58
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goes. Another strain of contemporary scholarship on the constitution of the war 
powers transforms a functional analysis of the contemporary institutional balance on 
matters of war into constitutional prescription. This is an argument that the 
constitutional design not only was to allow—through constitutional ambiguity or 
abeyance
60
—the possibility of executive initiative in war, but that it was 
institutionally and politically structured to promote it. Under this view the current 
state of the working constitution, characterized by the dominance of discretionary 
executive initiative over the use of force, should not be a subject of constitutional 
critique or reconstruction. Prominent advocates of executive discretion argue against 
legalism because they wish to largely affirm the basic contours of the contemporary 
warmaking order as in line with the constitutional design, while seeking to mitigate 
certain problems related to legalistic forms of institutional contestation.
61
 Though this 
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 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace; Powell, The President’s Authority over 
Foreign Affairs; Weinberger, Restoring the Balance; And more generally see Crovitz 
and Rabkin, The Fettered Presidency. Legal constitutionalism is thus by no means 
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version of the political constitution of the war powers allows a role for Congress, in 
that has its own constitutionally based claim of authority regarding the use of military 
force and has specifically enumerated constitutional powers to assert it, it largely 
glosses over any consideration of whether Congress is substantively fulfilling its role 
in the constitutional design as a matter of course and whether it reliably can do so as a 
matter of practical and political reality. It characterizes contemporary alarm over 
presidentially initiated warfare as overwrought, with Congress’s power over 
appropriations
62
 along with the disciplining effects of public opinion
63
 and media 
scrutiny
64
 enough to moderate executive excesses, while claiming that legal fetters by 
their nature run counter to the fundamental constitutional design and are unlikely to 
be effective.
65
 Accordingly, any critique of American warmaking should be based on 
policy rather than constitutional requirements for the decision process for war, and 
largely directed towards the “decider” in the oval office.   
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“tyrannophobia.” Scholars such as McGinnis see the contemporary working 
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design due to the tension between the generality of law and the specificity of security 
threats. In contrast, Posner and Vermeule triumphantly claim that “Madisonian 
oversight has largely failed,” that the functioning of the constitutional system could 
not really have been otherwise, and that an executive unbound by law and effective 
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A thicker theory of political constitutionalism moves beyond strict formalism 
and functionalism to offer norms for assessing the operation of a variable warmaking 
order drawn from the political forms that the written constitution calls into being. It 
highlights that the system of separated institutions sharing power is not only an 
elaborate mechanism to prevent the factional—unlimited, arbitrary—exercise of 
power due to its concentration in partisan hands but also a means for facilitating 
reflection, choice, and action towards the common good. From this perspective the 
politics of warmaking can be constitutionally evaluated on the extent the branches 
clearly express their distinctive institutional viewpoints on the use of force and review 
and respond to those of the others in institutionally distinct fashions. But while the 
written constitution formally secures a measure of distinctiveness within and 
responsiveness among the branches on matters of war, the extent to which the norms 
of political constitutionalism are upheld by the warmaking order is variable, 
dependent on its elaboration into practice over time by the branches themselves. A 
robust theory of political constitutionalism thus pushes scholarly inquiry on the war 
powers towards a consideration of the preconditions of a deliberative interbranch 
constitutional politics of war that involves the continual reassessment and 
reconstruction of the warmaking order, and thus the branches’ own roles within it, to 
achieve broad deliberation on the prospective use of military force in light of 
developments in the nation’s security context. In short, the argument that follows is 
that rather than a problem to be resolved, the seemingly interminable war powers 
debate—questions on how the United States should decide for war—should be recast 
as a central axis around which a deliberative constitutional order for war should 
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continually turn; and that the ordering of a constitutional politics characterized by 
systemic deliberation must itself be politically constituted. 
To bring us to this conclusion, the arc of this study proceeds as follows. 
Chapter Two describes the contemporary working constitution of the war powers and 
the conventional war powers debate within it. It then reframes the debate from a focus 
on constitutional interpretation to settle the boundaries of institutional authority in 
war to a focus on the form of constitutionalism—the process for ordering ordinary 
politics—that is best suited to reliable and broad deliberation on such questions of 
constitutional construction. Chapter Three analyzes the predominant approach to the 
constitution of the war powers, legal constitutionalism. After describing the promise 
and process of the legal entrenchment of a separation of powers, it highlights how this 
approach is largely a contemporary phenomenon in relation to war powers and that 
when legal constitutionalism is pursued as the whole of constitutionalism it can 
undermine the purposes to which it aspires. Chapter Four turns to consider a more 
fully political constitutionalism, a conception with roots in the American founding 
and which has seen a revival in recent scholarly discussions. Political 
constitutionalism accommodates continual discord over the proper boundaries of 
institutional authority in war and the inevitability of some executive discretion as 
inherent and potentially salutary elements of the political order. But the flexibility of 
the warmaking order that emerges from such constitutional politics does not entail 
anything goes, but instead can be judged by the extent the branches engage in 
recurring interactions that amount to systemic deliberation, a standard drawn from the 
political form of the constitution itself. This study concludes with a sketch of how 
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processes of legal constitutionalism might be integrated into the deliberative 
interbranch warmaking politics aspired to by political constitutionalism and a view 
towards the broader political foundations of a deliberative constitutional system for 
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 On the orders of the President, the United States began firing Tomahawk 
missiles into Libya on March 19, 2011.
67
 The US military involvement, continued 
through October of that year, would include over 110 missiles shot from US 
warships, extensive strikes from American military airplanes,
68
 and the offensive use 
of armed unmanned drones.
69
 No regular American forces were used on the ground, 
but small-scale clandestine operations were reported.
70
 This martial action was an 
essential part of a multi-state coalitional intervention to establish a no-fly zone in 
Libya called for by the United Nations Security Council,
71
 to protect civilians as well 
as the rebels who would ultimately overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. 
While the monetary cost to the United Sates for the military mission would exceed 
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 there were no American casualties and the mission, conducted 
under the auspices of NATO, was widely deemed a success as a matter of both policy 
and execution.
73
 Despite largely positive reviews from policy experts, the use of 
American martial force in Libya stoked a perennial, and often heated, debate on the 
constitution of the war powers. Political figures, scholars, and prominent voices of the 
commentariat were, once again, metaphorically “up in arms” over the process of 
warmaking, clashing over the constitutionality, legality, and propriety of the broad 
executive discretion to use military force characteristic of the contemporary United 
States, and on full display in the intervention in Libya. 
The primary point of contention centered on the fact that this six-month long 
military action occurred without any explicit authorization, or specific appropriations, 
from the United States Congress.
74
 President Obama, who as a presidential candidate 
argued against both the constitutionality and prudence of executive discretion to use 
offensive military force,
75
 initiated and continued the intervention in Libya without 
ever asking for, or receiving, formal Congressional authorization or special funds to 
support it. In contrast to the preceding presidential administration, which openly 
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argued that the executive has a constitutional prerogative to use military force as it 
sees fit,
76
 the Obama administration insisted that the United States military actions in 
Libya had been both legally authorized and consistent with the bounds set by existing 
statutory frameworks. Initially, the administration argued that the Security Council 
Resolution, under the United Nations Charter, made the use of force lawful.
77
 The 
claim of legal authority was supplanted with an assertion that “the United States had 
transferred responsibility for the military operations…to the North American Treaty 
Organization (NATO),” under which United States military forces remained engaged 
in the fight.
78
 Later, to counter claims that the duration of the conflict would entail a 
violation of the clear limit, set by statute, on the length of any use of military force 
without formal Congressional authorization, the executive branch argued that “the 
President was of the view that...the operations in Libya [were] consistent with the 
War Powers Resolution…because [they were] distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ 
contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision.”
79
 For the Obama 
administration, questions of the constitutionality of the military intervention in Libya 
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were moot because, they argued, the executive had been granted the legal authority, 
from disparate sources, to initiate and continue military force as it, in consultation 
with the allies of the United States, deemed necessary. 
Prominent commentators and select members of Congress strongly disagreed, 
calling the American use of military force against the Gaddafi regime in Libya 









 and Representative Ron Paul
84
 were among the 
loudest Congressional voices, and there was some talk that Congress as a whole 
might act to limit or stop the intervention.
85
 While the House of Representatives did 
pass several resolutions seen as symbolic rebukes of the President’s actions,
86
 no 




 the ongoing 
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military intervention. Although Congress never specifically appropriated funds for the 
half-year long military operations, they were supported through the use of money 
appropriated to the Department of Defense for general purposes.
89
 On June 15, ten 
members of the House of Representatives sued the Obama Administration to cease 
American military involvement in Libya, based on a claim it was in violation of the 
War Powers Resolution.
90
 The suit was dismissed, four months later and eleven days 
before the termination of conflict, for lack of standing.
91
 American military 
participation in the fighting in Libya continued until the United Nations voted to end 
the operations, over six months after they had begun.
92
  
The fires of the contemporary debate on the constitution of the war powers, 
which flared up in response to the military action in Libya, are fueled by a widespread 
perception of an ascendancy of discretionary executive power over the initiation of 
force beginning at the end of World War II and unseen in prior eras. Even though 
warmaking has been arguably the American way since its inception,
93
 “[t]he vast 
majority of the uses of the American armed forces have occurred since 1900, and 
many of the more recent uses of force have occurred in the absence of any explicit 
congressional authorization.”
94
 Since the 1950s every president, with the exceptions 
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of Dwight Eisenhower and arguably Barack Obama, has advanced a claim of 
executive prerogative over the decision to use military force—arguing that the 
Constitution affords presidents the discretionary authority to order American military 
forces to engage in hostilities in order to advance national interests and defend the 
country from immanent threats.
95
 And the list of examples where presidents have 
made good on this rhetorical claim about their Constitutional authority in regards to 
war has grown as the claim has been repeated in varying ways through successive 
presidencies without clear and sustained countering by the other branches of 
government.
96
 A glimpse of this be seen in the aftermath of the political controversy 
attending the Libyan intervention regarding the process, or lack thereof, for the 
initiation of military force. While there were minor stirrings among politicians to 
change how the United States goes to war following the intervention,
97
 and despite 
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the earlier recommendations of a blue-ribbon commission to study the war powers,
98
 
political and popular interest in the issue of the war powers was quick to fade.
99
 
Scholarly evaluation of the history of this state of affairs is markedly 
divergent, often hinging on respective interpretations of the constitution. For those 
who interpret the Constitution as requiring explicit legislative authorization for the 
use of military force the contemporary list of illegal—presidentially initiated—
offensive wars inauspiciously begins with the Korean War, where “respect for 
constitutional government ended abruptly in 1950.”
100
 It continues with 
Congressionally unauthorized military actions in Cambodia in 1969,
101
 Panama in 
1989,
102




 and Bosnia in 1994,
105
 Iraq in 1997-98,
106
 
Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998,
107
 Yugoslavia in 1999,
108
 and in Libya in 2011.
109
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From this viewpoint, the contemporary history of warmaking by the United States is 
one of constitutional violations and a blatant disregard for the rule of law. The 
intervention in Libya is yet another example of a worrisome trend: the arbitrary use of 
military force by presidents, disciplined neither by standing laws or contemporaneous 
processes of democratic authorization.
110
  
For others who argue against the propriety—constitutional and prudential—of 
formal a priori constraints on the use of force this trend tends to be seen as an 
understandable, permissible, and even positive adaptation to the contemporary 
security environment. One commentator recently described this view: 
Beginning with President Truman’s actions during the Korean War, the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union to the United States during the Cold War 
demanded that decisions about troop deployments and the initiation of 
hostilities be made quickly, decisively, and flexibly. Such traits, embodied in 
the president’s constitutional role as commander in chief, are the strengths of 





Here the US Constitution is to be understood as a highly flexible instrument, 
permitting if not promoting the executive discretion over the use of force that the 
international context, it is said, currently demands. The contemporary history of 
American warmaking, with its widely varied inter-branch relations that include the 
Congressionally unauthorized uses of force that many scholars cite with alarm, is 
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instead proof of a constitutional design that is largely operating as designed, which 
the establishment of formal constraints would unduly hinder.
112
  
The contemporary history of the use of force by the United States, and the 
divergent and seemingly intractable common approaches to evaluating it, sets the 
primary backdrop for engaging the question of the constitution of the war powers. 
Despite the heated reactions of certain politicians, scholars, and popular 
commentators to the intervention in Libya, the contemporary modus operandi of the 
war powers—“executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial 
tolerance”
113
—was once again replayed. Unlike the mercurial attention given to 
warmaking by politicians and public alike, scholarly interest persists, pursuing the 
underlying questions of how to evaluate and address the working constitution of the 
war powers, tending the embers of the debate until the—inevitable—next use of force 
brings the issue back into the national consciousness, however briefly. But much like 
the popular debate surrounding the intervention in Libya, a scholarly consensus is 
hardly at hand and the disagreement often presents as institutional partisanship, an 
argument either for a greater Congressional or executive role in warmaking grounded 
in constitutional interpretation. This highlights a tension between the durability of the 
war powers debate—reliable institutional partisanship based in claims of 
constitutional fidelity, arguments with scholarly pedigrees that are echoed in political 
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and popular discussions on the occasion of the use of force—and a widely noted trend 
towards increased executive discretion over warmaking in practice. Thus while one 
can expect heated, constitutionally inflected debate when the United States uses 
military force without explicit Congressional authorization, the use of military force 
without clear legislative approval can now also be expected.  
What should be made of this contemporary working constitution of the war 
powers, one characterized by deep dissensus over constitutional meaning paired with 
the emerging de facto settlement in favor of executive discretion evidenced by recent 
practice? To work towards a comprehensive understanding of the war powers and 
illuminate prospective paths beyond the seeming impasse in interpretation and 
practice, the remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section charts 
out the constitutional ground overtly agreed to by nearly all members of the 
respective war powers camps—in terms of founding aspirations and design—an 
important overlap rarely acknowledged as such. This sets the stage to spotlight the 
primary points of divergence in the constitutional interpretations of the war powers, 
the usual debate, in a different hue. While the discussion centers around the 
particulars of Congressional authorization for the use of force—when it ought to be 
required and what such authorization should entail—moving the analysis a step back 
from what the institutional boundary of power regarding the use of force ought to be 
under the Constitution to how such an important constitutional question is to be 
determined reveals an often obscured theoretical fault line that has real consequences 
for operation of the war powers in practice. The vantage point of how the separation 
and balance of powers in regards to warmaking is to be constituted—ordered over 
 35 
time—brings important differences in the approaches to the constitution of the war 
powers into relief, whose distinctive promises and perils will be explored in 
subsequent chapters. Thus while the interminable war powers debate described here is 
an important part of the working constitution of the war powers at present, asking if, 
and how, such constitutional contestation ought to continue opens up space to better 
conceptualize the warmaking order and the prospects for its reconstitution.  
 
Constitutional Common Ground: Separated Powers; Collaborative Warmaking 
As they are today, national security concerns were a key concern at the 
American founding: an element of debate at the constitutional convention, a primary 
aspect of the written constitution, and an important touchstone in the lead-up to 
ratification. While there is some scholarly discussion over whether problems in 
foreign or domestic affairs under the Articles of Confederation were the primary 
driver of the movement to fix and ultimately replace them with a new framework of 
government, the powers dealing with national defense and relations with foreign 
entities were clearly on the minds of the framers and an integral part of the 
constitutional design.
114
 The Revolutionary War had exposed problems of the lack of 
centralized governmental power under the Continental Congress and subsequently the 
Articles of Confederation, particularly in relation to foreign affairs, which the drafters 
of the US Constitution sought to address. The pre-ratification writings of James 
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Madison highlight this concern, as he stressed the external focus of the new compact 
as a primary selling point: 
[T]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal 
Government, are few and defined…[and] will be exercised principally on 




While Madison’s purposes here are at least in part rhetorical, designed to convince 
those wary of a strong national government that its powers would be limited in scope 
domestically, the discussions at the constitutional convention,
116
 in other passages of 
the Federalist,
117
 as well as the text of the Constitution itself lend credence to his 
emphasis on national security.
118
 The founders had good reason to keep security 
concerns at the forefront of the constitutional design, as the infancy of the United 
States was a time of great national insecurity.
119
 It had just recently concluded a war 
with Great Britain and had to be ready to contend with other security threats that 
might arise, including dealings with other European powers with colonial interests 
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and ambitions in the Americas as well as with Native Americans on the frontier.
120
 
And as careful students of history, the founders knew that no matter the current 
international security context, security threats from abroad would be an enduring 
concern.
121
 Establishing a capacity to defend and act against external threats was a 
primary, in not the primary, purpose of government—without it any other political 
purposes to which the political order aimed would be moot.
122
 
However, the martial power that would likely be necessary to secure the 
nation against external threats carries with it its own kind of insecurity. Though the 
founders were keenly aware that protection against violence was a prerequisite to any 
other political aims, they also knew that the very means essential to achieving that 
security could be used in ways that conflicted with the other purposes to which the 
new political regime aimed, such as individual liberty and self-government, and 
potentially in ways that could ultimately undermine its security and very existence. A 
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primary concern was that if unconstrained, martial power could be used in arbitrary or 
factional ways: directed internally to unnecessarily deprive the people of their 
liberties or externally in the pursuit of private gain based upon shared sacrifice—each 
contrary to the public interest. The former is a concern over domestic tyranny, the use 
of the military to institute government by coercion or force rather than self-
government and the rule of law.
123
 The latter is a worry that unnecessary uses of 
force—military adventurism or imperialism—would unduly burden the citizenry, 
weaken the republic, and even precipitate its decline. The founders knew that the 
historical tendency of executive ambition in war—a quest for individual fame, glory, 
and gain—might similarly lead presidents, if not properly constrained, to initiate wars 
contrary to the public interest.
124
  
The overarching aspiration at the founding was that the nation’s martial power 
ought to be balanced, at once effective for the national defense while constrained 
from arbitrary or factional use.
125
 In historical terms, the American model for 
warmaking rejected the cumbersome distribution of power of the Articles of 
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 but was also a decisive turn away from monarchy and the English 
political theory and precedent that gave the executive great powers over war.
127
 
Though the drafters of the Constitution emphasized effective national security 
powers, granting unlimited authority to the federal government to raise, fund, and 
direct military forces,
128
 they rejected the Lockean theory that all federative—foreign 
policy—powers, including and especially those related to warmaking, should 
properly reside in the hands of the executive.
129
 The Constitution broke with 
established British practice, described by Blackstone, which placed the sole 
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prerogative in war with the monarch, a power that could not be contested by any 
individual or other legal authority.
130
 Though the powers of the national government 
necessary to warmaking would be unlimited in an absolute and formal sense, the 
ability for any one person or part of the national government to unilaterally take the 
country to war, and to continue military operations, was to be constrained by 
dispersing the powers necessary to effectuate war among the political branches of 
government. Congress was allocated the power to raise an army and navy, to fund and 
regulate any military force it created, to declare war, and to issue letters of marque 
and reprisal,
131
 while any president as Commander in Chief was, as Alexander 
Hamilton put it, to “have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of 
the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the 
Union.”
132
 And to ensure every Congress would need to affirmatively act to maintain 
the nation’s material capacities for war, in times of peace as well as during active 
conflict, appropriations for armies were limited to a maximum of two years,
133
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mirroring the biennial elections for the House of Representatives. Warmaking was to 
be a shared enterprise: the participation of both the legislative and executive 
branches—every Congress and each president—would be necessary to the use of 
military force. 
This characterization of the broad aspirations of the constitutional founding in 
regards to warmaking is relatively uncontroversial and should be emphasized for 
what it is—constitutional common ground. While various contemporary analyses may 
quibble with the characterization of how much the American constitutional 
experiment was a break with historical and theoretical antecedents,
134
 there was a 
clear effort to establish constraints on the use of military force by the executive and to 
induce Congressional interest in and influence over the prospect of war. This is 
evidenced by the fact that powers essential to warmaking were be separated so that 
the use of force would require the participation of multiple parties. Even the 
staunchest executive partisans acknowledge Congressional power of the purse and the 
power to commission and decommission military forces,
135
 and the most fervent 
Congressional partisans accept that it is the president who has tactical command of 
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the military in the field.
136
 In a certain respect, then, there is broad agreement that the 
constitutional founding aspired to a model of warmaking comprised by some version 
of inter-branch deliberation and collaboration.
137
 American use of military force 
would require the participation of both a representative and deliberative Congress—
who at a bare minimum must act to provide the means for war and biennially 
appropriate to maintain it—as well as an executive primed towards action, and 
towards military victory once war is begun.
138
  
It is over the further particulars of whether the Constitution additionally 
requires a more regimented and formalized process for the use of military force 
abroad, over the details of what kind of “legislative provision” is necessary to call a 
part of the “militia of the nation…into the actual service of the Union,” where the 
divergence in opinion begins in earnest. This is largely a debate over whether a 
president can make use of the military that exists as he sees fit, if there are any 
standing constitutional constraints on the use of the martial apparatus that Congress 
has created and funded, and whether Congress can set statutory limits on the use of 
the standing military. But though the specific resolutions of these points of persistent 
disagreement, sketched in the next section, are critically important for the operation 
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of American warmaking in practice, it is a view towards how this persistent debate is 
to be resolved taken up in the subsequent section that lays the groundwork for a fuller 
understanding of the present constitution of the war powers and the prospects for 
meaningfully altering it.  
 
War Authorization: Constitutional Ambiguity; Persistent Debate 
The crux of the predominant framing of the contemporary debate on the 
constitution of the war powers is authorization: whether any non-defensive use of 
military force must be formally authorized by Congress, the proper form 
authorization must take, the extent to which Congress can set specific bounds on the 
use of martial force, and the extent of executive discretion over the initiation of force 
in the absence of a specific authorization or in violation of a specific limit. The range 
of answers offered to these questions often begin with an analysis of the meaning of 
the Declare War Clause,
139
 but also draw upon broader analyses of the text and 
structure of the written constitution, its relation to historical antecedents, early 
American practice in war, as well as analyses of the decisions of the judiciary on 
related matters. The spectrum of interpretations of the Constitution on these issues in 
many ways is the contemporary war powers debate, as the particular way these 
questions about war authorization are resolved in practice largely answers the 
question of who takes the country to war. The conventional debate is an ongoing 
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effort to establish bright lines of authority on the use of military force, a view towards 
settling—clarifying and entrenching—the proper process for warmaking under the 
Constitution. The primary points of divergence in the scholarly debate on these issues 
are highlighted below before turning to a consideration of the underlying question of 
how—the constitutional form and process—these disagreements are to be settled, if at 
all. 
As a matter of basic textual reading, there is much to be said for the view of 
Congressional partisans that the Constitution is rightfully interpreted as granting the 
sole power to authorize warfare to the legislative branch. Taylor Reveley was hardly 
exaggerating when he stated “[i]f we could find a man in the state of nature and have 
him first scan the war-power provisions of the Constitution and then look at war-
power practice since 1789, he would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out of 
so little. On its face, the text of tilts decisively toward Congress.”
140
 Indeed, more 
than half of the specific powers allocated to Congress in the Constitution, “eleven 
of…eighteen” by one accounting,
141
 are explicitly related to security, while those 
powers allocated to the executive branch are seemingly dependent on the legislature: 
“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy…when called 
into the actual Service of the United States” and shall have the power to make 
treaties, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”
142
 But although the 
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Constitution formally allocated a great amount powers to Congress on matters of 
national security, any further specific role in sanctioning warfare reserved to 
Congress beyond creating and maintaining the means for war however is subject to 
broad disagreement.  
One finds only a select few champions of the idea that the Declare War Clause 
should be read to require that Congress issue a highly formal declaration of war prior 
to any use of force, in the manner of previous historical eras. Those that do, 
emphasize the political benefits of an elaborate and regimented authorization 
procedure in terms of democratic deliberation and accountability rather than argue 
that the Constitution and early practice actually established such declarations, as a 
matter of formal constitutional precedent, as the only process for using force.
143
 
Instead, most analyses follow along with Alexander Hamilton’s view that “[t]he 
ceremony of a formal declaration has of late fallen into disuse,”
144
 to hold that formal 
declarations are not necessary prior to the use of force,
145
 but break on what this 
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entails for the meaning of the Declare War Clause. For executive partisans, 
Congressional power to declare war under the Constitution is wholly a tool to express 
a change in certain legal relationships, either in regard to other nations under 
international law,
146
 or domestically as a trigger, and thus formal barrier, to legal 
changes that affect individual liberties during wartime. This latter reconstruction of 
the Declare War Clause would trade a Congressional claim to exclusive authority 
over the use of force abroad for a default presumption against the executive exercise 
of war powers directly related to individual liberties—confiscation of property, 




Congressional partisans, in contrast, emphasize a broader conception of 
declaring war. For example, David Grey Adler argues that “at the time of the 
Framing, the word ‘declare’ had become synonymous with…‘commence’; they both 
meant the initiation of hostilities.”
148
 Michael Ramsey, whose interpretation of the 
Constitution allows for greater executive authority over foreign affairs powers 
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legitimate form of war authorization under the Constitution. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 
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generally, agrees, highlighting that declaring war was understood in the founding era 
to be done through both formal statement as well as through the actual initiation of 
military action—either by word or by deed—both of which were reserved to the 
legislature.
149
 A good amount of evidence from the founding era can be mustered to 
support this view. James Wilson, who during the constitutional convention argued for 
a break with prior practices on matters of war, because some of the prerogatives of 
the “British Monarch…were of a Legislative nature….[a]mong others that of war & 
peace,”
150
 later argued to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that,  
“[t]his system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It 
will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve 
us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the 




Wilson held, and was attempting to convince others who would vote to ratify the 
Constitution, that the power to declare war would entail a collaborative inter-branch 
process going to war—no person or unitary council could take the nation to war at its 
own discretion, Congress as a whole had to be involved. In 1793 George Washington 
put forth his view on the constitution of the war powers, that “[t]he constitution vests 
the power of declaring war in Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of 
importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject 
and authorized such a measure.” A few years later, Thomas Jefferson would state in a 
private letter to James Madison that his view was that the American constitutional 
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order required some significant form of Congressional assent prior to the use of force, 
which would be an effectual means to constrain executive warmaking: “we have 
already given...one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of 
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to 
spend to those who are to pay.”
152
 Later, Madison would write back to Jefferson that, 
“[t]he constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that 
the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It 
has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature.”
153
  
 Given these expectations of the founding era that Congress would play an 
active role in any use of force but that every use of force would not necessarily be 
authorized by highly formal declarations of war, what, then, is proper form of 
Congressional participation in warmaking? In the terminology of the founders, 
precisely how is the question of war “vested in the Legislature,” and by what 
“legislative provision” is the “militia of the United States” to be “called into the 
actual service of the Union?” Or, put slightly differently, how should Congress 
“deliberate[] upon and authorize[]” the use of military force, and what distinguishes 
an “offensive expedition of importance” requiring such authorization from the 
defensive or minor military operation that does not? The scholarly disagreement on 
these questions is broad and nuanced, ranging from the issue of what “war” means “in 
the constitutional sense,” thus necessitating authorization prior to initiation, to the 
particulars of the constitutionally permissible forms of such authorization. The former 
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delves into the boundaries of the executive’s plenary defensive power and the scope 
of executive discretion to order military action short of war. The latter involves issues 
such as delegation, contingent and restrictive authorization, appropriations as 
authorization, as well as states of emergency, post-hoc authorization, and executive 
prerogative. A brief survey of these foci of the conventional war powers debate 
highlights not only its complexity, but also its underlying legal tone, which raises the 
higher-order question of how these critical specifics regarding the institutional 
boundaries of power over warmaking are to be resolved. 
The matter of what “war” is “in the constitutional sense” is at heart a question 
of what kinds of military action are within the constitutional purview of independent 
executive authority, either because they are non-offensive or because they are minor 
enough not to amount to war. Just as there are competing interpretations of 
“Declare”—which arguably should be interpreted to grant Congress the authority to 
initiate war through either word or action—so too are there different constitutional 
meanings ascribed to “war” that influence what kinds of military operations are to 
require such prior Congressional authorization. One side of this particular piece of the 
conventional war powers debate focuses on the use of martial force for defensive 
purposes. While most scholars of the war powers agree that presidents have the 
constitutional authority to use the military to defend the nation and its citizens against 
attack, the precise boundaries of such authority are not without controversy—turning 
on the distinctions between defensive war, preemptive war, and preventative war. 
Defensive war at its most basic is military action in response to an ongoing attack, 
while preemptive and preventative war involve military action in advance of an 
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imminent or emergent threat, respectively.
154
 Madison’s commonly cited rationale for 
the textual change from “Make War” to “Declare War” in the Constitution was to 
permit presidents to “repel sudden attack.”
155
 Seemingly straightforward on its face, 
there is great complexity among the proffered views on the proper boundaries of this 
authority. Just how far can an executive-led response to an attack go before Congress 
must authorize—when does repelling turn into attacking? And what, if any, authority 
do presidents have to stop a pending or likely attack on the United States without 
prior Congressional sanction—how exigent must the circumstances be to legitimize 
discretionary executive action?
156
 The other side of this issue touches on whether the 
constitutional concept of “war” includes all forms of military aggression by the 
United States, or whether less substantial uses of force—“police actions,” 
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“humanitarian interventions,” or “hostilities”—are something short of war and thus 
must not necessarily be subject to prior Congressional authorization.
157
 
 The particulars of the conventional debate on the constitutionally permissible 
forms of authorization are no less complicated. One point of contention deals with 
whether Congress can, and in certain respects already has, delegated its authority to 
authorize military force through the treaty process,
158
 for example through its 
participation in NATO or the United Nations Security Council.
159
 Delegation also 
involves the issue of whether Congress can authorize, but not require, the use of 
military force against a specific target, leaving the decision of whether to actually 
initiate hostilities at the discretion of the president.
160
 Contingent authorizations entail 
executive discretion regarding short-term military interventions subject to sunsets or 
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other future procedural hurdles,
161
 a situation arguably created by the War Powers 
Resolution.
162
 Restrictive authorizations allow for the use of force against a particular 
enemy or in a particular theater of war. While this is what one might think of when 
discussing war authorizations, the notion of restriction here revolves around whether 
legislative authorizations are required at all
163
 and also over the extent and nature of 
the limitations Congress can set on the use of force through statute. At what point do 
statutory constraints unconstitutionally impinge on executive power as Commander in 
Chief—can Congressional limits on the use of the military be too specific?
164
 This is 
related to discussions over prerogative, the constitutional permissibility for presidents 
to transgress any formal boundaries on the use of force insofar as such discretionary 
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action is conducted transparently, only when necessary, and made subject to political 
judgment as soon as possible after the fact.
165
 The debate on the forms that constitute 
authorization continues with a discussion of whether appropriations for the military 
ought to be considered authorization and, if so, whether it supersedes any prior 
statutory restraint on the use of force.
166
 Lastly, the debate engages the question of 
whether as Commander in Chief a president has the inherent authority to use the 
military that Congress has created as he sees fit, subject only to the political checks of 
the need for the military to be commissioned and appropriated for by Congress.
167
  
In sum, we can best understand the conventional war powers debate as a 
disagreement on the particular resolutions to these issues, a spectrum of partisanship 
ranging from strong Congressional authority to strong executive authority over the 
initiation of military force. The most strident Congressional partisans argue for a 
requirement of explicit legislative authorizations prior to any non-defensive use of 
force abroad,
168
 and for some, the more formal, ritualized, and specific the 
authorization, the better.
169
 Under this view, the sole exceptions are those uses of 
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force absolutely necessary to defend against an attack before Congress can be 
consulted and asked to offer its authorization at the earliest instance after the 
initiation of hostilities.
170
 While Congressional partisans are generally wary of 
delegations or indefinite authorizations of force, those against specific targets or 
within particular theaters of war are generally held to be constitutionally 
acceptable,
171
 as there are no formal constraints on what the national government—
Congress and president together—can do in terms of fighting abroad.
172
 Less agreed 
upon are standing delegations, whereby Congress authorizes certain kinds of 
executive uses of force as a general proposition, essentially transferring the power to 
authorize such uses of force to the executive branch.
173
 Though the answer to these 
questions on the specific kinds of authorization that are constitutionally permissible is 
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important for the exercise of military force in practice, the question of plenary 
executive war power is critical, for if there is an inherent authority in the executive to 
initiate offensive military force the other particulars of the conventional debate are 
largely rendered moot.
174
 Such plenary authority would undercut any argument for a 
constitutional requirement of formal authorization beyond appropriations, and may 
also entail that formal a priori constraints on the initiation and use of force—limits 
set by statute—would be unconstitutional.
175
 This view also diminishes the relevance 
of prerogative to the war powers debate, as there would be little in the way of formal 
constraints on the use of force abroad that a president might violate.
176
 
This overview of the predominant framing of the war powers debate around 
authorization and its focus on establishing bright lines of institutional authority—
clarifying precisely when Congressional authorization is required and what forms are 
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permissible under the constitution—not only highlights the vast complexity of that 
task but calls into question how, if at all, this recurrent and seemingly intractable 
controversy attending the specific boundaries of power for use of military force is to 
be resolved. The particular resolution of these points of contention over the 
constitution of the war powers—which boundary-line within the spectrum above is 
put into political practice—is critically important as it would largely determine the 
process of American warmaking, or at least set its key contours. But once the debate 
moves from a strict requirement for a formal declaration of war prior to any offensive 
use of force, setting the boundaries of institutional power becomes exponentially 
more nuanced as it must navigate the many intricate choices described above.
177
 The 
difficulty in establishing these lines of institutional power is compounded by the very 
fact that the variation in views of constitutional propriety on this matter is within the 
bounds of reasonable disagreement: none can be simply dismissed out of hand and 
political actors can conceivably be expected to continue to advance and adhere to 
different interpretations within the spectrum described above.
178
 One only needs to 
look as far back to the response to the intervention in Libya in 2011 to see this 
phenomenon on full display. This points to a tension within the conventional war 
powers debate, as much of its underlying foundation rests on idea that there is, or 
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ought to be, a constitutionally based resolution to these foci of debate: the arguments 
surveyed above are made for the purpose of their becoming the settled understanding 
and practice for the use of military force.  
Often unstated, or at least not fully articulated and analyzed, however, is how 
any such boundary setting—the ordering of American warmaking—is to occur and 
endure. There are different ways of resolving such a political question politically,
179
 
and underlying the common debate over the distribution of institutional powers 
related to war are competing understandings about how the warmaking process is to 
be politically constituted. The distinction between legal and political 
constitutionalism, sketched below and detailed in subsequent chapters, has important 
implications for the ongoing debate over the proper boundaries of power described 
above, efforts to instantiate them, and for the decision to initiate of military force. 
This divergence in approach to constitutionalism is not only critical to the 
practicability of the varying schemas for the warmaking order but also to its political 
evaluation and prospective reconstruction. The form of constitutionalism is thus 
fundamental to the constitution of a durably deliberative constitutional system for 
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Bounding War Powers: Two Forms of Constitutionalism  
The aim of the conventional war powers debate towards demarcating the 
process by which United States comes to use military force often carries with it an 
important but often underemphasized premise: for an issue of such gravity as the 
exercise of martial power, the boundaries of institutional power that set the process 
for warmaking should be well established as a matter of constitutionalism. This 
entails that the particularities of the discussion above—when Congressional 
authorization is required, what forms of authorization satisfy that requirement, and 
what limits can be on warmaking through formal means—are to be properly 
understood as aspects of a constitutional debate, that there is a constitutional basis by 
which the disputes can be resolved, and that the conventional war powers debate 
ought to be settled accordingly. Undergirding much of the contemporary discussion 
on the war powers then is the view that ambiguity over the proper process for 
warmaking should be mitigated to the extent possible, the relevant boundaries of 
institutional power fixed as a matter of constitutional propriety. However, the process 
by which the precise boundaries of authority related to war are to be set is a 
constitutional question in its own right. This question of the form of 
constitutionalism, how the boundaries of the ‘constitutional’ are to be constituted—
established and maintained over time—is a key distinction underlying the 
conventional debate on the constitution of the war powers that is often obscured by 
the emphasis on the particular foci described above. Refocusing the analysis on the 
constitutional processes for resolving the intricate questions that cumulatively 
constitute the warmaking process, moving the debate from the what—what the 
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distribution of institutional authority in war ought to be—to the how—how any such 
theory of the balance of power in war is to be translated into practice, sheds a critical 
new light on the very role the competing constructions of institutional authority have 
in constituting the warmaking process in practice.
181
 Even more importantly, the 
approach to constitutionalism that necessarily underlies the variegated constructions 
of the war powers is critical to the very prospects for durably achieving any particular 
balance of powers for war to which they aspire.  
That this question of ‘how,’ what constitutional process should determine the 
proper ambits of institutional authority over the use of military force, is fundamental 
to the conventional debate can be seen by extending the examination of some of the 
particular foci around which it revolves a bit further. Consider, for example, the 
questions of the constitutional strictures regarding the distinction between a defensive 
response to an ongoing attack and an offensive continuation of hostilities, or the 
parameters of institutional authority over defensive, preemptive, and preventative 
uses of force. Parsing these issues to determine when Congressional authorization 
ought to be required involves multifarious considerations, including the interpretation 
of the written constitution as well as nuances of jus ad bellum and international law, 
whose relevant differences and implications have been vigorously debated by 
philosophers, legal scholars, and politicians espousing a variety of reasoned and 
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 The complexity of such issues and the difficulty of achieving 
a durable consensus on them highlight the importance of the process by which such 
boundaries are to be set. The question that opened the introductory chapter—“how 
should the United States decide for war?”—must be transformed into in a broader 
constitutional question: How should the competing, finely distinguished, conceptions 
of the proper process for warmaking under the Constitution be addressed and resolved 
in the American political order? At its core, this is a question of the form of 
constitutionalism; it is an inquiry into whether constitutional issues such as the 
institutional boundaries of authority over warmaking should be resolved through legal 
processes, ultimately clarified, entrenched, and enforced by the judiciary, or through 
other political processes. Underlying the various positions taken in the conventional 
war powers debate then are differing conceptions of, and approaches to, American 
constitutionalism, a choice between—or at least a tendency towards—legal 
constitutionalism or political constitutionalism.
183
 This distinction is key to 
understanding the relationship between the competing constructions, the 
contemporary working constitution, and the prospects for its reconstitution. 
The foundational place of this divergence is further evident in the ongoing 
dispute over delegation, which is concerned with the extent of discretionary authority 
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over the use of force that can be granted to presidents by Congress—either through 
treaty or statute. Like many constitutional issues, there are two types of interpretive 
considerations: What are the constitutional boundaries for authorizing the use of 
military force abroad through treaties and statutes? And what does a specific treaty or 
statute mean for political practice—what in particular has been authorized? Of 
relevance here are whether standing authorization for military action can properly be 
given to presidents through treaties or statutes under the Constitution and whether 
under existing treaties or statutes presidents have actually been granted standing 
authorization to initiate military force—for example when in accordance with the 
United States’ obligations under NATO, following approval by the United Nations 
Security Council, or under the terms of War Powers Resolution. Congressional and 
executive partisans alike worry about what can be done through treaties in regards to 
war authority, but in different ways. The most orthodox of the former argue that 
Congress cannot delegate away its constitutionally mandated role to authorize force, 
either to the executive or to international actors, as formal Congressional 
authorization is required before all non-defensive uses of force. Louis Fisher, for 
example, argues that Congress cannot “surrender to an international organization its 
prerogatives over war and foreign policy.”
184
 The most strident partisans of executive 
war powers argue against the constitutionality of constraining presidents through the 
treaty process, which would be an attempt to discipline discretion with foreign 
procedural conditions. John Yoo argues not only that “[b]ecause the president already 
has the domestic constitutional authority to initiate military hostilities without any 
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authorizing legislation, he need not rely on treaty obligations for legal justifications 
[to initiate force]” but also that “presidents are not constitutionally or legally bound 
by international law.”
185
 A similar breakdown occurs in regards to statutory 
authorization, detailed above, where there is a multiplicity of views on whether any 
formal authorization is needed prior to the initiation of force, how broadly Congress 
can delegate authority to use force to presidents, and what limits—if any—Congress 
can set through statute on the use of force abroad.
186
  
Though resolutions to these points of disagreement are critical to the practice 
of American warmaking, the persistent ambiguity and disagreement that characterizes 
the contemporary working constitution makes any clear and durable settlement appear 
dubious without a fuller view towards of the processes by which such a resolution is 
to be achieved. Excavating the framework of constitutionalism that necessarily 
underlies these competing constructions of the constitution of the war powers 
transforms the interpretive considerations discussed above to into constitutive 
questions: How—by what political process—are the boundaries for the use of 
military force to be established and enforced? Here in particular, how—by what 
political process—is the determination of what ambits of institutional authority can be 
properly set through treaties and statutes to be established and enforced? And how—
by what political process—is what a specific treaty or statute actually authorizes to be 
established and enforced? This formulation brings the roles of all three branches of 
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government in determining the boundaries of constitutional, and legal, propriety in 
regard to warmaking into the purview of the war powers debate, a broadened 
perspective that offers a different view of the conventional debate and its role in 
constituting the balance of institutional power for war. 
Shifting the analysis from which constitutional construction is correct—based 
on constitutional exegesis, philosophical analysis, or pragmatic considerations—to 
the question of how such constitutional questions are to be decided politically 
spotlights the competing constructions discussed above in a new hue. The question of 
how is in part one of who—which political actors—needs to be convinced of the 
propriety of a given construction, and act accordingly, to bring it into being. The 
various constructions must be understood then as not only offering a theory of what 
those boundaries ought to be but also a theory, at least an implicit one, of the roles the 
branches of government ought to play in constructing the process for warmaking in 
practice—delineating ambits of institutional purview, monitoring practice, and 
sanctioning transgressions. Accordingly, the more self-conscious constructions of the 
war powers are pitched to convince the constitutional actors that they hold integral to 
resolving the dispute over the boundaries of power to instantiate that those ambits of 
institutional authority deemed proper by the construction. That a good deal of the 
scholarship that engages the war powers debate is legalistic in character—focusing on 
constitutional interpretation and case law—and that many proposals to set how the 
United States initiates warfare center on statutory delineations of the desired ambits 
of institutional authority reflects a view towards the priority of law, and the judiciary, 
for resolving constitutional disputes, bounding institutional authority and ordering 
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politics through formal constitutional entrenchment. The common forms of 
contemporary constitutional constructions of the war powers are thus both a sign and 
element of a widely held, but often unacknowledged, conception of the proper 
overriding form of constitutionalism.  
A fuller, more political, conception of constitutionalism incorporates the idea 
that the construction of constitutional boundaries of institutional authority need not 
solely occur through formal means such as case law, statutory frameworks, and 
constitutional amendment. In the context of the war powers debate, such a view 
towards political constitutionalism can begin to be seen by taking seriously the 
argument—most often made by partisans of broad executive discretion over 
warmaking—that the bounds of institutional purview are rightfully established and 
maintained through the exercise of more basic, clearly enumerated, ‘hard’ powers. 
For example Congress’s hard powers include commissioning the various elements of 
the military-security apparatus, appropriating for them, as well as its powers of 
contempt and impeachment while the hard powers in the executive include the veto 
and pardon.
187
 The exercise of such powers roughly and contingently constructs the 
ambits of executive discretion, establishing a material and political basis upon which 
the use of military force depends.
188
 Both the creation of that material basis for war 
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and its exercise are held to ultimately rest popular judgment expressed through 
elections, which has politically disciplining effects on institutions as they act in the 
light of past, and anticipation of future, electoral judgment. While executive partisans 
make this case in part to delegitimize legal constitutionalism on matters of national 
security and formally entrench a protected sphere for executive discretion—
intimating that the judiciary should not enforce statutory limitations on the use of 
force, if not rule such efforts unconstitutional—their emphasis on the political 
enablement and constraint of discretionary executive power points to the importance 
of the informal—un-lawlike—aspects that order how the United States goes to war. 
From this vantage point, legal constitutionalism can be seen as but one particular 
approach to political constitution, its embrace of the formal ordering of politics a 
version of constitutionalism with unique advantages and limitations that can be 
compared and connected to more distinctly political orderings. 
The distinction between legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism 
as underlying approaches to the war powers can be starkly drawn out on one final 
point of debate that pops up in the scholarly literature: whether an unwilling president 
is compelled to use military force following an explicit Congressional authorization 
or Declaration of War, that is, whether Congress has the constitutional authority to 
mandate the actual use of force. The first point to emphasize with this issue is that it 
complicates the distinction between delegation and authorization, for if presidents can 
decline to execute uses of military force authorized by even the most formal and 
solemn Congressional means, then any Congressional authorization of military force 
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is merely a specific delegation—giving a president legal sanction to use force against 
an authorized target at his sole discretion. While a situation where Congress 
affirmatively requires a use of force that a president firmly opposes might seem 
unlikely at present, such institutional positions are not unreasonable to imagine as 
presidents are not inherently interested in warmaking in all times and places and 
legislators may have reasons to push for certain uses of force despite their domestic 
costs.
189
 The corresponding conflict that would be involved in such a scenario clearly 
implicates the constitutional boundaries of authority of the political braches related to 
the use of force—the relationship between legislative powers to Declare War and 
regulate and fund the military, and those of the Commander in Chief. The tension 
between these elements at its core is a question of the how of constitutionalism—
whether such a constitutional question is to be ultimately resolved by a Supreme 
Court who has a preeminent claim over interpreting the written constitution and 
statutes and applying them to particular cases, or instead by the exertion of political 
pressure, Congressional or popular, on a pacifistic president in the face of bellicose 
legislature. Conversely, and perhaps more apropos to contemporary circumstances, 
given the Constitutional requirement for at least biennial military appropriations—
now conducted annually as a matter of course—there is a built-in contingency where 
Congressional action is needed to create the possibility for new uses of force or 
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continue ongoing military operations. In sum, any legislative enablement of martial 
power—formal, structural, material, and even rhetorical—helps to construct a 
framework for executive discretion in war, but this also entails that such discretionary 
power is always contingent and has the potential to be constrained. The extent of the 
contingency, and thus the prospects for constraining executive discretion, is tied to 
the levels of formal and political entrenchment—that is, the likelihood of effectual 
legal, material, or political checks on pending or ongoing uses of force. 
The choice between forms of constitutionalism—here how the boundaries of 
institutional authority in war are to be established and maintained—is a political 
question, which can be resolved politically in different ways.
190
 Though there may be 
a constitutional basis to argue for a particular resolution,
191
 the process by which such 
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political questions are to be answered is itself a political question.
192
 The remainder of 
this work engages these constitutive questions by evaluating legal constitutionalism 
and political constitutionalism for their prospects to order the use of military force in 
the manner aspired to at the founding: a deliberative constitutional system for war. 
While legal constitutionalism might be seen as the most direct and reasoned manner 
for constitutional construction—elucidating the meaning of the constitutional 
document and clarifying its lacunae through legal mechanisms; here fixing the 
boundaries of institutional authority over warmaking—constitutional construction is 
not coextensive with self-reflexive political action. Those political acts—legal, 
structural, material, and rhetorical—that help to construct the contours of the 
warmaking process are not always self-conscious attempts at constitutional 
construction.
193
 Construction can be a byproduct of the pursuit of other political ends, 
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 In contrast, constitutional degeneration can be understood as constitutional 
change unconnected to a coherent, if not articulated, constitutional vision that 
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such as the advancement of particular policy goals as well as partisan, or even 
individual, aggrandizement that may or may not be directly related to the 
constitutional issue at hand. This complicates the common view towards legal 
construction—the translation of constitutional theory into practice through legal 
means—as those who are held integral to that process may be moved by 
considerations other than instantiating a constitutional construction as such. Thus 
even a strong version of legal constitutionalism—with its concomitant heavy 
emphasis on legal construction—rests on complex political foundations that at 
minimum involve the motivations and capacities of the three branches of government 
to reliably engage in the kinds of construction it seeks. Though widely understood as 
a process for ordering politics, legal constitutionalism is at its core one kind of 
constitutional politics whose own ordering must be politically constituted. 
                                                
undermines fundamental aspects of the constitutional order. There is perhaps also a 
middle category of constitutional change, constitutional drift, where developments in 
political practice were largely un-self-conscious but relatively benign—that is, the 
change was not intended to be a rebalancing of political principles, but those 
consequences are not obviously contrary to the basic constitutional aspirations of the 
political order. From the perspective of constitutional conservatism, however, any 
significant drift might be considered degeneration, and certain kinds of constitutional 
construction might derogatorily be characterized as this kind of degeneratory 
“constitutional drift.” For example, efforts in line with the idea of a “living 
constitution” are termed constitutional drift in this negative sense in, Thomas, The 
Madisonian Constitution, 78–84.  
 Constitutional maintenance is thus dependent on context: it can be active 
construction—restructuring the patterns of political practice to continue to, if not to 
better, work towards fundamental political principles of the constitutional order in 
light of inevitable developments in the basic political conditions of the polity; or 
maintenance can be the active prevention of constitutional change—seeking to stem 
constitutional degeneration from either untoward drift or imprudent (factional) 
construction.     
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Combining this with the idea that the ordering of American warmaking also 
occurs through less formal means, such as commissioning and funding of various 
aspects of the security apparatus, puts a fine point on the complex political 
foundations of the constitution of the war powers. The constitutional process by 
which the boundaries of institutional authority are constructed—both formally and 
informally—is itself a result of constitutional construction, which itself may not have 
wholly occurred through self-conscious political action. This broader picture of 
constitutionalism clarifies the idea that the contemporary working constitution of the 
war powers—the pattern of politics for the decision to use military force—has been 
politically constructed over time in complex ways, through legal as well as political 
means and in both direct and indirect ways. Such a perspective calls for a 
consideration of the role of law and courts in the contemporary working constitution 
and the prospects for the legal ordering of political practice for warmaking in the 
future. This is a view towards the interrelationship between legal constitutionalism 
and political constitutionalism: how the emphasis on, and effectiveness of, legal 
constitutional construction depends upon and affects aspects of the broader political 
constitution. It is in part a view towards the potential and limits of legal 
constitutionalism: focusing our attention on what the relationship between legal 
constitutional construction, bounding executive power,
194
 and a deliberative and 
effective warmaking process is and might possibly be. It is also a view towards the 
informal ordering of how the United States comes to use military force, to the 
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constitutive foundations of the patterns of warmaking politics that are only diffusely 
constructed by law, and which may also be essential to any reliably deliberative 
warmaking order. Given its predominance in the contemporary debate, the promise 
and perils of legal constitutionalism for ordering the use of military force is taken up 
in the next chapter. This is followed by an exploration of how a more distinctly 
political conception of constitutionalism, centered on how separated institutions 
sharing power can by a system means for weighing and advancing cross-cutting 
political purposes. As we will see, the distinction between legal constitutionalism and 
political constitutionalism is fundamental to the evaluation of the contemporary 
American warmaking order and the prospective reconstruction of a more durably 
deliberative constitutional system for war.  
 
Conclusion 
The controversy surrounding the use of military force by the United States in 
Libya in 2011 depicted at the beginning of this chapter encapsulates the emphasis of 
the conventional war powers debate on bright legal lines of institutional authority in 
war. Though there is a broad area of constitutional common ground that highlights the 
necessity of some inter-branch participation in warmaking, the contemporary war 
powers debate remains heated, its persistent disputes framed around authorization: 
When is Congressional authorization required for the use of military force abroad? 
What forms of Congressional action satisfy any such Constitutional requirement for 
authorization? And what uses of force have actually been so authorized? Though such 
questions seem straightforward at first blush, they involve nuanced considerations 
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that transform the common binary institutional split between Congressional and 
executive partisans into a broad spectrum of interpretations on the proper ambits of 
authority over initiation martial force. This gives the seemingly interminable war 
powers debate, whose persistence is lamented by many, some important context: such 
a multifaceted area of contention does not permit easy resolution, for once and 
especially for all. The complexity of the predominating focus of the war powers 
debate—what the appropriate ambits of institutional power in war under the 
Constitution—brings into view the broader constitutional question of how such 
boundaries are to be determined: through what political process should the way in 
which the United States goes to war be set and enforced? Reframing the war powers 
debate in this way exposes an important, but often obscured, approach to 
constitutionalism underlying the common war powers debate.  
An inquiry into how the variegated and particular boundaries of institutional 
authority are to be determined, implemented, and maintained over time implicates the 
distinction between legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism. Seen 
through the lens of the former, the question of the proper boundaries of institutional 
power over warmaking is a foundational constitutional question calling for formal 
settlement, a political process ending with a sole, final arbiter—the Supreme Court. 
Under such a view, constitutional construction is best, if not entirely, conducted as 
legal construction. Ultimately it is up to the judiciary to determine what, if any, 
bright-line constraints the Constitution establishes, or permits Congress to set, on 
executive discretion to use force and it is the Court that should be the site of enforcing 
those formal delineations of authority when disputes arise. Looking through the lens 
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of political constitutionalism broadens the issue to include how the ambits of 
institutional authority in war are bounded through less formal political mechanisms, 
as well as how both the formal and informal political processes that construct the war 
powers are themselves politically constituted. This permits an inquiry into the 
interrelationship between the legal constitution of the war powers and its political 
constitution. The promise and perils of legal constitutionalism as the predominant 
approach the war powers debate—constitutional construction primarily understood, 
and engaged in, as legal construction—is explored in the next chapter. The broader 
political constitution of the war powers—how the exercise of war powers is ordered 
politically—and how this political ordering might be altered to improve the 















The Promise and Perils of Legal Constitutionalism in War 
The narrowing, formalizing, and hardening of the terms of debate…efforts to 
legalize, formalize, and proceduralize; efforts to strip out the ambiguity of 




The increasing reliance on the Court to settle a wide variety of questions of 





American warmaking is characterized by persistent ambiguity and discord 
over the boundaries of institutional authority regarding the use of military force, in 
particular over when Congressional authorization is necessary and which actions 
properly authorize warfare. Whether favoring greater executive or Congressional 
authority, the conventional lines of the contemporary war powers debate—made by 
scholars and political actors alike—are exercises in constitutional construction that 
seek to instantiate a particular interpretation of the Constitution as the process by 
which the United States decides to fight. Implicit in many of the contemporary claims 
to constitutional fidelity is a fundamental but often unstated common premise: that 
among the most basic purposes of constitutionalism is to resolve fundamental 
questions of authority such as who properly takes the country to war. Though 
executive and Congressional partisans emphasize different harms associated with the 
persistent dissensus and contestation attending the complexities of the institutional 
boundaries for warmaking, a common touchstone is that the endurance of multiple 
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claims of constitutional fidelity—and the politics that accompanies the seemingly 
interminable war powers debate—is problematic and ought to be settled. This broadly 
shared view towards a comprehensive resolution of the ongoing controversy over the 
constitutional boundaries of the war powers has a corollary premise that is critical to 
understanding the contemporary working constitution: that the resolution should be 
formally entrenched, achieved through legal processes that limit ambiguity, and 
contestation, over the ambits of institutional authority to the extent possible.  
The predominating view towards ordering how the United States decides to 
use military force—setting precise ambits of Congressional and executive purview in 
war—directly, and primarily, through legal entrenchment implicates a conception of 
the proper roles of the branches of government in establishing and maintaining the 
warmaking process that the respective institutional partisans seek. Such legal 
constitutionalism hinges on a decisive role for the judiciary, the Supreme Court held 
as ultimate expositor of constitutional meaning and steward of the constitutional 
design. Much of the conventional debate aims, at least in significant part, to persuade 
the Court to formally entrench a preferred interpretation of the Constitution, fixing 
the institutional ambits of authority in war as such issues are brought before the 
judiciary through relevant cases and controversies. Where Congressional partisans 
seek to bolster such a process through statutory framework legislation intended to 
clarify and ensconce an inter-branch warmaking process, executive partisans instead 
seek to put claims that any Congressional authorization is required prior to the 
initiation of force to rest, with the most fervent hoping to entrench that any such 
statutes are judicially unenforceable if not altogether unconstitutional. The 
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contemporary discord over the war powers is thus largely conducted against a 
backdrop understanding of American constitutionalism as legal constitutionalism, it 
revolves around competing attempts at legal constitutional construction, the pursuit of 
formally entrenched settlement of a fundamental question of political authority. 
This chapter explores the promise and perils of legal constitutionalism for 
ordering the use of military force—the predominating pursuit of a formally 
entrenched settlement of the interminable war powers debate shared by many 
Congressional and executive partisans. It argues that efforts to order the political 
process for warmaking primarily through legal entrenchment are unlikely to achieve 
the results that either side seeks while propagating many of the ills that they aim to 
ameliorate. While both Congressional and executive partisans point to some real 
harms of the uncertainty and contestation characteristic of the contemporary working 
constitution, case law and statutory frameworks have failed to fix clear institutional 
boundaries of authority to initiate military force and a continued legal approach, 
focusing on well-drafted statutes and assertive judicial enforcement, is unlikely to lay 
the perpetual contestation over war authority wholly to rest. Perhaps more 
importantly, a heavy emphasis on legal ordering helps to construct a pattern of 
politics typified by legalistic discord, if not confusion, at moments of decision for 
war. The push towards formally fixing the parameters of institutional authority in war 
under the constitution, and thus ultimately towards judicial constitutional 
stewardship, can engender the broad executive discretion, under a thin aegis of 
legality, that many seek to discipline through law. This process can also impair the 
development and assertion of the unique perspectives of all three branches of 
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government on the national security context at hand as well as on the proper scope of 
their authority to face future security challenges. In short, the very real differences 
among those favoring greater Congressional or executive authority over the use of 
military force abroad obscure a broadly shared understanding of and approach to the 
American constitutional order, legal constitutionalism, whose prioritization of formal 
entrenchment can undermine the political foundations of a deliberative system for 
war. 
 
The Promise of Constitutional Settlement 
The contemporary war powers debate is rooted in the primacy of the written 
constitution in ordering the how the United States goes to war. As one scholar 
supportive of broad executive power in war puts it, “[a]s a matter of American 
political theory, the basic framework for the making of foreign policy is, or ought to 
be, the Constitution of the United States.”
197
 Congressional partisans heartily agree, 
arguing that: “constitutional arrangements and democratic values should govern the 
conduct of foreign policy.”
198
 Such views are the underpinnings of what has become a 
standard understanding of constitutionalism, that a key purpose of a written 
constitution is to clearly and decisively resolve fundamental questions of political 
authority. This conception is summarized nicely by Michael Foley:  
In portraying constitutions, there is normally a pronounced emphasis upon 
declaratory acts of creation, upon stipulated frameworks of institutional 
organization, and upon enumerated allotments of power—all centering on an 
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underlying premise of a constitutional settlement in which major sources of 
conflict over the nature of political authority and obligation have been 





This basic aspiration for the foundations of a constitutional order stands in stark 
contradistinction to the contemporary working constitution of the war powers, as 
described in the previous chapter. Though constitutional common ground does exist, 
the institutional roles in warmaking are only loosely defined at present, leaving key 
questions regarding the contours of the warmaking process—when legislative 
authorization is required prior to the use of force, what types of legislative provisions 
properly authorize force, and what restrictions can be set on warmaking through 
law—subject to a broad spectrum of opinion. The precise contours of the warmaking 
process under the constitution are relatively ambiguous and it is uncertainty, if not 
unpredictability, that define the contemporary constitution of the war powers. The 
pervasive confusion and dissensus that attends many uses of military force is widely 
held to be a failing of American constitutionalism. While arguing for different 
institutional allocations of power in war and sometimes emphasizing their differing 
benefits, advocates for both congressional and executive purview over warmaking 
share an aspiration towards a clear and lasting resolution to the seemingly 
interminable war powers debate. 
Though the recent turmoil over war authority belies an enduring settlement of 
the constitutional allocation of power, competing narratives of settled prior practice 
are a common refrain in the contemporary debate. For many concerned with the 
expansion of unilateral executive power in war, modern presidential warmaking is not 
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only a violation of the proper interpretation of the Constitution’s textual provisions 
but is importantly a break with a constitutional consensus that had been in place for 
most of the United States’ history. Louis Fisher, for example argues that: 
For 160 years, there was no ambiguity. Until President Harry S. Truman went 
to war on his own in 1950 against North Korea, no one recognized a conflict 
or tension between the war-declaring power of Congress and the commander-
in-chief responsibilities of the president. No one argued that the president 
could initiate war. The president was only commander in chief after Congress 




Prominent executive partisans counter that a strict requirement for Congressional 
authorization was never an established expectation for all uses of force. John Yoo, for 
example, highlights the many instances of legislatively unauthorized military 
initiatives throughout American history: 
Without any congressional approval, presidents have sent forces to battle 
Indians, Barbary pirates and Russian revolutionaries; to fight North Korean 
and Chinese communists in Korea; to engineer regime changes in South and 




From his perspective, it is contemporary efforts to formally bind the president—to 
require Congressional authorization before any military initiative is begun or impose 
other standing statutory constraints on the use of force—that transgress previously 
settled constitutional practice: 
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Despite the record of practice…critics [of presidential war power] 




There is thus a broadly shared aspiration for a return to differently settled 
constitutional boundaries of the storied, but not-so-distant, past—to ambits of war 
authority that were well established at the founding and which lasted through the 
second half of the twentieth century.
203
 Though the contradictory nature of these 
claims invites inquiry into the extent—and form—of any such settlement,
204
 such 
claims signify and reinforce a pervasive prioritization of a fixed constitutional order 
for warmaking: purported historical precedent ought not merely inform the 
contemporary construction of the warmaking process but should be determinative, 
rendering discord over institutional purview in war obsolete. 
Beyond a general commitment to constitutional settlement and the 
continuation of political precedent, clearly established institutional boundaries for the 
use of military force are widely held as critically important to a well-ordered decision 
making process for war. This emphasis was on full display in the responses to 
President Obama’s ordering of military force in support of Libyan revolution in 2011. 
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James Baker and Lee Hamilton, who had previously served on the bipartisan War 
Powers Commission to study and address the persistent constitutional ambiguity 
surrounding war,
205
 argued that the American people and its soldiers in arms:  
Would be best served if our leaders debated the substantive issues regarding 
the conflict in Libya—and those of Afghanistan and Iraq—rather than 





Conservative political commentator Charles Krauthammer agreed, arguing that legal 
settlement of institutional authority in war would enable more focused and fruitful 
debate:  
We need a set of rules governing the legality of any future war. This will 




From this viewpoint, uncertainty regarding the constitutional requirements for the use 
of force imperils a rational and focused process for the decision for war. 
Institutionally partisan conflict can engender an unnecessary conflation of 
constitutional and policy questions, drawing the limited resources of political 
attention and energy away from important considerations that face the nation at the 
moment of decision for war. Instead of focusing on whether or not the use of martial 
force is appropriate in a given instance and what particular resources are necessary to 
the war effort, public debate is clouded with competing claims of constitutional 
fidelity regarding which branch can legitimately do what in war. The abiding concern 
is that if taken to an extreme, heated institutionally partisan rancor can completely 
displace dispassionate policy deliberations, the potential for a reasoned give and take 
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over what is to be done swallowed by contestation over the constitutional mandates 
for who ultimately decides for war. An entrenched settlement of the war powers 
debate thus promises deliberative dividends, replacing the unruly mix of ambiguity, 
discretion, and alarm that characterizes the contemporary working constitution of the 
war powers with a consistently disciplined debate focused on issues germane to the 
prospective use of force at hand. 
The predictability that attends clearly settled institutional boundaries of power 
is also seen to be essential for the creation and operation of efficient and effective 
national security policy. Seth Weinberger argues,   
The distractions and inefficiencies caused by extensive attention to the power 
to control the deployment of the armed forces of the United States is not 
measured just in time spent to no avail…an adversarial relationship between 





Perennial contestation over the proper institutional ambits authority under the 
Constitution creates an expectation of uncertainty and discord—a kind of 
predictability anathema to the rule of law—that can compromise the very ability of 
the United States to formulate and enact responses to foreign policy challenges. As 
Weinberger further articulates this view,  
Having a clear understanding of the proper balancing of war powers in place 
before the making of policy would…mak[e] it easier for all involved parties to 
formulate coherent strategies without fear of overstepping political bounds, 
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In the face of constitutional uncertainty political actors may hedge their bets, 
choosing a politically safe but sub-optimal position, from their perspective, on the use 
of force instead of vigorously advocating for their preferred course of action. Thus 
not only can the seemingly interminable institutional rivalry over constitutional 
authority in war serve as a distraction from focused policy deliberation but it also can 
diminish the quality of the deliberation that does occur. Constitutional indeterminacy 
thus has the potential to induce legislators and presidents alike to obscure if not abjure 
their best judgment for fear of constitutional challenge and judicial or political 
repudiation. Durable settlement of the constitutional bounds of power relating to war 
is therefore held to be critical to departmental coordination, providing a fundamental 
political certainty that engenders inter-branch deliberation and collaboration that best 
yields coherent, efficient, and effectual national security policy. 
In addition to enhanced deliberation and coordination between the branches of 
government, clearly delineated constitutional responsibilities are also seen as critical 
to ensuring their political accountability on matters of war. Harold Koh crystallizes 
this view when he argues that, 
The goal of institutional accountability [is advanced]…by clarifying the legal 




When the particular boundaries of power are clear and widely known, not only will 
the institutions themselves know what to expect from one another and be able to 
comport themselves accordingly but the general public will be in a better position to 
influence a prospective military initiative. A clearly established decision-making 
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process for war can enable interested parties to direct their views on the use of force 
at hand to the political officials responsible for the decision to initiate warfare and can 
also subsequently hold the political agents who are formally responsible for a given 
area accountable for how well they upheld their roles. The constitutional 
indeterminacy that characterizes the contemporary working constitution can enable 
political actors to avoid difficult political decisions—letting others take the lead, and 
the corresponding risk, on matters of national security—or at least dissemble their 
role in the decision for an ongoing or prior use of force that has not worked as 
intended. An settled resolution of the war powers debate can thus induce the 
responsibility in political actors that comes from procedural transparency and political 
accountability as the attention of both the political branches as well as the public—
and their corresponding ire or accolades—are directed in a coordination fashion at 
those in a clearly established position of authority. 
An entrenched resolution to the war powers debate is also seen as key to a 
strong and credible presence for the United States on the international stage. 
Persistent uncertainty regarding constitutional propriety can undermine a national 
unity of purpose that is held as essential to conducting and sustaining the military 
hostilities in which the United States elects to engage. On the domestic level the 
specter of unconstitutionality and the political discord it can provoke can diminish the 
support of the general public for military action taken in the name of national 
security. The cultivation of relatively broad and lasting political support is especially 
critical to sustaining the material foundations necessary for any long-term military 
initiative. Lingering and pervasive doubt about the constitutionality of executive 
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action on matters of war can also have a pernicious effect on the United States 
relations with foreign powers. When such an important use of power is tinged with 
claims of illegitimacy and usurpation of power, allies may hesitate to join a fight that 
is roiled in controversy within the United States. Similarly, domestic contention 
stemming from constitutional dissensus may embolden enemies to persist in fighting, 
as they might perceive institutionally partisan contestation over constitutional 
principle as evidence that a presidentially led use of force does not have domestic 
political support it needs to endure.
211
 Constitutional settlement of the war powers 
debate is thus held to promise not only a more deliberative and efficient process for 
the planning and execution of military policy, but can also—qua settlement—yield 
national security dividends through its diffuse effects on foreign entities. 
While these prospective benefits of a predictable, coordinated warmaking 
process are worthy of serious consideration in the construction of a national security 
order, those wary of the contemporary pattern of politics engendered by constitutional 
ambiguity on the use of military force still disagree on the details of what the 
constitutional settlement should entail and why a particular resolution is preferable. 
Beyond the competing claims of constitutional fidelity, Congressional partisans insist 
that “collective decision-making”—and thus a settled requirement for a robust form 
of Congressional authorization prior to the initiation of warfare—is key to the 
development of wise policy. From this viewpoint, unilateral executive decisions to 
use military force increase the prospects of imprudent military action. Lacking 
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broader participation and deliberation, discretionary executive martial actions may 
fail to fully account for the costs and benefits of a particular conflict and as a result 
are more likely to be based on partial rather than common interest. For many 
Congressional partisans, a primary aim of American constitutionalism is thus to cabin 
executive power within the rule of law, disciplining the decision and initiative 
characteristic of former with the democratic deliberation and legitimating 
authorization of the latter. The settled constitution of the war powers should thus be 
an entrenched expectation of formal Congressional authorization prior to the initiation 
of military force except in cases of absolute necessity. Presidential partisans counter 
that the “functional superiority” of the more hierarchical executive branch in terms of 
information, expertise, and dispatch make it the proper site for decision-making on 
the use of force. Only the executive branch is held to have the competency and 
capacity to judge the extent of any foreign threats and determine what diplomatic 
tools—including the use of violent force—should be deployed to address them. From 
the perspective of presidents and partisans of the executive branch, any undue delay 
in responding to exigent and even emergent threats can endanger the nation. 
Accordingly, presidents should be unfettered of formal procedural constraints, and 




It is important to note then that the widespread emphasis on settlement 
discussed above is never an argument for mere settlement, that is, that any clear and 
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durable resolution of the debate will do, but rather for a particular model of 
warmaking for which settlement and its attendant promises are a critical element. The 
shared push towards differing versions of a settled constitutional framework for the 
use of military force brings us back to the underlying constitutive question of how 
such clear boundaries of institutional authority in war are to be established and 
maintained over time. If settlement is indeed desirable, how is it to be achieved? And 
what are the consequences of the politics of constitutional settlement for the war 
powers? The next section describes the connection between the view towards 
constitutional settlement and a pervasive legalistic conception of constitutionalism—
constitutional settlement understood as, and sought through, formal entrenchment. 
Efforts to legally construct a settled resolution of the war powers debate that 
characterizes this predominating approach to constitutionalism are an important part 
of the contemporary working constitution of the war powers. As we will see, the 
pursuit of formal entrenchment has critical implications for the practicability of the 
competing models for ordering the use of military force, and thus for the construction 
of a reliably deliberative constitutional system for war.  
 
The Process of Settlement: Formal Entrenchment 
The widespread aspiration towards constitutional settlement that undergirds 
the war powers debate is closely linked to a juriscentric conception of 
constitutionalism: resolution of the perennial dispute is to be achieved through legal 
processes that limit ambiguity, and thus contestation, over the boundaries of 
governmental power to the extent possible. This approach takes its bearings from the 
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primacy of the rule of law in a constitutional order, a view crystallized by Charles 
McIlwain in his seminal work on the subject:  
[Modern] constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 




Public power is to be authorized, justified, and constrained through law. Tethering the 
exercise of governmental power to formal authorization is sought in both foreign and 
domestic affairs, but it is perhaps of greatest concern when it comes to the use of 
violent force, where arbitrary rule is literally a matter of life and death. The emphasis 
on legal constraint is therefore focused most intently on the executive branch, a view 
forcefully expressed in the introduction to The Constitution and the Conduct of 
American Foreign Policy: “the very marrow of constitutionalism consists in the 
subordination of the president to the rule of law.”
214
 While conceptions of the rule of 
law vary, at minimum it requires that government act only where there is law and that 
laws must be clear, prospective, general, and well promulgated.
215
 A seemingly 
straightforward constitutional principle at first blush, the rule of law is complicated 
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by the existence of a written constitution and the inevitability of disagreement over 
the meaning of both higher and ordinary law. 
If the written constitution is understood as a kind of law,
216
 then subordinating 
the warmaking process to a thin conception of the rule of law does not necessarily 
entail any particular institutional distribution of power. Constitutional provisions that 
explicitly provide for certain kinds of independent executive authority, such as over 
the decision to move and use military forces created and maintained by Congress, are 
just as compatible with a thin conception rule of law as would be a requirement of 
highly formal legislative authorization before any offensive use of force. Broad 
statutory authorizations of executive power regarding the use of force are also 
compatible with the thin rule of law, insofar as such delegations are both clearly made 
and not proscribed by the Constitution that establishes such legislative authority. 
While any governmental action is to have a legal basis, it can be rooted directly in the 
written constitution—the higher political law that establishes the institutions of 
government and their ambits of authority—or can be a result of lawmaking processes 
with clear constitutional bases. It is discretion, action in the absence of or contrary to 
law,
217
 rather than any particular boundaries of executive power itself that is 
antithetical to constitutionalism as defined by legal limitation on government. 
While this thin conception of the rule of law may permit a wide array of 
institutional roles for the decision to engage in warfare, it does demand that the 
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process for warmaking be clearly established by and operate through law. This 
approach to constitutionalism aspires towards a lofty ideal: foundational questions of 
institutional authority are to be clearly and comprehensively established in a 
constitutional text; such constitutional provisions are to be abided by all political 
parties; and any changes to the original distribution of authority would only occur 
through well established procedures of formal amendment, such as prescribed by 
Article V of the Constitution.
218
 Executive power over the use of military force would 
thus be limited to that which is definitively allocated by the written constitution or has 
been duly authorized through legislation. At its most fundamental level then, 
constitutionalism as the rule of law appears to offer the promises of settlement. The 
contours of the exercise of governmental power—who can do what, and how—will 
be well known by all relevant parties in advance through their clear delineation in 
law, the expedience of politics tempered by the order and stability provided by a 
sharp separation of powers and the formal nature of law. 
Enduring settlement of the kind this ‘ideal’ version of constitutionalism 
promises is not easily achieved, however. Constitution making, like any political 
process, involves the limitations of human foresight and the vagaries that result from 
compromise. Even relatively clear textual provisions can yield divergent 
interpretations over time due to changing circumstances and political understandings. 
Thus for law to rule—for law to order the use of martial power—there must be a 
political process to clarify what the constitution means as disputes arise and to induce 
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compliance with it. This brings the connection between the widespread aspiration 
toward constitutional settlement, the primacy given to the rule of law, and the 
predominance of legal constitutionalism in the war powers debate into relief. The 
common view towards constitutional settlement seems to require a sole, ultimate 
arbiter to resolve disputes over fundamental questions of political authority as they 
inevitably arise.
219
 Adding in the primacy placed on the rule of law and the common 
view of the constitution as kind of law, along with the judiciary’s traditional role in 
interpreting laws and applying them to particular cases, and it is a seemingly small 
and direct step to situate the process of resolving the fundamental questions of 
institutional authority—and bounding executive power—over war in the juridical 
realm. 
Legal constitutionalism, the pursuit of constitutional settlement through legal 
entrenchment, operates on two distinct, but related, tracks. When disputes over the 
foundational distribution of institutional power arise, this model of constitutionalism 
posits that the Supreme Court should clarify and entrench the basic structure of 
government through case law, tying down any open-endedness in the written 
constitution and preventing constitutional degeneration through small shifts in 
practice over time. David Adler offers perhaps the strongest version of this view, 
To maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the Court must police 
constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental alterations in our 
governmental system will occur only through the process of constitutional 
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Where this mode falls short, formal settlement is to be secondarily pursued through 
statutory clarification and regimentation: framework legislation designed to close any 
gaps, setting bright legal lines of authority and thus mitigating confusion and discord 
over procedural propriety in a given area.
221
 Gordon Silverstein aptly summarizes this 
overarching conception of constitutionalism, 
The Courts are responsible for the constitutional context within which the 
other branches operate, and the Supreme Court will judge the interpretation 
offered by the other branches, either giving it the sanction of constitutional 
legitimacy and establishing that law or action as a precedent for future 




Constitutional settlement—and attendant strict separation of powers—is thus to be 
properly achieved via the ordinary workings of the juridical order, the boundaries of 
power clarified and entrenched as a matter of law over time. Legal constitutionalism 
ultimately rests on a decisive role for the judiciary in constitutional construction and 
maintenance: judges are to resolve novel and particular lacunae that inevitably 
develop in relation to both the written constitution and statutes, and the Supreme 
Court is to have the final say on matters of constitutional propriety and operation—it 
is held as the custodian of the constitutional design.
223
  
However, as we will see in the overview of how disputes on the institutional 
balance of war powers have been dealt with by juridical system that follows, although 
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a fixed formal settlement of the ambits of institutional authority over the use of force 
has not been achieved, its pursuit has hardly been neutral for the practice of American 
warmaking. The next section describes how the progressive judicial settlement of 
constitutional lacunae on matters of war aspired to by legal constitutionalism has been 
discrete, at best, throughout much of American history. While the Court has been 
willing to hear cases involving and related to the use of military force, for most of its 
tenure it has largely avoided staking out constitutional boundaries of institutional 
power relating to warmaking while upholding the rule of statutory law and protecting 
the liberty and property of individuals affected by war when feasible. Though this 
overarching trend in judicial practice continues in many ways, the subsequent section 
highlights what has been a marked contemporary shift towards a formally entrenched 
resolution of the main points of the war powers debate. Such legalization, particularly 
the emphasis on the judicial clarification and enforcement of bright legal lines of 
authority, reconstructs the constitutional politics of warmaking on a distinctly legal 
plane, which has important consequences for the ordering of the decision process for 
war. While statutory delimits of executive power in war have the potential to serve as 
a clear statement of Congress’s position on the proper ambits of institutional purview 
foreign affairs—which presidents may attempt to rebut through the ordinary course of 
politics—the pervasive view that American constitutionalism ought to be comprised 
by a strict and legally defined separation of powers that is ultimately stewarded by the 
Supreme Court has undergirded the construction of legal grey holes that have 
ramifications for the politics of warmaking. The pursuit of formal entrenchment—the 
aspiration towards narrowing, if not eliminating, all constitutional grey holes—can 
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engender a pattern of politics characterized by expansive executive discretion under 
the visage of legality, which undermines political deliberations on matters of war.  
 
The War Powers in Court: Rule of Law Without Settlement 
Despite the high frequency of American involvement in war throughout its 
history, and in contradiction to the now pervasive aspiration towards constitutional 
settlement and corresponding acceptance of judicial supremacy, the Supreme Court 
has only infrequently and somewhat cautiously taken up cases relating to the use of 
military force. This tension between the pervading norms of legal constitutionalism 
and political practice was recently highlighted in the National War Powers 
Commission Report, which laments that though there are strong constitutional 
arguments in favor of both congressional and presidential powers over war, “the only 
branch of government capable of resolving these disputes—the Judicial Branch—has 
consistently declined to do so.”
224
 Though this commonly held view of the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to intervene in constitutional disputes relating to war is largely 
correct,
225
 the following review of the primary cases related to the use of military 
force shows that while the Court has not definitively resolved all of the particular 
points of discord over the ambits of institutional power in war described in the 
previous chapter, neither has it stayed wholly out of the matter, declaring either in 
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word or deed that the balance of power in war is entirely a political question.
226
 The 
primary questions around which the war powers debate revolves—when 
Congressional authorization is required, what constitutes proper authorization, and 
what restrictions can be set on the exercise of martial power—have been at issue, at 
least in some respects, in Supreme Court rulings over time. And while the question of 
the propriety of autonomous use of military force by presidents—warmaking in the 
absence of statutory authorization or constraint—has been largely left ambiguous, the 
Court’s rulings have had subtle but important consequences for American 
warmaking.  
Before proceeding to a discussion of specific cases, a point of clarification and 
emphasis is warranted. Any analysis of the separation of powers jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, and claims about any ‘precedent’ that was set, depend not only on the 
particulars of the cases—the context in which they arose as well as the substance and 
result of the controversy—but also necessarily on a conception of the role of the 
judiciary in the constitutional system. Though the Court has arguably played a role in 
the clarification and entrenchment of certain boundaries of institutional authority 
related to warmaking over time, the import that is given to its rulings rests on the 
critical, but often obscured, underlying distinction between legal constitutionalism 
and political constitutionalism. Looking through the lens of the former, the 
constitutional rulings of the Supreme Court are seen to properly govern the entire 
constitutional order—the process of constitutional codification and entrenchment 
through law described above. In contrast, from the perspective of political 
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constitutionalism, the Court is free to expound its own institutional view of 
Constitutional propriety and enforce it in its own sphere—that is, its holdings 
determine the outcome of a particular case while the opinions that justify it are a 
constitutional argument from its particular institutional point of view as well as a 
signal of how the judiciary will comport itself on related matters in the future, qua 
system of courts.
227
 The treatment of war powers disputes in the courts below thus not 
only charts how the judiciary has ruled on matters relating to the boundaries of 
institutional authority in war but also maintains a focus on how the judicial role in 
delineating and entrenching the ambits of governmental war powers has developed 
over time. As we will see below, though the Court has rarely made overt 
pronouncements of the necessity of legal constitutionalism and judicial supremacy, 
and has never enforced constitutional constraints on the use of military force, its 
modern separation of war powers jurisprudence has played a role in fostering a now 
pervasive juriscentric approach to the war powers that can impair a deliberative 
constitutional politics for war.
228
 
Cases involving the horizontal separation of power in foreign affairs were 
atypical in early American history,
229
 but the Supreme Court did take up and rule on a 
number of matters relating to the use of military force in the period prior to the Civil 
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War. The earliest cases relevant to questions of warmaking stemmed from the Quasi-
War with France, where martial conflict centered on maritime commerce. The 
question of what ‘war’ is, and in particular what forms of legislative action are to 
count as authorization that would place the nation into a state of war, were first 
touched upon by the Supreme Court in Bas v. Tingy. The case involved a dispute over 
the compensation owed to a privateer following the recapture of a U.S. merchant ship 
from France. The amount the ship owner was to be liable for depended on whether 
France was an ‘enemy’ of the United States, a designation that would trigger greater 
compensation under the terms of a 1799 act of Congress. For the Supreme Court, the 
case ultimately hinged on whether the hostilities between the United States and 
France, despite the absence of a formal declaration, amounted to a legal state of war. 
In the Court’s judgment Congress had authorized ‘imperfect’ war through statute, and 
ruled that the privateer was owed the greater sum.
230
 In a related case the following 
year, Talbot vs. Seaman, the Court once again focused on Congressional authorization 
absent a formal declaration of war to resolve a dispute over a maritime seizure. 
Ruling the seizure legal, Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “The whole powers of war 
being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that 
body alone can be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry.”
231
 For the purposes of the 
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Court, disputes that depended on whether the United States was engaged in warfare—
at least those between private parties—could be determined based on the existence of 
legislative action short of a formal declaration of war.
232
  
A third Quasi-War case taken up by the Supreme Court, Little v. Barreme, 
was the first to touch directly on the boundaries of executive power over the use of 
force. The dispute stemmed from the capture of a vessel following a proclamation 
made by the Secretary of the Navy, on behalf of President John Adams, that ordered 
the seizure of American ships suspected of travelling to and from French ports. 
Because a Congressional statute only authorized the seizure of those American 
vessels suspected of sailing to, not from, a French port, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the capture in question violated the law. Responding to the claim by the captain that 
he was just following the orders of the president, and thus protected from legal 
responsibility, Chief Justice Marshall argued that only Congress can make laws and 
that a president, even in the role of commander in chief, could not authorize a military 
officer to commit acts in clear violation of the law. While Marshall emphasized here 
that the Court would enforce clear bounds on executive discretion in war where “the 
legislature seem to have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried 
into execution,” he also raised, but did not answer, the question of independent 
executive power. The Chief Justice further remarked that “it is by no means clear that 
the President [might] have empowered the officers” in the absence of Congressional 
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The question of statutory regulation of executive warmaking was revisited by 
a circuit court two years later in United States vs. Smith, where the liability of an 
officer for the transgression of an act of Congress was reaffirmed. In ruling the 
attempted paramilitary expedition conducted by Col. William Smith against Spanish 
America a violation of the Neutrality Act of 1794, the court made a distinction 
between the president’s defensive power to repel invasion and the authority of 
Congress to authorize offensive military actions. Responding to an argument by the 
defense that the President had secretly approved the operation, Supreme Court Justice 
William Paterson, who presided over the circuit trial, held that there was “a manifest 
distinction between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made 
against us by actual invasion, or formal declaration. In the former case, it is the 
exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war.” The 
Constitution, “which measures out and defines the duties of the president, does not 
vest in him any authority to set on foot a military expedition against a nation with 
which the United States are at peace…that power is exclusively vested in 
congress.”
234
 While enforcing a penalty for the transgression of a statutory 
delimitation of executive discretion the judiciary rhetorically reinforced, and 
intimated that it might someday enforce, a Constitutional limit on discretionary 
executive use of offensive military force in the absence of such legislation. 
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The Marshall Court went even further in Brown v. United States, a case 
involving the seizure of British property found in the United States during the War of 
1812, where it imposed constraints on executive discretion in war where Congress 
had already acted but had not specified the limits in question.
235
 The conflict with 
Great Britain was the first major military engagement for the young nation and it was 
consequently authorized by a formal declaration of war rather than through the host 
of statutory provisions that characterized American warmaking since the 
Revolutionary War.
236
 Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion held that the seizure 
required authorization that Congress had not provided in its declaration of war, and 
that while the laws of war generally permitted a sovereign to confiscate enemy 
property found in its territory during war, that power was the legislature’s to 
exercise.
237
 In an important and interesting dissent, Justice Story pushed back on the 
question of the parameters of independent executive authority where Congress has 
not formally legislated. He emphasized that while Congress can impose limits “as to 
the extent to which hostilities may be carried by the executive,”
238
 there properly 
remains a scope of executive discretion following a declaration of war insofar it is 
consistent with the laws of nations and is in the absence of domestic law that restricts 
it: “To regulate the exercise of the rights of war as to enemies, does not, however, 
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imply that such rights have not an independent exercise.”
239
 For Story, while 
Congress could regulate the exercise of executive war powers, at least some executive 
war authority had a legal basis beyond explicit Congressional authorization. 
In subsequent decades, the Supreme Court offered a broad view of the bounds 
of executive discretion over martial force where Congress had authorized it in 
advance, as seen in two cases dealing with legislative delegation and the use of the 
militia. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to, “provide for 
calling forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and 
repel Invasions.” In Martin v. Mott, the Court ruled that President Madison had been 
given statutory authority to order the states to call out their militias in advance of the 
War of 1812, ruling against a private who had challenged a fine resulting from his 
refusal to assemble with his company. In writing for the majority, Justice Story 
acknowledged a broad discretionary power in the executive to determine whether the 
security context triggered the authority granted to the president by law: “Whenever a 
statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his 
own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute 
constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.”
240
 In the 
view of the Court, not only can Congress delegate its authority to call forth the militia 
to the president through statute, but any such delegation also entails that the actual 
decision to utilize the militia accords to the executive as well. While the early Court 
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may have been wary of executive discretion against or absent formally expressed 
Congressional will, it was willing to read the Constitution as permitting, if not 
promoting, strong government when the political branches were in agreement. 
In 1849 the Court further emphasized that it would not step in to limit how 
broadly Congress could delegate martial power to the president. While Luther v. 
Borden is best known for centering on the question of whether Rhode Island’s charter 
violated the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government
241
 and the 
Courts’ determination that the issue was political question, the Court also held that 
Congressional legislation had delegated the authority to decide whether an 
insurrection had occurred and whether use of the militia was required to the 
executive. While acknowledging the potential abuse of the power given to the 
president in such a statue, Chief Justice Roger Taney averred from asserting a strong 
role for the judiciary in policing the discretion afforded by such a delegation, noting 
that, “it would be in the power of Congress to apply the proper remedy.”
242
 For the 
Court, the scope of any statutory delegation of authority to the president over the use 
of martial force was properly the concern of the political branches of government—
Congress would be responsible not only for the judicious delegation of military power 
to the executive but also for checking its misuse. 
Two Antebellum cases further touched upon the question when Congressional 
authority is required for certain exercises of executive power relating to war. In 
Fleming v. Page a dispute over the proper duties to be levied on goods from the port 
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of Tampico, captured by the United States in its war with Mexico, hinged on whether 
the captured territory had become part of the United States, thus rendering the 
transportation of goods no longer an importation. In determining the duty had to be 
paid, Chief Justice Taney emphasized that the president, as commander in chief, “is 
authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at 
his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to 
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy,” but that “his conquests do not enlarge the 
boundaries of the Union, nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond 
the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power.”
243
 Though the Court did 
not precisely define the parameters of unilateral presidential authority over the use of 
martial force, it again saw fit to decide a question of the domestic legal consequences 
of an act of war—here refusing that any enlargement of the territory of the United 
States without specific Congressional authorization was to be given legal effect by the 
Court. 
A decade later, in Durand v. Hollins, a circuit court recognized broad 
executive discretion to use the military abroad to protect American lives or property. 
In 1854, an American ship was sent to the port of Greytown in Nicaragua in response 
to an affront to an American diplomat as well as complaints from American business 
interests about property losses there. After the ship commander determined that the 
local authorities had not made requisite reparations, he ordered the crew to bombard 
the town and then to come ashore to burn what remained of it.
244
 In ruling that neither 
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the president nor his agents can be held “personally civilly responsible for the 
consequences” of such an independent use of military force by the executive branch, 
deciding against an American resident of Greytown who filed suit for damages to his 
property from the siege, the circuit court further stated:  
[A]s it respects the interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of 
the lives of property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the 
discretion of the president. Acts of lawless violence, or of threatened violence 
to the citizens of his property, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and the 
protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not infrequently, require the 
most prompt and decided action.
245
     
 
While the court refused to enforce civil remuneration in this instance, a ruling that is 
often cited as a significant precedent by advocates of executive prerogative in foreign 
affairs, it is notable that the authority to protect Americans and their property abroad 
was not an area in which Congress had yet legislated national policy—either to 
authorize or restrict such discretionary use of the military by a president. Thus while 
Durand might be read to signal a move away from the strict construction of the 
Marshall Court, the question of whether Congress could limit such uses of force was 
not at issue in this case.
246
 In 1868, Congress clarified its position in a statute that 
remains part of permanent law:  
[W]henever it shall be made known to the President that any citizen of the 
United State has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under authority of 
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President…to use such 
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to 
obtain or effectual such release, and all the facts and proceedings relative 
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Neither the extent of discretionary executive power authorized by this statute—what 
military means used for the protection of American lives and property do and do not 
amount “to acts of war”—nor the extent of executive discretion to use the military to 
protect lives and property in the absence of such legislation, has been taken up by the 
Supreme Court since. 
The period from The Civil War to the Second World War saw a number of 
war powers issues taken up and decided by the judiciary that showed both a continued 
willingness by the courts to engage disputes relating to national security as well as the 
limits of its institutional capacities to directly constrain the exercise of executive 
power in wartime. While the Court sought to reinforce certain broadly accepted 
boundaries of institutional authority, it did so largely in word rather than in deed, 
without directly interfering with the active exercise of martial power. The Civil War, 
which occurred on U.S. soil and was characterized by a number of emergency actions 
taken by President Lincoln which had direct impact on U.S. citizens and residents, 
brought a number questions regarding presidential power in war before the federal 
bench. Apart from the important questions regarding executive discretion to suspend 
the privilege of habeas corpus
248
 resulting from an order given by President Lincoln 
at the onset of the Civil War,
249
 the Court’s primary decision regarding the use of 
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military force in this period was in The Prize Cases.
250
 Stemming from Lincoln’s 
1861 proclamation that ordered a blockade of Southern ports, the key question of 
constitutional import before the Supreme Court was whether the president had 
exceeded his constitutional authority by ordering the seizure of ships trading with the 
Confederacy without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.
251
 The 
dispute between the parties in the case, whether the vessels captured under the 
blockade were prizes, and thus the legal property of the privateers who captured 
them, or the illegitimate result of piracy depended on whether the United States was 
legally at war. The Court recognized that the rebellion constituted a state of war, and 
put forth its view that not only did the Constitution grant the President the authority to 
order the use force in response to military aggression underway, but that the executive 
is “bound to resist force by force…without waiting for any special legislative 
authority.
252
 However, the Court also emphasized a distinction between an executive 
authority to order the defensive use of military force and the legislative authority to 
authorize the initiation of war where active hostilities does not yet exist. The Court’s 
view that the president “has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a 
foreign nation or a domestic State”
253
 was hardly controversial. Legal counsel for the 
executive branch in the case agreed, insisting that President Lincoln’s blockade did 
not involve “the right to initiate a war, as a voluntary act of sovereignty. That is only 
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 While the Court here had shown itself once again willing to 
determine that the United States was at war and warned that it saw a key 
constitutional distinction between defensive and offensive war, it also continued to 
avert specifying any test for recognizing war for constitutional purposes as well as 
from actively constraining the discretionary use of military force. 
Following the war the Supreme Court was faced number of cases that further 
highlight the mixed nature of its role in resolving constitutional disputes related to 
warmaking. In its unanimous ruling in Ex parte Milligan the Court signaled its view 
that the President did not enjoy wholly unlimited constitutional discretion in waging 
war once begun, as well as a willingness to construe ambiguous statutory language 
regulating the execution of warfare—here the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863—against 
the president.
255
 However, that the constitutional and legal questions before the Court 
in this case dealt with matters of military detention and trial—matters of particular 
judicial interest—and that the war had been terminated at the time of its ruling might 
reasonably mitigate any expectation of expansive judicial intervention into the use of 
executive power when hostilities are imminent or ongoing. While the Court 
ostensibly reinforced a clear constitutional requirement on the rights of individuals 
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whose enforcement had been inhibited during the war,
256
 the postwar reassertion of 
this boundary and its institutional authority to enforce after it had been unable to do 
so at the beginning of the war also reinforced a potentially inherent limitation in the 
capacity for judicial constraint of executive power in the midst of war. While the 
executive branch may have a legal price to pay for its discretionary use of power in 
war, such penalty would come as a delayed or post-hoc rebuke.    
A year later, the Supreme Court took up a question of the boundaries of power 
of the national government vis-à-vis the states that implicated its own role in 
navigating disputes on the separation of powers. The State of Mississippi attempted to 
enjoin President Andrew Johnson from using the military from carry out two 
Reconstruction acts that were passed through a Congressional override of his veto. 
Based on “general principles which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of 
Executive discretion,” the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to “enjoin the 
President in the performance of his official duties,” even though it acknowledged that 
the legislation was “alleged to be unconstitutional.”
257
 Chief Justice Chase openly 
mused about the prospects of a president refusing to comply if the Court had 
attempted to interfere, admitting that in such an event “it is needless to observe that 
the court is without power to enforce its process.” Additionally, if such an injunction 
was issued and complied with, the Court might be helping to induce a 
“collision…between the executive and legislative departments of government,” where 
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the president might be subject to impeachment. Pointing towards the distinction 
between legal and political constitutionalism, Chase concluded his line of thought:  
And in that case, could this court…restrain by injunction the Senate of the 
United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange 
spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to arrest 
the proceedings in that court? These questions answer themselves.
258
   
 
While the Court acknowledged that it couldn’t prohibit a president from complying 
with, nor compel the executive branch to act contrary to, an action imposed on it by 
statute, Congress was not under similar constraints. In 1868 it impeached President 
Johnson for a related violation of law. 
  In 1901 a case arising from the Spanish-American War brought up the 
question of whether a U.S. military commander could impose duties on goods coming 
from the United States into Puerto Rico. The Court ruled that while the executive had 
the authority to legislate for a conquered country, once a peace treaty is signed he 
must abide by the laws of his own country.
259
 In a second case from that war, in 
deciding whether the seizure and detention of a ship owned by a Spanish corporation 
by U.S. naval forces was a legal exercise of executive power, the Court determined 
that the Spanish-American War did not legally end until the exchange of ratifications 
of the Treaty of Paris in 1899.
260
 A year later, the a circuit court similarly proved 
willing to determine whether the United States was engaged in “a condition of war,” a 
point upon which the conviction of a U.S. serviceman for murder—which occurred 
while 5,000 soldiers were deployed to China on the orders of President McKinley for 
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the protection of American citizens threatened by the Boxer Rebellion—rested.
261
 In 
wartime disputes, particularly those involving individual liberties and private 
property, the Court remained willing to analyze the particulars of the national security 
context to decide the dispute at hand without codifying what ‘war’ is for all 
constitutional purposes. 
 In a 1936 case that centered on the question of how broadly Congress can 
delegate to the president, in part a question of the parameters of power of the national 
government where the political branches act in concert, what ought to have been a 
relatively unremarkable decision was turned by Justice Sutherland into an opportunity 
to proffer a distinction between the bounds of constitutional propriety in domestic 
versus foreign affairs that has had lasting influence on the war powers debate. United 
States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp dealt with a weapons manufacturer who had 
been convicted of selling arms to warring nations in South America in violation of an 
executive order, which was made pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress 
permitting the executive to issue such a formal prohibition at his discretion.
262
 
Though the decision upholding the constitutionality of the delegation was largely in 
line with the track of the Court’s prior jurisprudence permitting broad delegations 
relating to issues of foreign affairs, the case is notable because dicta in Sutherland’s 
majority opinion have become de riguere points of reference for contemporary 
partisans of plenary executive power.
263
 His remarks that the president is the “sole 
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organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” and that the 
nature of the president’s power in foreign affairs is “plenary and exclusive,”
264
 are 
often cited as legal precedent for claims of independent and preclusive presidential 
power in foreign affairs.
265
 However, close attention to the substance of the decision 
and the context in which Sutherland wrote reveals a concern with distinguishing 
broad constitutional powers of the national government in foreign affairs from the 
domestic powers of the federal government that he aspired to constitutionally 
constrain.
266
 The question of the horizontal separation of powers—the parameters of 
power of the executive and legislative branches—on matters of foreign affairs were 
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not directly at issue, rather the concern was the power of the national government to 
act as a unified whole. 
From the American founding to the Second World War disputes relating to 
war were taken up and decided by the judiciary on a number of occasions, but the 
overall import that this jurisprudence can be given is subject to widely divergent 
interpretations and emphases hinging on whether they are viewed through the lens of 
legal or political constitutionalism. That is, what the Court’s rulings entail for the 
boundaries of institutional authority in war depends on whether the judiciary is held 
to have the ultimate say in delineating and enforcing constitutional boundaries of 
institutional powers—a question of the parameters of constitutional authority in its 
own right. From the perspective of judiciary supremacy, the Court’s early rulings can 
be seen to have resolved and entrenched some of the important questions of the 
constitutional allocation of power discussed in the previous chapter. A brief synopsis 
of the ‘fixed’ constitutional boundaries of institutional warmaking authority at the 
start of the Second World War, from this perspective, might entail the following: the 
use of military force can be authorized by statute, rather than a formal declaration of 
war;
267
 the executive branch cannot violate clear statutory prohibitions or limits on 
warmaking;
268
 Congress can delegate broad authority to the president to initiate 
military force;
269
 Presidents cannot independently expand the territory of the United 
States;
270
 Presidents have the discretion to take military action to protect American 
                                                
267
 Bas v. Tingy. 
268
 Little v. Barreme, Brown v. United States, U.S. v. Smith. 
269
 Martin v. Mott; Luther v. Borden. 
270
 Fleming v. Page. 
 113 
lives and property, at least when not prohibited by statute;
271
 and the President can 




A different, but not entirely contradictory, narrative takes shape when the 
cases are seen from the perspective of political constitutionalism, absent a conception 
of judicial supremacy. This more modest interpretation shows a judiciary willing to 
resolve specific legal disputes resulting from warmaking, particularly those relating to 
individual liberty and private property, but also one that balked from asserting 
sweeping constitutional requirements for warmaking, especially on the actual use of 
force. For example, instead of interpreting Bas v. Tingy as establishing that there is 
“no constitutional rule requiring Congress to approve military measures through some 
specified legislative form,”
273
 the Court can be understood to have merely signaled in 
its early rulings that “any act of war, to be entitled to judicial recognition as such, 
must be ascribed to congressional authorization.”
274
 The judiciary would only 
exercise its powers where there was ordinary law upon which to base a ruling in a 
given case. Although the Court was later willing to determine the existence of a state 
of war in the absence of formal authorization in order to decide disputes, they were 
disputes over the application of existing law nonetheless.
275
 Similarly, while the 
Court proved willing to hold executive officials liable for martial action taken in clear 
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contradiction to existing law,
276
 despite occasional hints that it might similarly rule in 
an instance where the use of offensive military force occurred in the absence of law, 
no such constraint on presidential power in war was ever substantively enforced. The 
judiciary, acting as a system of courts, was willing and able to impose certain limits 
on executive discretion in war within its sphere of competence—it consistently acted 
to uphold the rule of law. But promoting the rule of law did not entail the progressive 
entrenchment of constitutional boundaries of institutional authority in war. Key 
aspects of the parameters of institutional purview in war—including its own further 
role in delineating and maintaining them—remained in many ways undefined. 
 
The Pursuit of Formal Entrenchment 
The Second World War marked the beginnings of what many describe as a 
broad change in the balance of institutional powers relating to warmaking, with a 
marked growth in executive power. The war effort entailed a massive expansion of 
martial capacities that were sustained in many ways after the Allied victory,
277
 and 
the decades that followed saw the development and growth of arguments for 
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independent executive authority to use the martial capacities of the United States as 
well as a growing embrace of legal constitutionalism—a view towards the judicial 
settlement of the boundaries of institutional authority as well as the enactment of 
statutory framework measures to govern the intelligence agencies, military, and the 
conduct of war.
278
 While the material and structural changes took root after the war 
are important elements constructing the contemporary political system for war,
279
 the 
relatively recent emphasis on formal settlement of the war powers has also had 
critical effects on the balance of war powers. As we will see, legal constitutionalism 
tends to yield broad executive discretion under the aegis of legality, particularly in 
times of perceived exigency, and undermines political deliberation on prospective 
uses of force as well as the proper ambits of institutional authority relating to war. 
Though the use of American military force against the Axis nations in the 
Second World War was authorized by formal declaration of war, the Supreme Court 
did take up a number of disputes relating to warmaking, and it largely adopted a 
posture of deference to the political branches—to broad legislative delegations as 
well as to presidential discretion,
280
 while at the same time reflecting and reinforcing 
                                                
278
 Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers, 65–82; David J. Barron and Martin S. 
Lederman, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional History,” 
1058. 
279
 This point, along with an argument that at least some of these developments 
should be understood as constitutional—that is, as aspects of constitutional 
construction—will be picked up in subsequent chapters. 
280
 Examples of deference to legislative delegation include: United States v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289  (1942), Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 
(1944), and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 505 (1944). Deference to executive 
discretion absent authorizing legislation includes Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 116 
a growing view towards judicial supremacy. The now infamous decision in 
Korematsu v. United States, which lent constitutional legitimacy to the internment of 
Japanese Americans, is a prominent example how a Court that understands itself as 
the ultimate guardian of constitutionality is likely to formally expand and entrench 
executive authority when faced a dispute over the parameters of institutional authority 
in wartime, a process that inhibits broader political deliberation. Justice Black’s 
majority opinion held that the Court had the authority and responsibility to adjudicate 
disputes over the constitutionality of the actions of government but found no 
constitutional restriction that would justify judicial interference of the execution of its 
internment policy. The Court emphasized that had this been “a case involving the 
imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice” 
its duty to reach a different ruling would have been clear. However the executive 
order was upheld because the Court said it was unable to judge the claim of a military 
imperative made “by the properly constituted military authorities,” and thus could not 
reject it as contrary to the Constitution.
281
  
Fully aware of its own inherent limitations to assess questions of military 
necessity but compelled to rule what the law is—the written constitution here taken as 
the ‘law’ in question—the Court seemingly expanded the boundaries of 
constitutionality to permit what was acknowledged as an extraordinary and unseemly 
exercise of power. Such broadening of the president’s independent constitutional 
authority by the judiciary affects not only the outcome of a particular case, but also 
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has important consequences for the balance of institutional power as well as the 
deliberative quality of the system for war in the near and long term. Giving 
constitutional sanction to what was widely acknowledged as an extraordinary exercise 
of executive discretion—so characterized by both the Court and the executive 
branch—undermines the prospects for the political interrogation and judgment of 
whether that particular use of governmental power was in fact necessary. Just because 
judges rightly understand themselves to lack the capacity to adequately judge the 
claim of military imperative does entail that others outside the executive branch 
cannot judge the wisdom, or better the necessity,
282
 of such an act. Once the Court 
deems the act within the bounds of constitutionality, it becomes more difficult for 
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Congress to take up the matter—to permit or restrict the action through law, or at 
least to pressure the executive to limit itself only to what is legitimately necessary for 
security and no more. A ruling by the Supreme Court affirming an a-legal or normally 
unconstitutional exercise of executive power alters the political burden of both action 
and justification: the president can now cite a constitutional authority for an ongoing 
action that has been legitimized by the Court, while Congress must have good 
reasons—and the political will—to interfere with an active exercise of 
constitutionally legitimate power on behalf of national security. Absent the alarm that 
can be triggered by the claim that the executive order is unconstitutional, or at least 
unauthorized, members of Congress are less likely to feel the pressures of public 
awareness and concern, and less able to muster the public against the presidential 
exercise of power.
283
 And the executive branch will feel less pressure to publically 
justify why its exercise of power was necessary—here why the broad internment of 
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sphere, while knowing the executive as well as Congress can each do the same in 
their respective spheres, this can enable it to publicly flag executive discretion or 
Congressional abdication—governmental action in transgression, or in the absense, of 
law—without stopping what may in fact be a necessary exercise of extraordinary 
power or legislating where Congress has fallen short.  
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Japanese Americans was the most minimal action necessary to actually protect the 
security of the United States.
284
 
The lasting ramifications of judicial settlement of the boundaries of 
institutional power are equally important. As Justice Jackson stressed in his dissenting 
opinion in Korematsu, giving constitutional sanction to what all parties in the matter 
agreed was a relatively extraordinary action, outside of norms of prior governmental 
behavior, could lead to the entrenchment and further expansion of such power:  
Once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to 
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the 
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the 
principle [which] then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of 




The self-understanding that the Court has the institutional responsibility to resolve a 
dispute over the boundaries of institutional power under the Constitution, combined 
with judicially unknowable possibility that the policy in question was in fact 
necessary for national security, not only led the Court to set a constitutional precedent 
that might yield similar internment policies in the future but also sent a broader signal 
regarding how it might treat claims of military necessity more generally going 
forward. Instead of declaring the act unconstitutional without specific statutory 
authorization—thus leaving open the possibility for the post-hoc ratification of the 
policy, or clarifying that the act was not based in law but refusing to rule this act of 
executive discretion unconstitutional and enjoin it—thus refraining from expressing 
its independent constitutional judgment and leaving the matter a “political question” 
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for Congress to weigh in on, potentially through a statute that the judiciary might then 
enforce—the Court showed it would accept and affirm the executive’s own appraisal 
of its authority under the Constitution to meet whatever it deems a military 
necessity.
286
 That this ruling dealt with the domestic infringement of individual 
liberties only reinforced the limitations of the Court should it be faced with claims of 
the necessity of the independent use of military force abroad.  
Eight years later the Court was faced with a wartime dispute over the 
propriety of an executive order for the seizure of domestic steel mills—to ensure their 
operation in support of the fighting in Korea in the face of a severe labor dispute—
area in which Congress had arguably already legislated.
287
 For all of the justices in 
the majority, the fact that Congress had previously considered and rejected delegating 
authority to the president to engage in the action at issue, and had authorized less 
extreme remedies for resolving such labor disputes, played an important role in their 
decision to affirm the injunction against the Truman Administration. While upholding 
the rule of law in this way—deciding a particular case where there was statutory law 
upon which to rule—was in many ways in line with the Court’s earlier jurisprudence, 
Youngstown is widely heralded as a landmark case because the wide range of 
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justifications for its holding were not limited to enforcing existing law but extended 
to claims regarding the constitutional boundaries of executive power and implicated 
their judicial enforcement. The concurrence penned by Justice Jackson is the most 
nuanced and has had the most lasting influence, framing subsequent discussions of 
the separation of powers in the United States—serving as a key precedent in the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and as well as a lens through with the parameters 
of institutional power are more widely understood.
288
  
Jackson put forth what he described as “a somewhat over-simplified grouping 
of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his 
powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of 
relativity,”
289
 a tripartite schema for how judges should engage disputes on the 
separation of powers. The president has the greatest authority when acting pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization of Congress, because it “includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” The Court would thus 
give such Congressionally authorized exercise of governmental power should be “the 
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” In 
contrast, Presidential power is “at its lowest ebb” when he acts against the express or 
implied will of Congress. Here the Court will review the discretionary act with 
heightened scrutiny, because if it sustained such a “conclusive and preclusive power” 
in the executive as constitutional, the Court will be “disabling Congress from acting 
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on the subject.” Where Congress has not legislated, either to grant or deny executive 
authority, the President   
…can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which 
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference, or 
acquiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not 
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any 
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 




This articulation of a “zone of twilight” was intended to preserve executive discretion 
in the absence of law as a political question—to posit a realm bounded by politics 
where the Court need not tread. However, the necessity of a judicial role in resolving 
disputes that fall into the other categories, and thus the need to determine which 
category any disputes falls, seems to necessitate judicial inquiry and decision in all 
such cases.
291
 Was the exercise of executive power treading into an area in which 
Congress had already acted—and, if so, what precisely had it ‘expressly or impliedly’ 
authorized or proscribed? And did Congress transgress the boundaries of ‘preclusive’ 
executive authority through any limits it sought to impose on presidential action? 
While Jackson’s schema overtly sought to limit the judicial role in constitutional 
separation of powers disputes, its logic points towards the progressive settlement of 
the boundaries of institutional authority through legal processes. Not only does it 
invite future disputes over the boundaries of independent—constitutional in the 
absence of contrary law—as well as preclusive—constitutional despite contrary 
law—executive power to be taken up by the judiciary, but it also seems invite 
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Congressional reliance on Courts to constrain executive discretion, as both its express 




Jackson did, however, signal that such reliance would likely be tenuous for 
disputes relating to the use of military force abroad. He took special care in his 
opinion note to draw a distinction between his willingness as a justice to enjoin a 
domestic seizure of property with the standards he would apply when faced with a 
dispute over the use of military force abroad. Although in his view Congress had the 
authority under the constitution to “impinge upon even [the President’s military] 
command functions” through legal regulation, this was only so “to some unknown 
extent.” When presented with a dispute over the regulation of warmaking, Jackson 
would afford “the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s] 
exclusive function…[to] command the instruments of national force…when turned 
against the outside world for the security of our society.”
293
 While Jackson sought to 
emphasize that it is Congress, and not the Court, who must act to prevent the 
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presidency from being “further aggrandize[d],” his view of the proper judicial parsing 
of regulations on the use of force abroad suggests that the Congressional tool he 
recommends for conscribing executive aggrandizement, “the power to legislate for 
emergencies,” might not necessarily be best effectuated through formal legal 
processes.
294
 Youngstown was both a step towards, and harbinger of the future perils 
of, legal constitutionalism. Though the Court struck down the act of executive 
discretion, it did so partly on constitutional grounds,
295
 and even Jackson’s more 
modest opinion contained an implicit tension—the move towards judicial settlement 
of the boundaries of institutional authority and a robust role for statutory frameworks 
backstopped by courts,
296
 along with a judicial hesitancy to enforce limits on the use 
of force abroad—that hinted at the consequences of legal constitutionalism for the 
deliberative system for war that would follow. 
Throughout the Vietnam War there were a variety of attempts to constrain the 
use of military force through legal processes, which occurred in the courts as well as 
through a variety of legislative approaches, and culminated in the passage of a 
framework statute designed to regulate the future use of military force. Despite the 
volume of lawsuits disputing the president’s authority to conduct warfare in the 
absence of a formal declaration of war or explicit Congressional authorization that 
were filed throughout the war, the judiciary repeatedly avoided ruling on the 
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constitutionality of the use of military force, largely by dismissing them on grounds 
of nonjusticiability.
297
 The litigants in these cases ranged widely, including citizens, 
servicemen, members of Congress, as well as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
By and large the judiciary explicitly treated the question of executive authority in the 
absence of a formal declaration of war as a political question, “outside the judicial 
function.”
298
 As the war progressed, judges began to explore the question of 
Congressional participation in the war in their opinions—whether Congress had 
formally authorized, regulated, or supported the ongoing use of martial force—but 
continued to dismiss the cases as nonjusticiable political questions.
299
 Later, some 
Federal courts began to state that the political questions doctrine did not preclude it 
from taking up the question of whether there had been adequate Congressional 
participation, but ultimately held that some minimal—but unspecified—level of 
Congressional participation necessary for a prolonged war had been met, with one 
judge observing: “[t]his is not a case where the President relied on his own power 
without any supporting action from Congress, as in the steel seizure.”
300
 Towards the 
end of the conflict, at the time of greatest political opposition to the war, some judges 
did indicate that there might be some situations where judicial limitation of 
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independent executive warmaking might be warranted, for example when faced with 
clearly unauthorized escalations of warfare,
301
 but no limitations on the use of force—
either constitutional or statutory—were enforced by the judiciary during the Vietnam 
War. After the political tides had turned on the war, though not quite in post-hoc 
fashion, the courts insisted on their role in delineating and enforcing the parameters of 
institutional authority in war—despite having never actually acted to constrain 
executive warmaking throughout the entirety of the war. 
Congress certainly had not been inactive during the war. At first it delegated 
broad authority to President Johnson to use conventional military force in Southeast 
Asia.
302
 Subsequently Congress acted to limit executive discretion over the scope of 
the fighting and eventually sought, through law, to stop American military 
involvement in the region altogether. The legislative attempts to limits the warfare 
included a provision in a 1970 Defense Appropriation Act forbidding the use funds 
“to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops in to Laos or 
Thailand.”
303
 When President Nixon decided instead to send troops into Cambodia, 
the Senate was prompted to conduct a wide-ranging debate on the power of Congress 
to regulate and limit the war in Cambodia. Robust debate continued for seven-weeks 
and culminated in the enactment of the Cooper-Church Amendment, which 
proscribed any funds being used to finance the introduction of troops to Cambodia. 
However, by the time the measure was finalized all ground troops had left Cambodia, 
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leaving Congress and the President in agreement on that particular issue. Later, amid 
mounting Congressional and public pressure, and after vetoing a bill that cut off all 
funds for combat activities, President Nixon signed a bill that instantiated a delayed 
cut off of funds, giving the President six more weeks to conclude the war.
304
 Finally, 
in light of the difficulty Congress faced in trying to stop the war, it passed a 
framework statute to regulate the future uses of force—the War Powers Resolution 
(WPR)—over President Nixon’s Veto.
305
  
The provisions of the statue read as an assertion of Congressional authority 
over the use of military force and an attempt to clarify and entrench many of the 
questions at play in the war powers debate as described in the previous chapter. The 
WPR demands information sharing on pending and ongoing conflicts,
306
 delineates a 
small range of circumstances where executive discretion to initiate force is authorized 
in advanced,
307
 requires formal Congressional assent to continue any military conflict 
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beyond a short window for executive discretion,
308
 and authorizes Congress to 
compel the President to remove the armed forces from hostilities by the passage of a 
concurrent resolution.
309
 In short, the statutory framework sought to delimit 
independent executive authority to initiate warmaking solely to cases of necessity, 
and provide a limited timeframe for presidents gain formal Congressional 
authorization before being legally compelled to cease combat operations.
310
 The WPR 
was thus an attempt to clarify the warmaking process and reap the benefits of 
settlement. Ostensibly establishing in law that any use of force must be justified as a 
necessary emergency measure or through a regular process of bicameral debate and 
authorization—either up front or in short order after necessary response to a crisis—
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the law ostensibly provides a solid foundation for reliable inter-departmental 
coordination and deliberation on matters of war. 
However, while the provisions of the WPR attempt to construct a tightly 
regulated process for warmaking and place a tight legal leash on executive discretion 
to initiate martial force abroad, such formalization can have decidedly mixed 
consequences for the process of deliberation and decision. Presidents have 
consistently avoided submitting reports to Congress that would start the sunset clock, 
limiting information sharing and inhibiting the reliable consultation that Congress 
looked to secure. The law has also arguably provided a legal basis for up to ninety 
days of warfare without additional Congressional approval, which alters the default 
requirements of justification and venues for contestation. When independent 
executive authority to use military force is a subject of constitutional ambiguity, 
presidents face at least some risk of censure by the Supreme Court—as the Court has 
occasionally suggested that it might enforce a constitutional limits on independent 
executive warmaking—as well as the real prospect of political contestation mobilized 
by legislative elites leveraging the claim of a flagrant transgression of a constitutional 
boundary. Such built-in political pressure creates a high bar of justification for 
presidents who independently order the use of force: leaning on claims of 
constitutional authority as commander in chief or the presidential oath to “preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution” calls for an explanation of why initiating 
combat without the formal assent of Congress was in fact necessary, and in a way 
reaffirms Congressional participation in warmaking as a norm. Accordingly, such 
political pressures provides a real political incentive to get authorization whenever 
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feasible. Though the language of the statute attempts to codify the widely held view 
that the Constitution requires formal legislative authorization except in cases of 
necessity, it has been widely seen to formalize the once relatively ambiguous 
constitutional principle that it is up to the president’s sole judgment when a national 
emergency necessitates the use of military force. Additionally, the sunset clause 
permits defenders of executive discretion to claim that the statute is properly 
understood as a delegation of authority over short-term military initiatives to 
presidents in general, as Congress formalizing it intention to play primarily a post-hoc 
role in the warmaking process.
311
 A legal framework seemingly designed to assert 
and bolster Congress’s role in warmaking and counter the growing claims and 
practice of discretionary executive warmaking has, when seen from a different light, 
constructed a rhetorical scaffolding for executive discretion—presidents can now 
leverage claims to both constitutional and legal authority to initiate warfare on their 
own accord.  
Beyond bolstering the executive discretion it seeks to constrain, the War 
Powers Resolution might additionally be understood to yield even more perverse 
consequences for the planning and execution of military initiatives. The prospect that 
any military hostilities will be terminated after sixty or ninety days solely due to 
Congressional inaction can provide a powerful incentive for presidents to order the 
use of overwhelming force at the start of any conflict. Presidents reasonably would 
seek to avoid spending the political capital required to gain formal authorization to 
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continue the conflict if it could conceivably be completed quickly. Even more 
importantly, they will seek to mitigate the risk that the military mission will be forced 
to end without completing its purposes due solely to the gridlock that can be caused 
by an intransigent Congressional minority. The sunset clause as written thus 
constructs a warmaking rationality that runs counter to the norm of proportionality 
that is built into the concept of necessity—instead of using the minimal military 
might necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose, or even to offer the best military 
strategy, military planners must ask the armed forces to fight in such a way that will 
best guarantee victory in war in a very short timeframe.
312
 Additionally, while the 
very possibility that Congressional inaction can result in the premature termination of 
a nascent military initiative can distort executive war planning, the same deadline can 
impinge robust Congressional deliberation and action. With the sunset clause, 
Congress has ostensibly also required itself to openly engage the wisdom of the 
executive-led use of force at just the point when it would likely face a political 
context, due to such factors as the “rally ‘round the flag” effect,
313
 that would make it 
difficult to express and justify opposition, even if merely through inaction. At its most 
pernicious, such circumstances might induce Congress to formally authorize the 
ongoing military conflict and swallow any criticisms—and thus refrain from stringent 
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demands for presidential explanation—of the necessity and purposes of, as well as the 
strategy for, the warfare already in progress.
314
    
Since the Vietnam War and the passage of the War Powers Resolution a broad 
pattern of warmaking politics has emerged—“executive initiative, congressional 
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance”
315
—which brings the overarching ramifications 
of the legalization of the constitutional politics of war into relief. Defenders of 
executive discretion in war, including every president from Nixon through Obama, 
argue that there is an independent executive authority under the constitution to move 
troops around the world and to use military force to protect and promote the security 
interests of the United States, and many accordingly assert that standing statutory 
constraints on executive discretion in war—like the WPR—are unconstitutional.
316
 In 
practice, presidents have seen fit to order short-term uses of military force without 
clear Congressional authorization: armed intervention in Grenada in 1983 and air 
strikes in Libya in 1986 ordered by President Reagan,
317
 a military incursion into 
Panama ordered by President Bush in 1989, operations in Somalia and Iraq in 1993, 
Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, and Yugoslavia in 1999 ordered by President 
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 and the strikes in Libya ordered by President Obama in 2011.
319
 Though in 
many of these cases presidents have gone through some of the motions set forth in the 
War Powers Resolution, they have carefully avoided acknowledging its force or 
actually triggering its substantive provisions, and have also often argued that legal 
grounding for these initiatives came from international agreements and existing laws 
outside the WPR.
320
 For military operations that were anticipated to be large-scale 
and long-term, presidents have sought—and received—formal Congressional 
authorization, though independent executive use of force was always overtly 
maintained as within the bounds of the president’s constitutional authority.
321
  
Despite the continual assertions of plenary executive war power in the face of 
a statutory framework designed to regulate it, the substantive provisions of the WPR 
have never been formally enforced in practice. Though the judiciary has occasionally 
hinted that it might step in to resolve a constitutional impasse over the use of military 
force, it has largely premised the prospects of any substantive judicial intervention 
                                                
318
 Ibid., 177–201. 
319
 See the introduction to chapter 2 of this work. 
320
 As Koh sketched the basic point: “Even a glimpse of the recent history reveals a 
consistent pattern of executive circumvention of legislative constraint in foreign 
affairs that stretches back to the Vietnam War and persists….” Koh, The National 
Security Constitution, 38; Or as Posner and Vermeule more forcefully frame it: 
“Framework statutes are one of liberal legalism’s principle instruments of executive 
constraint, in a world of little constitutional constraint. But have been tried, they have 
been found wanting.” Posner and Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, 89. 
321
 In the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War, while the Bush (I) administration repeatedly 
argued that could initiate offensive military force against Iraq without Congressional 
approval, formal authorization was eventually requested and granted. For the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, beginning in 2001 and 2003 respectively, the George W. Bush 
administration received broad formal authorization from Congress. Debate on the 
latter, however, was skewed in part by the administration’s loud trumpeting of faulty 
intelligence. Fisher, Presidential War Power, 169–174, 202–230.  
 134 
into warmaking on Congress having exhausted its independent institutional means to 
challenge the use of military force.
322
 And although there have been a number of 
instances where members of Congress have attempted to challenge the use of military 
force in the courts since the law was passed,
323
 the statute has never been subject to 
any formal judicial review or enforcement.
324
 Additionally, in other decisions the 
Court shown a propensity to defer to executive discretion in interpreting and 
implementing other statutory frameworks,
325
 thus requiring Congress to be both 
exceedingly clear in its proscriptions and willing to proactively contest executive 
transgressions of the law in question for standing legal constraints to have practical 
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 For its part, Congress as a whole has not forcefully challenged the growing 
claims of executive discretion in war and has never attempted to compel the President 
to comply with the War Powers Resolution or even to file a report that would activate 
it.
327
 And when presented with the prospects of a major war, it has willingly delegated 
great discretion over the use of military force to presidents through sweeping 
authorizations.
328
 The turn towards statutory frameworks to close the lacunae of 
institutional power in war replicates, if not compounds, the problems associated with 
judicial supremacy discussed above. When faced with a dispute over the legality of an 
executive act of war, the judiciary—which had refused to constrain executive 
discretion without a formal Congressional prohibition, thus inviting statutory 
regulation of the warmaking process—has subsequently permitted existing statutory 
frameworks to be stretched to by creative executive interpretation. Formal constraints 
on the use of military force become a legal aegis for executive discretion and 
Congress is left to muster opposition against a purportedly illegal, rather than 
unconstitutional, executive action conducted under the banner of American national 
security interests. 
The pattern of politics engendered by legal constitutionalism and the 
consequences for the deliberations for war were crystallized in the military strikes in 
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Libya ordered by President Obama in 2011.
329
 Despite the election of a president who 
had championed the legislature’s constitutional role in authorizing the use of force 
except in cases of self-defense, the United States engaged in a bombing campaign 
without specific Congressional authorization or appropriations. Though the Obama 
administrated provided Congress with notice of impending military involvement in 
Libya as required under the War Powers Resolution, ostensibly starting the sixty day 
sunset clock and reinforcing the legitimacy of the statute in general as well as its 
substantively constraining provisions, it subsequently insisted that the missile strikes 
and drone attacks were not “hostilities” as defined under the WPR.
330
 Congress not 
only did not insist on presidential compliance with the statutory framework, but it 
never expressed a formal institutional viewpoint on the use of force through an 
authorization, prohibition, or even through specific funding. A lawsuit filed by fifteen 
members of Congress, which claimed the terms of the WPR had been transgressed, 
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330
 In crafting this statutory interpretation Harold Koh, who was serving as Legal 
Advisor to the State Department but had previously criticized the increasingly 
unilateral politics of warmaking in his National Security Constitution, reaffirmed 
what he once sought to change. In an astonishing foreshadowing of future events, in 
that book Koh proposed the following hypothetical: 
  
If asked…whether the president can…bomb Colonel Qaddafi’s headquarters, 
the presidential lawyer must answer three questions: (1) Do we have the legal 
authority to act? (2) Can Congress stop us? And (3) Can anyone challenge our 
action in court?  
 
But given his analysis that the president’s advantage in foreign affairs derives 
“first…because it has incentives to take the initiative in foreign affairs and has often 
done so by construing laws that were enacted to constrain executive authority to 
authorize its actions,” along with the contemporary trend of Congressional 
acquiescence and judicial tolerance, his actions as advisor to the president might 
leave us less than astonished. Koh, The National Security Constitution, 5, 116–118, 
emphasis added; Koh, “Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya.” 
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was dismissed for lack of standing, in line with contemporary judicial precedent. The 
contemporary view towards formally settling ambits of institutional authority in war 
has not only failed to achieve its goals, but the emphasis on law and courts has 
seemingly enabled what they seek to constrain. It has created a legal structure upon 
which presidents can, perhaps disingenuously, ground their authority to initiate 
force,
331





Conclusion: The Perils of Legal Constitutionalism 
The contemporary pattern of politics for warmaking must be understood as 
occurring within the context of a pervading view towards formal settlement of the 
boundaries of institutional authority in foreign affairs. While for most of American 
history the precise allocation of authority over the use of military force under the 
constitution remained a matter of considerable formal ambiguity, following the 
Second World War presidents began to increasingly assert broad independent 
authority to act on matters of national security that was met with an increasing view 
towards fixing the ambits of war authority through juridical mechanisms. This 
embrace of legal constitutionalism in regards to warmaking has important 
consequences for the deliberative quality of decision-making process for war and the 
constraint of executive discretion.  
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As the basic premise of legal constitutionalism—that every exercise of 
governmental power must be within the law—becomes the predominating principle 
of the constitutional order, it undermines the constitutional politics that best serves as 
a deliberative constraint on the use of military force. When the written constitution is 
understood as law, the debate over the boundaries of institutional authority becomes a 
legal debate, to be ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court. But as the foregoing 
overview described, the interventions of the judiciary into the boundaries of 
institutional authority in war have not constructed an adequate legal framework for 
the use of military force, nor has it shown itself willing or able to substantively 
restrain executive power on matters of national security. The modern Supreme Court 
has, however, repeatedly asserted its rightful role as the final word on such issues,
333
 
reinforcing the predominance of legal constitutionalism in the political culture while 
quietly showing its very limitations. 
The pull of legal constitutionalism has also led Congress to try to formalize 
the warmaking process in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, further constructing of 
the politics of warmaking on legal grounds. Even when carefully drafted, such laws 
can be interpreted—via creative statutory construction by executive branch lawyers, 
its own kind of executive discretion—as broad delegations. At the same time, the 
view towards the judiciary as steward of a legally ordered constitution has 
encouraged Congressional passivity, if not irresponsibility, as members of Congress 
increasingly look to the judiciary to “clean up” the constitutional and legal ambiguity 
surrounding the boundaries of institutional authority on matters of national security 
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that it has played a role in creating.
334
 A pervasive embrace of judicial supremacy 
thus has diffuse but important effects on the balance of power between Congress and 
the president, the Court’s interventions creating a kind of “judicial overhang” that 
misdirects Congress in its pursuit of its constitutional responsibilities if not to 
altogether colonizing its constitutional judgment.
335
 Legal constitutionalism has also 
had important consequences for executive branch decision-making and public 
justification on matters of war. Though statutory frameworks such as the WPR 
designed to establish bright-line constraints on the use of force have proven 
susceptible to being transformed into legal aegises for executive discretion to initiate 
military hostilities, they can also be understood to lead presidents to publically justify 
their decision to use force in legalistic terms and even to tailor its exercise—such as 
the use of brief but overwhelming force—to avoid any legalistic judgment instead of 
making a public case for his preferred military ends and means or basing the decision 
for war on an assessment of what would be approved through more robust 
mechanisms of retrospective public judgment. Perhaps most concerning of all is the 
disciplining effect that legal constitutionalism has on the constitutional judgment of 
the citizenry in relation to the use of military force, altering the sense of responsibility 
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and agency the people have over constitutional elaboration and practice,
336
 a point 
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Political Constitutionalism in War: Forms and Norms 
 
Constitution making outside the courts is more free-form, more unsettled, 





There is never a constitutionally mandated allocation of authority, except in 
the sense that the Constitution creates a framework within which president 





The institutional design of the regime must…facilitate deliberation, that is, the 
exercise of practical political reason through which the public interest is 
given concrete meaning; and, in order to make that possible, it must prevent 






Where the formal settlement of the boundaries of institutional authority 
aspired to by legal constitutionalism has been an exercise in sharply diminishing 
returns for the deliberative constraint of the use of military force, an alternative 
version of constitutionalism embraces the kinetic tensions of continual contestation 
over such political questions as an inherent, and potentially productive, element of the 
American constitutional order. At its most basic, political constitutionalism posits that 
matters of political principle—here the decision for war—ought to be contingently 
determined through politics rather than fixed in advance for all time.
340
 Bounds on the 
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 “A political constitutionalism…concentrat[es] on who exercises power and how, 
rather than trying a priori to circumscribe where it can be used and for what 
purposes.” Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, 146; Consideration of the proper 
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exercise of political power are properly established by the dynamic equilibrium of the 
interaction, and sometime competition,
 341
 of interested political agents and 
institutions. Though the Constitution clearly anticipates a minimal level of 
participation of both Congress and the president for the use of military force and 
grants specific powers that can be used to bolster their respective roles—the 
constitutional common ground discussed in chapter two—a political conception of 
constitutionalism centers on a considerable measure of flexibility in the decision 
making process for war as a general matter over time and the potential necessity, if 
not inevitability, of some executive discretion in any given instance of martial 
conflict. From the lens of political constitutionalism the unsettled nature of 
constitutional warmaking authority, and the tumult over the proper process for 
warmaking that can arise on the occasion or in the aftermath of a particular offensive 
initiative, are integral mechanisms of the constitutional design—features to be built 
upon rather than bugs to be eradicated from the system. Constitutional indeterminacy 
serves as an invitation for the branches of government to assert themselves on matters 
of foreign affairs: an inducement not only to influence particular decisions on the use 
of military force but also to participate in the construction of the legal and political 
context for future security decisions. But while the manner through which the United 
States decides for war is not reducible to textual provisions of the Constitution, it is 
                                                
ambits of institutional power are linked to considerations of policy: “Constitutional 
theory rooted in constitutional politics focuses on public policy rather than on abstract 
moral values.” Graber, “Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory,” 330. 
341
 A view aptly summarized by Jeffrey Tulis: “The founders urged that “line 
drawing” among the spheres of authority be the product of political conflict among 
the branches, not the result of dispassionate legal analysis.” Tulis, “The Two 
Constitutional Presidencies,” 102. 
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emphatically a constitutional issue—the balance of fundamental political principles in 
practice is determined by patterns of politics that are ordered in many ways by their 
relation to the written constitution. 
Despite a burgeoning recognition of the perils of the pervasive view towards 
formal constitutional settlement,
342
 and particularly a nascent scholarly wave that 
rejects legal constitutionalism in connection to the balance of institutional power in 
war,
343
 there remain significant differences among political conceptions of the 
constitutional ordering of the war powers. The primary distinctions center on 
constitutional forms and norms: what elements of the political order are emphasized, 
if not simply included, in the idea of a constitutional order upon which the theory of 
political constitutionalism is built; and what, if any, normative leverage can be 
derived from an analysis of that political constitution to guide an evaluation of the 
contemporary warmaking system. Analyses of the war powers from the vantage point 
of political constitutionalism are highly institutional in focus, hinging on the differing 
characters and functions of the branches of the federal government and the varying 
output of their interactions.
344
 They share a view of constitutionalism as 
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 Such analyses thus proceed from a conception of the constitutional order as 
comprised primarily by the patterns of politics within and between the institutions 
that are ordered in significant ways by a relation to the constitutional text. For a 
characterization of the institutions that make up the separation of powers in terms of 
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predominately comprised by “separated institutions sharing power” rather than the 
progressive formal entrenchment of the bounds of political power resulting from 
continual exegesis and enforcement of the written constitution by the Supreme 
Court.
345
 However, while embracing the idea that “there is no one constitutionally 
correct method for waging war,”
346
 recent political approaches to the war powers 
differ on whether and how the operation of a flexible constitutional system for 
warmaking can be judged. If there is no singular bright-line procedure for how the 
United States decides for war, and the warmaking process is properly bounded by 
politics, is whatever emerges from the political system—what the politics will bear at 
a given moment—acceptable? Or is there a constitutional basis upon which to assess 
the patterns of politics that determine whether and how the martial power of the 
United States is exercised abroad?
347
 And how are constitutionally salutary 
warmaking orders to be constructed—debated, structured, assessed, and reordered 
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over time? Finally, what constitutive modes engender such a deliberative 
constitutional politics on matters of war? The different approaches to such questions 
of constitutional forms and norms have important consequences not only for 
analyzing contemporary uses of force—whether the constitutionally-based 
warmaking order functions well—but also have implications for the construction and 
maintenance of a deliberative constitutional order, and the broader deliberative 
system of which it is a central element, on matters of war. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the baseline perspective of political 
constitutionalism that holds that matters of constitutional principle such as the 
parameters of institutional authority regarding the use of military force properly 
depend on the outcome of political interactions between the branches and thus that 
there is no single, fixed process for the of use force under the Constitution. When the 
boundaries of power are to be delimited by politics rather than parchment distinctions 
the ostensible range of constitutionally possible and permissible warmaking processes 
appears quite broad, including the prospects of extensive executive discretion as well 
as a president constrained by a highly assertive Congress. The discussion then turns to 
engage recent treatments of the war powers that have pushed this emphasis on the 
constitution as political structure rather than strict legal code even further, drawing 
normative implications from the institutional framework. One version argues that the 
executive discretion in using military force characteristic of contemporary American 
foreign affairs should not merely be understood as one of a broad range of 
constitutional possibilities, but rather a realist assessment of constitutional function 
sets the unfettered president as the rightful norm. While the constitution is rightly 
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understood to invite institutional struggle for the direction of foreign affairs, the 
natures of the branches it establishes advantage executive discretion in war and the 
contemporary warmaking order is largely a preordained outcome of the fundamental 
constitutional design.  
Alternative analyses draw broader normative aspirations for the warmaking 
order from the constitutional text and the institutional structures its establishes, even 
if its bounds are not to be strictly fixed and formally entrenched. An embrace of 
constitutional flexibility for the process by which the United States decides for war 
not only entails a rejection of formal constitutional settlement and an acceptance of 
the prospect of some executive discretion over the use of force, but also demands that 
the constitutional “invitation to struggle” remains a continuing invitation to a fair 
fight. At minimum a political constitutionalism must include the enduring possibility 
of a substantive rebalancing of institutional purviews, which requires the ‘hard’ 
mechanisms for political constraint established by the constitution to remain 
practically viable. Thicker versions of political constitutionalism move beyond this 
baseline aversion to constitutional entrenchment to develop prescriptions for the 
functioning of the constitutional order in relation to war. While the practical 
possibility of a reordering of the warmaking process entails the prospect of broad 
deliberation over its proper contours, a thick political constitutionalism eschews 
isolated and unchallengeable institutional purviews and emphasizes the importance of 
recurrent inter-branch interactions that yield systemic deliberation on the use of 
military force as well as the process by which the decision for war is made. 
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A Perilous Invitation to Struggle: Anything Goes? 
 
While legal constitutionalism maintains that the lines of political authority 
ought to be settled through processes of juridical entrenchment, political 
constitutionalism takes its bearing directly from the unsettled, often contestatory 
nature of American constitutional practice. The contentious and variable character of 
institutional purviews under the Constitution is particularly evident in matters war. 
Edward Corwin’s seminal description of the constitution of foreign affairs is a useful 
starting point for engaging the idea of the political constitution of the war powers, as 
he decisively avoids any emphasis on parchment distinctions yielding fixed political 
practice and maintains an analytical focus on a flexible constitutional model girded by 
the interplay of institutional politics:   
What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer upon the 
President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain 
other powers of the same nature upon the Senate, and still other such powers 
upon Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final 
voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to 
resolve…. All of which amounts to saying that the Constitution, considered 
only for its affirmative grants of powers which are capable of affecting the 





The disjunction between this oft-cited passage and the pervasive contemporary view 
towards formal constitutional settlement can be partly understood in terms of 
historical context. First published in 1940 and reprinted as-is in a revised 1948 
edition, Corwin’s constitutional analysis occurred during a period that bracketed the 
Supreme Court’s infamous Koretmatsu decision but which predated the landmark 
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judicial review of the separation of powers relating to war in the Youngtown case—
early steps in the change from ‘the rule of law without settlement’ to the ‘pursuit of 
formal entrenchment’ described in the previous chapter. What would become a 
growing embrace of legalistic efforts to gain and keep institutional advantage—or 
perhaps to stem defeat—within the struggle Corwin identified was at best a nascent, 
and relatively unremarkable, development at the time of his study. 
 Corwin’s emphatic claim that all that the Constitution does is to distribute 
institutional powers that can be used to affect foreign affairs appears at first blush to 
abjure the possibility of constitutional judgment in the realm of external 
governmental action. Stated most simply, such a conception of political 
constitutionalism would entail that when it comes to matters of foreign affairs, such 
as the exercise of military force, whatever the political system will bear is 
constitutionally acceptable—anything goes. Such a starkly realist view of 
constitutionalism cannot be fairly imputed to Corwin, however, who elsewhere made 
a distinction between constitutional theory and practice:  
Theoretically the power [to independently order military force] is a defensive 
power and reserved for grave and sudden emergencies. Practically the limit to it 




Though he did not delve deeply into how this normative interpretation was derived or 
how this sense of constitutional propriety should be translated into political practice, 
this underlying view led Corwin to a concern over an observable growth of executive 
power, particularly in wartime.
350
 Marked by a combination of discretionary 
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 The connection between the pull of that normative sense of constitutional 
propriety—a distrust of executive discretion and penchant for the rule of law 
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executive action, statutory delegations, as well as rulings by the Supreme Court, 
Corwin worried that American constitutional development in this area might be a 
kind of political ratchet, characterized by unidirectional movement towards broader 
executive power.
351
 This tension between constitutional description and prescription 
spotlights a potential conundrum for any theory of political constitutionalism. Can a 
conception of constitutionalism that centers on political contestation determining 
matters of political principle—here delimiting the proper process for the decision for 
war—also provide principled, constitutional, grounds upon which to assess the 
working constitution? One influential line of contemporary scholarship, described 
below, embraces a kind of constitutional realism that seemingly abjures substantive 
bounds on the politics of warmaking. Ostensibly neutral, this conception of the 
political constitution has been interpreted by some to not only permit, but also in 
many ways to promote, executive discretion in war. 
 Continuing on where Corwin stopped short, a recent wave of scholarship 
emphasizes and embraces the strikingly protean character of American 
constitutionalism in foreign affairs. Sharpening the basic premise forged by Corwin, 
Mark Tushnet argues that “the Constitution prescribes no distribution of power at all, 
                                                
seemingly stitched into the American constitutional soul, even if not definitively 
inscribed in the constitutional text—and the actual exercise of those political limits—
how the constitutional lacunae in regards to warmaking are filled; the constitution in 
practice constructed politically—is critical to the notion of political constitutionalism 
discussed in what follows. 
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but only sets up a framework of political contestation over that question.”
352
 Under 
such a thin version of political constitutionalism, because Congress and presidents 
have constitutionally-based institutional tools to alter the balance of their influence 
over foreign policy, the trend of executive initiative on matters of war that has only 
increased since the middle of the twentieth century is merely one of a nearly infinite 
array of permissible warmaking orders. Tushnet goes even further, arguing that on the 
question of the proper process for warmaking, “whatever the political process 
produces is what the constitution requires.”
353
 Under such a highly distilled realist 
interpretation of the constitution of foreign affairs, not only can no fixed formal rules 
for warmaking be derived from a proper interpretation of the written constitution, 
constitutional judgment is seemingly ruled out altogether. Taken to the hilt, a thin—
‘realist’—conception of political constitutionalism is not merely ‘anything goes,’ it 
also entails that the constitutional is—the working constitution—subsumes the 
constitutional ought. 
 Other recent treatments of the war powers push this idea of a politically rather 
than formally ordered constitution even further, drawing even more prescriptive 
implications from the practice the institutional framework has yielded over time. 
Though the constitution is understood to invite institutional struggle for the direction 
of foreign affairs, the historical trend of political practice is held as evidence that the 
political constitution is purposively structured to advantage executive initiative in 
war, perhaps necessarily so. H. Jefferson Powell leans heavily on early American 
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political practice to argue for “the existence in the founding era of a 
coherent…‘presidential-initiative’ reading of the Constitution.”
354
 While stressing 
that constitutional authority in foreign affairs is variable and political, he concludes 
that the “functional superiority” of the executive on display from the very beginning 
of the republic engenders “a clear best reading of the Constitution that resolves 
questions about where authority to determine American foreign policy is vested.”
355
 
A similar thread of reasoning can be found in the war powers analysis of John Yoo. 
Acknowledging that “practice alone cannot provide the answer to its own 
constitutional legitimacy,”
356
 Yoo also stresses that “the structural advantages of the 
executive branch and the functional exigencies of international politics have led to the 
centralization of foreign affairs power in the president,”
357
 and that this was a widely 
expected result of the constitutional design at the time of the founding.
358
 For Powell 
and Yoo, though the constitution is rightly understood to include some measure of 
institutional interaction over the direction of foreign affairs, a realist analysis of the 
constitution shows that it is structured, at its core, to favor executive initiative in war. 
 The purest articulation of constitutional norms for warmaking being derived 
from the functioning of the working constitution frames the issue in organic, almost 
teleological terms. John McGinnis, for example, describes contemporary American 
                                                
354
 Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 7. 
355
 Ibid., 5. 
356
 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace, 24. 
357
 He continues: “The history of American foreign relations has been the story of the 
expansion of the executive’s power thanks to its structural abilities to wield power 
quickly, effectively, and in a unitary manner.” Ibid., 22. 
358
 Ibid., 88–142. Yoo’s historical analysis has been widely criticized as a kind of 
‘lawyer’s history,’ one that places ends before means. 
 152 
warmaking as a “spontaneous order generated by the dynamic interplay of 
institutions.”
359
 The balance of power between the branches of government over the 
use of military force is held to be the result of a kind of institutional purview free 
market, whose adaptability yields near optimal results given a continually changing 
and unknowable international security context.
360
 But while the current equilibrium 
point of the war powers is described as the outcome of dynamic—highly variable—
interbranch “bargaining game,” McGinnis goes on to claim that “the existing 
spontaneous order is the result intended by the Framers…and is a natural 
consequence of the system they established.”
361
 Because “the very nature of the 
subject matter could not be governed by fixed rules, but required discretion to 
maximize the effective deployment of the strength of the nation,”
362
 ambits of 
institutional power that were left relatively undefined have developed—through a 
kind of invisible hand of institutional accommodation—into a fairly reliable executive 
dominance in practice. Though it is formally permissible and ostensibly possible for 
Congress to constrain executive initiative in war, the fundamental nature of the 
constitutional design entailed that the legislature would usually serve a more limited, 
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 While a thin conception of political constitutionalism claims to 
permit a near free-for-all, the balance of powers in practice is a playing out of the 
deep-seeded natures of those institutions of government—an ordering more a matter 
of predestination than evolution or self-conscious construction. 
 These relatively ‘thin’ conceptions of political constitutionalism on matters of 
war are not all quite as starkly realist as they first appear, however, as a complete 
embrace of “anything goes” can potentially erode the foundations that differentiate a 
political conception of constitutionalism. Tushnet, for example, draws one key 
normative claim from his analysis of the Constitution, “that the political constitution 
excludes the courts from deciding what the Constitution prescribes to be the 
institutional power between the President and Congress.”
364
 While the political 
constitution should be understood as no more or less than the branches of government 
contending for political power, a constitutional system premised on dynamic 
institutional interactions must normatively preclude the judiciary from formally 
entrenching a settlement of the war powers debate. The extent of the normative 
bounds on the judicial purview varies among these analyses, with some permitting the 
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enactment of statutory constraints on executive warmaking and their judicial review 
and enforcement and others proscribing this along with judicial supremacy,
365
 but 
even the seemingly thinnest conception of political constitutionalism includes at least 
some guidelines for the institutional interplay that determines their respective 
purviews. For the political constitution to function as such—to remain dynamic—the 
authority of the judiciary must be constrained so as to prevent constitutional 
calcification. The halfhearted constitutional realism of these conceptions of political 
constitutionalism is a key normative thread that, when pulled, reveals additional 
fundamental—immanent—elements of a political model of constitutionalism that 
have important implications for understanding and addressing the American 
warmaking system.  
 
Invitation to a Fair Fight: Politically Bounding Power 
 
The inadequacy of a thin conception of political constitutionalism that merely 
proscribes formal constitutional entrenchment and the contours of a thicker normative 
conception begin to become evident by taking seriously the basic premise of 
variability, that the precise ambits of institutional purviews should be decided through 
political processes whose result is never settled for all time. If matters of principle are 
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to be contingently determined through a dynamic constitutional politics then political 
power must be durably dispersed and meaningfully interconnected in a fashion that 
maintains at least a rough balance over time. James Madison succinctly summated the 
basic necessity of separated branches of government: “The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many…may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
366
 Because 
political constitutionalism depends on the interaction of multiple centers of political 
power, not just anything that the political process produces goes. Without some 
lasting equilibrium between distinctive institutions any notion that political power 
will be subject to principle collapses into decisionism—unbounded discretionary 
power.  
The question of the mechanisms by which a relatively balanced constitutional 
order is to be sustained over time brings the discussion back to the ‘constitutional 
how’ spotlighted in the second chapter. Formal constitutional entrenchment of precise 
parameters of institutional power was viewed as impractical and unwise from the very 
start of the republic. Madison argued that telling the branches of government what 
they ought to do and not do, even if their purviews were delineated in the written 
constitution, would not be enough maintain a division of governmental powers: “a 
mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several 
departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a 
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”
367
 The 
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separation of powers had to be constituted politically, but the mechanisms for 
maintaining a durable balance of institutional power—critical to the success of the 
constitutional system as a whole—could not be constructed in any straightforward 
way. Just as a written constitution could not reliably constrain the aggrandizement of 
one branch at the expense of the others on its own, other external mechanisms for 
constitutional maintenance also had their own particular weaknesses that left them 
incompatible with a meaningful balance of powers over time. 
 No single constitutional authority, either popular or institutional, was seen as a 
reliable steward for the separation of powers. Though the endurance of any republic 
ultimately rests on the people themselves, Madison argued that formal appeal to the 
people as a whole, either on an occasional or periodic basis, would not be dependably 
prevent “encroachments of the stronger [branch]…or [redress] the wrongs of the 
weaker.”
368
 Frequent appeals to popular judgment was seen to carry with it the 
implication that the founding constitutional order was defective which could 
undermine the public veneration that Madison held to be essential for constitutional 
endurance. Even more importantly, the public’s esteem would not be equally 
distributed to the branches of government but instead would likely be biased towards 
the institution with the closest connection to the public. Such a disparity over time 
could ultimately serve as a constitutional ratchet, fostering an increasingly 
imbalanced separation of powers as one branch was favored more often than not and 
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its powers aggrandized accordingly.
369
  
 There could similarly be no secure reliance on any single supreme institutional 
authority charged with adjudicating the proper contours of institutional purview, 
according to Madison. Partisanship for particular branches, or for the agenda of those 
who hold the prominent offices of those branches, would be replicated inside any 
constitutional council because its composition would likely be made up of political 
elites who formally held the offices whose boundaries of power they were now 
charged with adjudicating.
370
 Such bias also precluded any claim by one of the 
branches to be the singular steward of the constitution: “The several departments 
being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of 
them…can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries 
between their respective powers.”
371
 Madison held firm to such a political conception 
of constitutionalism following ratification and in the midst of heated political debate. 
While offering a range of constitutional arguments to counter the expansive 
interpretation of executive power in foreign affairs offered by Hamilton during the 
Washington Administration, Madison reemphasized the inherence of such 
institutionally-partisan constitutional politics: “It may happen also that different 
independent departments, the legislative and executive, for example, may in the 
exercise of their functions, interpret the constitution differently, and thence lay claim 
each to the same power. This difference of opinion is an inconvenience not entirely to 
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be avoided. It results from…a concurrent right to expound the constitution.”
372
 
 Instead of relying on formal entrenchment of constitutional authority interpreted 
and enforced by a purportedly—but impossibly—neutral arbiter, American 
constitutionalism incorporated partisanship into the constitutional design, harnessing 
such disparate political energy as a mechanism to translate constitutional principles 
into practice while maintaining a substantive balance of power over time. This would 
be accomplished by “so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its 
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
other in their proper places.”
373
 Madison continued:  
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department 
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all 
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with 




The construction of such a self-balancing constitutional system began with the written 
constitution, which laid out the basic contours and powers of the primary institutions 
of government and broad principles to which it aspires, and then was to operate 
through the interplay of those institutions as they engage in the work of governance to 
achieve those widely shared ends. The precise parameters of institutional authority 
were not determined a priori and in the abstract but were to emerge from the conflict 
and collaboration of the political agents who comprised the branches of government 
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as they pursued their particular policy interests through their respective institutions in 
the face of developing circumstances. While the difficult process for formal 
amendment made sweeping alterations of the basic framework of government an 
unlikelihood, the absence of highly codified institutional purviews would serve as an 
inducement for those inhabiting the political offices of the legislature, executive, and 
judiciary to seek to enlarge the parameters of their respective institution’s powers 
when possible as a means to their own political agency. But because the formal 
constitutional plan not only provided each branch with select ascribed powers but also 
required the participation of more than one branch of government for most exercises 
of public power, including those acts that further constructed the political order, the 
anticipated proclivity of each institution towards protecting and enlarging its own 
purview was harnessed as the primary mechanism to ensure that the public power 
would remain dispersed and at least roughly balanced over time. 
This places the aversion to judicial supremacy discussed above in fuller 
context and points to a broader normative baseline for evaluating the political 
constitution of the warmaking order. Not only can the prospective bias of a sole 
authoritative constitutional arbiter lead to a “gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department” on its own, but a widespread prioritization of 
juridical constitutional entrenchment can also undermine the constitutional ambition 
that is a foundational basis for the separation of powers. As Joseph Bessette and 
Jeffrey Tulis succinctly state the point: “failure to defend ‘the constitutional rights of 




 Maintaining a multi-polar constitutional system in 
relative balance requires a widespread understanding that the respective place of each 
institution in the constitutional order is not fixed for all time and that it is largely up 
to the ‘branches themselves’ to assert their perspective on proper institutional roles as 
the constitutional order is constructed and reconstructed over time.
376
 But while the 
concern regarding the diffuse effects that the pursuit of formally codified parameters 
of institutional authority has on political deliberations for war accords with the 
analysis in the previous chapter, the diminished sway of judicial supremacy is not a 
sufficient condition for the dynamic interplay upon which a system of separated 
institutions sharing powers is premised. Madison’s well-known passage underscores a 
foundational element of political constitutionalism glossed over in many realist 
accounts: each institution of government must have, and continue to have, the 
capacity as well as the proclivity to act in ways that maintain a relative balance of 
power going forward. That the constitutional invitation to struggle should never be 
definitively won not only proscribes formal constitutional entrenchment, it demands 
an ongoing fair fight. Accordingly other forms of constitutional construction that 
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unduly affect the capacities and incentives of branches of government to maintain 
themselves in relative balance—that transform the constitutional pendulum of power 
into a politically entrenching ratchet—run counter to political constitutionalism as 
well. 
The issue of whether the branches have adequate means and motives to 
properly participate in the constitutional politics of warmaking does arise in the 
contemporary war powers debate, but the varying perspectives on the baseline 
capacities and motivations necessary to the maintenance of institutional balance are 
often inextricably linked to rigid conceptions of the warmaking order that should 
result from the operation of the political constitution. Louis Fisher for example argues 
that the “constitutional system [for war] is in tatters” largely because the institutional 
ambition of Congress has faltered in the contemporary era. While the framers 
“expected Congress to be especially vigilant in protecting the power to go to 
war…the record since 1950 reveals an alarming decline in congressional confidence 
and institutional self-esteem.”
377
 The use of military force abroad without 
contemporaneous legislative authorization from this vantage point is de facto 
evidence of constitutional degeneration, as Congress should always have the 
motivation to compel presidents to stay the dogs of war until it formally assents or 
immediately seek its retrospective authorization in cases of emergency. John Yoo 
offers a wholly different analysis of the very same trend:  
The practice of the political branches in making war since the end of World 
War II has fallen within the constitutional design. While Congress never 
declared war in Korea or Vietnam, among many other places, it had every 
opportunity to control those conflicts through its funding powers. That it did 
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not was a reflection of a lack of political will rather than a defect in the 
constitutional design. 
 
Here the emphasis is that Congress’s ‘hard’ powers, in particular its discrete authority 
to raise and appropriate for the military, entail sufficient capacity to constrain 
executive warmaking and are all that is necessary for political model of 
constitutionalism. While this seemingly offers a minimal guideline for assessing if the 
political constitution of warmaking remains a fair fight, whether Congress can 
actually “control [military] conflict through its funding” and other assigned powers, 
such a standard leaves little constitutional ground upon which to evaluate institutional 
behavior.
378
 Insofar as the military is funded by the legislature, congressional 
passivity on matters of war can be characterized as reasoned preference that could 
have been, but never ought to have been, otherwise: “In these conflicts, Congress 
chose instead to allow the president to take the initiative in warmaking but also to 
suffer the political consequences along.”
379
 These starkly divergent characterizations 
of a salutary “flexible” constitutional politics of warmaking—consistent 
Congressional contestation to compel the need for its formal authorization before all 
military conflict versus a highly constricted role for Congress as military appropriator 
and little else—at their core are largely refractions of the formalistic binary of the 
conventional debate discussed in chapter two.
 
Though abjuring juridical constitutional 
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codification they remain characterized by inflexibility contrary to the core of political 
constitutionalism. The next section describes a thicker conception of political 
constitutionalism that provides additional leverage to understand and assess the 
variability of the warmaking order that can result from the constitutional invitation to 
struggle. Deriving norms from the political forms established by the constitution, this 
perspective directs our view towards the underlying rationale of a system of 
government made up of distinctive branches that share the powers through which 
much of ordinary politics and constitutional construction occur. 
 
Political Constitutionalism’s Promise: Desiderata and Deliberation 
 
The constitutional politics of warmaking can be more fully engaged from a 
perspective that looks beyond the current functioning of formally ascribed 
institutional powers to the broader purposes of a constitutional form composed of 
separate institutions that share powers and have concurrent rights to expound the 
constitution. From such a systemic vantage point the dispersion of power among 
distinctive branches of government who must regularly interact in order to act can be 
seen not only as a mechanism for inhibiting the concentration of public power in the 
hands of a single agent or group but also as a means of structuring deliberation and 
action towards the public good.
380
 While political constitutionalism at minimum 
                                                
380
 Separation of powers is thus a primary mechanism in the political ordering of 
“active, limited government.” Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, 144, 
150; While the following section is firmly grounded in the above work, it also draws 
heavily upon Tulis, “Deliberation Between Institutions”; Zeisberg, War Powers: The 
Politics of Constitutional Authority. 
 164 
requires the branches to maintain a latent capacity to check the others, a bulwark 
against the factional exercise of public power, the patterns of politics that determine 
the exercise of United States martial power abroad can be more robustly assessed on 
the extent the branches advance the perspectives they are structured to represent in 
the constitutional system and substantively review and respond to the views put forth 
by other branches. These two norms of political constitutionalism are intrinsically 
linked, as the full development and expression of distinctive viewpoints occurs most 
reliably within a context of a continually responsive relationship between the 
branches. Inter-branch relations need not always be either wholly contestatory or 
collaborative, but regular and significant institutional interaction is essential to the 
functional excellence of each branch as well as to that of the constitutional system as 
a whole. But while the written constitution formally secures a measure of 
distinctiveness within and responsiveness among the branches on matters of war, the 
extent to which the norms of political constitutionalism are advanced is variable,
381
 
dependent in many ways on the elaboration of the constitution into practice over time 
by those selfsame institutions. As we will see, the construction of a deliberative and 
effective warmaking order in line with the norms of political constitutionalism must 
account for and address the institutional preconditions for achieving those standards 
over time, a view towards the capacities and motivation of the branches to reliably 
engage in forms of recurrent interactions to which it aspires.  
One aspect of the constitutional structure essential for understanding its 
broader purposes, and that can guide an evaluation of the constitutional politics of 
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warmaking, is the very separateness of the branches of government, which can be 
understood in terms of distinctive institutional characters and relative independence. 
The foundations for this separateness begin in the basic schemas for the branches set 
forth in the written constitution, which yield particular political traits and tendencies 
in practice. As Jeffrey Tulis describes, the “[p]lurality or unity of office-holders, 
extent of the terms of office, modes of selection for office, as well as specified 
powers and duties combine to create a set of institutions that behave and ‘think’ quite 
differently from each other.” On the whole these distinctive institutional characters 
can be understood as each representing “differing desiderata of democratic 
governance”
 
including “the expression of popular will in and about public policy; 
protection of individual rights; and…provision of security or self-preservation for the 
regime.”
382
 The institutional embodiment of these basic political values is not cleanly 
divided, however, as each branch is structured to consider multiple and overlapping 
values while understanding and prioritizing them differently.
383
  
Congress’s geographically dispersed constituencies gives it a unique claim to 
represent the diversity of opinion and interests of the citizenry,
384
 while its legislative 
processes take time to refine and reprioritize them as they are translated into 
generalized legal forms. Its constitutionally prescribed role in commissioning and 
appropriating for the armed forces along with the biannual elections for the entirety of 
the House of Representatives and a third of the Senate make it particularly attuned to 
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the domestic costs of war. But the public’s general concern for their security from 
violence will also be reflected in the deliberations and efforts of the legislature. The 
provision of the sinews of war necessary to public protection, any formal 
authorization or restriction of their exercise, and oversight in advance of further 
Congressional support or constraint are thus to be tempered by concerns with the 
domestic inconveniences associated with the mobilization of military resources, the 
consequences of military expansion and engagement for the national interest abroad, 
and any misuse of that martial power. A sign of these complex and competing 
interests with Congress is that it has organized itself through committees to cultivate 
the expertise and direct the attention of select members on matters such foreign 
affairs, the armed services, intelligence, and appropriations,
385
 who will at least 
occasionally alert the houses of Congress as such matters become pertinent such as in 
anticipation of military conflict, in response to hostilities underway, or on the 
occasion of requests for special military appropriations.
386
   
In contrast, the unitary and hierarchical structure of the executive branch, the 
president’s sole claim to represent the nation as a whole and roles as commander in 
chief and head of state lend themselves towards quick and decisive action in external 
affairs. While prone to chafing at formal and material limits on government power, 
presidents do attend to public opinion and to its relationship to the blood spilled and 
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treasure spent in war,
387
 are concerned with maintaining at least the perception of 
lawfulness,
388
 and can bolster their power through practices of self-binding.
389
 And 
though the president sits at the decisionary apex of the executive branch of 
government, administrations can be constructed to include a diversity of voices in 
order to improve its internal deliberative capacities and its credibility to Congress and 
the public in advance of any unitary decision.
390
 A complex mixture of desiderata is 
also represented in the judiciary. Structured to focus most intently on the rule of law 
and individual rights on a case-by-case basis, the Supreme Court is not disinterested 
in either public opinion
391
 or the policy goals of the other branches,
392
 including 
exigent security concerns proclaimed by the executive.
393
 But while Congress, the 
president, and the judiciary each consider a range of political principles and interests 
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internally, their distinctive characters combined with measures of constitutionally 
prescribed independence entail that their views on policy, as well as on the proper 
contours of their respective roles in determining ends and means for a given policy 
area like warmaking, will rarely be in full accord. 
This leads directly to a second feature of the fundamental constitutional 
design essential to understanding its overarching purposes and to norms that should 
guide an analysis of its flexible operation: the powers of the national government are 
in many ways shared—the cooperation of more than one branch is necessary for any 
political will to be fully effectuated. All sides in the war powers debate accept the 
constitutional common ground discussed in chapter two that it is up to Congress to 
muster the sinews of war while it is the president who is to command the armed 
forces in battle. While the precise circumstances under which formal Congressional 
authorization is required for the use of military force and the proper form that such 
approval should take are subject to persistent debate, the United States cannot engage 
in hostilities without a military apparatus that is commissioned by and regularly 
appropriated for by Congress and without a specific order from the president. And 
though the ‘political’ branches will be those most substantively involved in the use of 
military force abroad, the judiciary is not without a role to play in the basic 
warmaking order framed by the constitution.
394
 While the emphasis on the Supreme 
Court as primary site for resolving constitutional questions relating to war is a 
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relatively recent construction, the judiciary has been relatively consistent in 
adjudicating legal disputes that result from warfare, particularly those that deal with 
questions of individual liberties and property. Even while limiting its rulings to cases 
pertaining to the relationship of the individual to the state and to relationships 
between individuals, some of which will hinge on whether a condition of war 
‘formally’ exists to trigger particular statutory provisions, the courts can have real 
influence on the arguments and efforts of the other branches on matters of national 
security. 
That the powers of the national government are shared does not make 
independent—discretionary—action by one institution impossible, but it does 
establish a political contingency at the core of the exercise of governmental power 
that is critical to prospect that the use of military force will be reliably disciplined by 
principled deliberation. The sequential nature of shared powers entails that 
achievement of most political goals are dependent on the active cooperation of 
multiple institutions and that each branch is always subject to prospective review and 
response by others. At its core, the aim of shared powers is towards a context where 
each branch must convince the others of the merits of its distinctive perspective or it 
will be subject to varying degrees of resistance in its pursuit of a disagreeable course 
of action. And because much of the persuasion between the branches is conducted in 
view of the public, who ultimately has its own capacity for review and response 
through the electoral process, even the most partial of interests a likely to be 
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articulated as arguments about the public good.
395
 This “transformation of interest 
into good” can be understood to occur through a loosely defined process aptly 
described by Jeffrey Tulis:  
Personal ambition is translated into partisan position; partisan position is 
translated into an institutional point of view; institutional points of view are 




In requiring inevitably divergent political interests to be pursued through distinctive 
branches of government that must publically work together through sequenced joint 
powers—through a system of checks and balances—the constitutional design is an 
elaborate contrivance to subject the exercise of public power to political principle. In 
short, a thick political constitutionalism aspires towards a constitutional order 
characterized by systemic institutional deliberation where public power is reliably 
“authorized, justified, and constrained”
397
 in a manner that makes “effective 
governance more likely.”
398
 The warmaking order can thus be constitutionally 
evaluated on how well it is characterized by the expression of institutional 
perspectives on ends and means and their review and response by the other branches. 
However, while the basic system of separated institutions sharing power 
framed by the written constitution establishes a formal baseline for a “pattern of 
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mutual testing and deliberation” between institutions recently described by Stephen 
Griffin as a “cycle of accountability,”
399
 the substantive contours of the warmaking 
order within which the deliberation and decision for any particular use of force occurs 
are highly variable over time. While the conventional war powers debate focuses on 
the meaning of the declare war clause and its elaboration into practice, many 
constitutionally delineated grants of institutional authority—not all of which are 
particular or overtly connected to war—are potential elements of the warmaking 
order depending on how they are constructed and exercised. For example the manner 
in which Congress appropriates for the military, regulates and oversees its operation, 
as well as how it generally wields its capacity to impeach the president can vary in 
terms of frequency and substance that have real consequence for the deliberative 
quality of the patterns of politics that comprise the warmaking order.
400
 And although 
each branch’s participation in warmaking can be roughly categorized in terms of 
prospective and retrospective elements, the various elements of the warmaking order 
are often interconnected and developments in one area can have consequences 
elsewhere. For example the expectation of retrospective judgment and sanction, and 
the form that such political processes will take, can affect prospective institutional 
claims and behavior. Thus while the executive is often said to be the prospective 
branch on matters of war while Congress and the judiciary are the retrospective 
branches,
401
 all three branches help to construct the context—legal, structural, and 
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rhetorical—in which the decision for war is made and in which it is judged 
politically. This study concludes with a view towards the political construction of a 
deliberative constitutional order for war in light of the normative guidelines clarified 
by a thick conception of political constitutionalism. 
 
Conclusion 
Where a thin political constitutionalism requires the underlying possibility of 
institutional contestation and rebalancing—and ongoing invitation to a fair fight—a 
thick conception of political constitutionalism offers a constitutionally derived 
standard for assessing the patterns of constitutional politics relating to the use of 
military force. The warmaking order can be evaluated on how well it advances the 
norms of systemic deliberation imminent in the constitutional design: the expression 
of distinctive institutional perspectives on ends and means and their review and 
response by the other branches. The final chapter concludes this study with a sketch 
of the prospective roles of more overtly political processes in a deliberative 
warmaking order, including a consideration of the role that the political processes 
integral to legal constitutionalism might play within it. It also considers some 
ramifications of the idea that it is largely the branches themselves that are responsible 
for elaborating the basic principles and processes formally delineated in the 
Constitution into political practice, and thus for determining how well the norms of 
political constitutionalism are enacted in their own patterns of behavior over time. As 
we will see, at its best the political constitution is a framework for an ongoing inter-
branch relationship that is a form of public deliberation on ends and means on 
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multiple levels: the core values of democratic political order represented and weighed 
within a given decision on the use of military force as well as in the reconstruction of 
the warmaking order that structures such decisions in light of the contemporary 
security context. A postscript points towards further areas for inquiry, a view towards 
the broader political foundations necessary to such a self-reflective deliberative 





















Towards a Deliberative Constitutional Order for War 
 
We can evaluate them in terms of how well they bring their special 
institutional capacities to bear on the problem of interpreting the 




The thrust of theorizing on the subject of balance has focused on establishing 
the normative guidelines to the exclusion of a consideration of the 




Political judgment ought…to start with the design of the institutions that will 







This study began with a question that continues to spur heated debate in both 
public and scholarly spheres: how should the United States decide for war? Though 
there is a broad spectrum of perspectives on the proper answer to this question, most 
commentaries coalesce around two key points: the American warmaking process has 
been subject to significant change, the most dramatic of which has occurred since the 
Second World War; and the proper roles of the branches of the federal government in 
warmaking—the ambits of institutional power relating to the use of military force—is 
a constitutional issue, rendering the dramatic rise in executive war power a cause for 
concern. The analysis that followed engaged with the interminable constitutional 
debate over the war powers to clarify its essential contours, to excavate the theoretical 
frameworks that underlie the primary approaches to it, to investigate the promises and 
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perils of the constitutional practices that follow from those conceptions, to derive a 
constitutional standard by which the variable patterns of politics that order the 
decision for war can be evaluated from the political form of the constitution, and 
ultimately to inform prospective efforts at reconstruction. To bring this project closer 
to that end, this concluding chapter briefly recapitulates the arc and primary findings 
of the preceding chapters before offering a brief view towards a deliberative 
constitutional order for war and avenues of further scholarly inquiry. 
Chapter Two began with a description of the domestic institutional politics 
relating to the use of military force in Libya in 2011, a snapshot of the contemporary 
working constitution of the war powers and the executive discretion, political discord, 
and constitutional debate over institutional authority that are among its most salient 
features. It then detailed the prevailing contours of the war powers debate, including 
its often unrecognized common constitutional ground—a view towards warmaking as 
a shared enterprise that requires at least some inter-branch collaboration—as well as 
the primary points of disagreement—when Congressional authorization is required 
for the use of military force and what form it should take. The chapter then reframed 
the war powers debate from the conventional fault line between partisans of executive 
and legislative authority over the use of force. It argued that the narrow focus on 
constitutional interpretation to settle what the boundaries of institutional purview in 
war are under the constitution should be broadened to include a key underlying 
theoretical consideration that is often obscured in scholarly analysis: how such an 
important constitutional question should be determined politically, under the 
constitution. The chapter closed with a view towards the analysis that would follow, 
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an argument that the form of constitutionalism—the processes by which ordinary 
politics, the ambits of institutional purview, is to be ordered—is critical to the 
prospect that the use of military force is authorized, justified, and constrained; and 
that the ordering of a deliberative constitutional politics of war must itself be 
politically constituted. 
Chapter Three analyzed legal constitutionalism, the predominant approach to 
the constitution of the war powers, which centers on competing attempts at legal 
constitutional construction in pursuit of an entrenched settlement of political 
authority. It began by clarifying two key premises upon which the claims to 
constitutional fidelity characteristic of much of the contemporary engagement with 
the war powers rest: a basic purpose of constitutionalism is to resolve fundamental 
questions of authority such as who properly takes the country to war; and such a 
resolution should be formally entrenched, achieved through legal processes that limit 
ambiguity and contestation over the bounds of institutional power. The chapter then 
identified the key promises of the constitutional settlement aspired to by legal 
constitutionalism: clearly fixed ambits of institutional authority are said to allow 
political debate to focus on the wisdom of policy rather than the ambiguities of 
process, facilitate institutional responsibility and public accountability, promote 
forthright institutional behavior with diminished concern over prospective 
constitutional censure, and foster a unity of purpose within the federal government on 
matters of foreign affairs that is critical to the state’s international posture and 
national security. The chapter then depicted the political processes through which 
formal settlement of the ambits of institutional authority in war are to be settled under 
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the rubric of legal constitutionalism, constitutional case-law and statutory framework 
legislation, which ultimately rely on a decisive role for the judiciary as steward of the 
Constitution.  
Turning to constitutional practice, Chapter three then detailed the history of 
disputes relating to the use of military force that came before the Supreme Court. It 
highlighted how the progressive judicial settlement of constitutional lacunae on 
matters of war aspired to by legal constitutionalism has been discrete, at best, 
throughout much of American history. The pursuit of a final and formal resolution to 
the war powers debate has largely been a contemporary phenomenon. The political 
ramifications of the push towards a formal resolution of the war power debate were 
then analyzed, and it was argued that when legal processes are pursued as the whole 
of constitutionalism they can undermine the promises to which legal constitutionalism 
aspires. In short, the crux of chapter three is the finding that the pursuit of formal 
entrenchment of the war powers—the aspiration towards narrowing, if not 
eliminating, constitutional grey holes through legal means—can engender a perilous 
pattern of politics characterized by expansive executive discretion under the visage of 
legal restraint and deformed political deliberations on matters of war.  
The preceding chapter turned a more overtly political approach to the 
constitution of the war powers that emphasizes the institutional forms called into 
being by the written constitution and the norms of a contingent constitutional politics 
that can be derived from them. Political constitutionalism begins from the premise 
that although the Constitution frames much of the distinctive characters and 
interrelationship of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, the exact roles of the 
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branches in deciding matters of principle cannot, and should not, be entirely fixed for 
all time. Instead a political conception of constitutionalism accommodates continual 
discord over the proper boundaries of institutional authority as policy disputes 
inevitably arise, and the prospect of some executive discretion, as inherent and 
potentially salutary elements of the political order. Constitutional indeterminacy and 
variable institutional authority serve as an invitation for the branches of government 
to assert themselves on matters of foreign affairs, an inducement not only to influence 
particular decisions on the use of military force but also to participate in the 
construction of the legal and political context for future security decisions. After 
detailing a thin conception of political constitutionalism that holds that such 
constitutional flexibility largely entails anything goes on matters of war and critiquing 
its susceptibility to the exercise of unlimited—factional—power, chapter four argued 
that norms derived from the political form of constitution should discipline the 
construction and functioning of the warmaking order. At bare minimum, the 
variability that is at the core of political constitutionalism demands the enduring 
possibility of a substantive rebalancing of institutional purviews—the constitutional 
invitation to struggle in foreign affairs must continue to be a fair fight. A political 
model of constitutionalism thus requires that the capacities of the branches to 
constrain one another remain practically viable, and accordingly proscribes certain 
kinds of constitutional entrenchment—structural as well as formal—as contrary to its 
imminent norms.  
Chapter four then turned to a thicker conception of political constitutionalism 
that emphasizes the fundamental purposes of a system of separated institutions 
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sharing power as a fuller basis upon which the flexible behavior of the branches of 
government can be assessed. From such a vantage point the dispersion of power 
among distinctive branches of government who must regularly interact in order to act 
can be seen not only as a mechanism for inhibiting the concentration of public power 
in the hands of a single agent or group but also as a means of structuring deliberation 
and action towards the public good. The constitutional politics of warmaking can thus 
be properly evaluated on the extent the branches reliably engage in practices that 
amount to systemic deliberation: the expression of distinctive institutional 
perspectives on both policy and process, and their review and response by other 
branches, all done in institutionally particular fashion. However just as with the view 
towards maintaining a fair institutional fight, though the written constitution 
structures inter-branch interaction, the reliability and quality of institutional 
deliberation—over particular uses of force as well as the over the construction of the 
warmaking order within which such decisions are made—rests upon on the capacities 




A robust conception of political constitutionalism thus aspires towards 
continual institutional relations that not only yield reliable and broad interrogation of 
the wisdom of any use of force—its purposes, the plan for achieving them, likelihood 
of success, prospective costs, and viable alternatives—but also that engender the at 
least occasional consideration of the proper construction of a warmaking order 
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capable of such a reasoned and effective politics of war. A deliberative constitutional 
order subjects power to political principle on multiple levels: not only must its 
institutions regularly weigh and decide matters of national security policy, they must 
also intermittently grapple with questions of how the necessary elements of a wise 
decision for war—of a broad and substantive consideration of ends and means—are 
to be reliably secured in light of the inevitability of developments in the 
contemporary security context.
406
 The latter is the realm of constitutional 
construction; it is a view towards how the patterns of political practice, centered on 
institutions, should be structured to achieve security—in the face of constantly 
evolving and potentially unknown external threats—that is in proportion with other 
constitutional principles such as political equality, individual liberty, and the rule of 
law.
407
 The design of a reasoned and effective warmaking order is thus most 
profitably understood, and achieved, as the contingent result of a recurrent 
deliberative process of constitutional construction, a pattern of politics in which 
questions of policy and constitutional propriety are tethered and mutually fructifying, 
which itself must be constituted politically. 
But while a thick theory of political constitutionalism offers guidelines for the 
behavior of officials and institutions on matters of war that accommodates a 
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significant measure of constitutional flexibility,
408
 the most complete statement of 
which integrates variability in the precise ambits of the proper roles of the branches in 
the warmaking order as well as in their actual capacities to embody such roles in 
practice,
409
 most normative treatments of constitutional war powers fall short of deep 
engagement with the political conditions necessary to reliably engender the practices 
immanent to them.
410
 The next section concludes this project with a view towards 
further research in this area, a brief sketch of considerations of intra-institutional and 
inter-institutional design towards a more reliably deliberative constitutional order for 
war.
411
 And given that it will be the branches themselves that are responsible for 
constructing the precise contours of the constitutional order in which they act, a 
further view towards future lines research on the political foundations of a reflexive 
deliberative system for war—of its underlying constitutive modes—is taken up in the 
postscript. 
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Towards Deliberative Interbranch Warmaking 
The practicability of the normative guidelines for the interbranch politics of 
warmaking under a thick conception of political constitutionalism can be elucidated 
with attention to the variable forms that such a constitutional politics can take. Such a 
view towards the constructed practices of political constitutionalism in war highlights 
the key roles that nonlegal political processes play in eliciting the advancement of 
distinctive institutional viewpoints and their substantive review and response by the 
other branches. But it also spotlights the processes of legal constitutionalism in a 
more positive light than they were left in chapter three, pointing towards the 
important political role laws and courts can play within a deliberative constitutional 
order for war. In addition, a view towards institutional practices relating to war brings 
the systemic nature of the political constitution into relief. Although each branch’s 
participation in warmaking can be roughly categorized in terms of prospective and 
retrospective elements, the various elements of the warmaking order are often 
interconnected and developments in one area can have consequences elsewhere and 
for the deliberative quality of the decision for war. For example the expectation of 
retrospective judgment and sanction, and the form that such political processes take, 
can affect prospective institutional claims and behavior. The two norms of political 
constitutionalism are thus intrinsically linked, as the full development and expression 
of distinctive viewpoints occurs most reliably within a context of a continually 
responsive relationship between the branches. Inter-branch relations need not always 
be either wholly contestatory or collaborative, but regular and significant institutional 
interaction is essential to the functional excellence of each branch as well as to that of 
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the constitutional system as a whole. A brief discussion of the executive, judicial, and 





Concerns over rising executive discretion over the use of military force lie at 
the heart of the contemporary war powers debate but, as described in chapters two 
and three, discretion is often framed in legal terms—as governmental action in the 
absence or contrary to law. This legalistic conception of constitutionalism leads 
executives to make creative legal claims to justify the use of force and also permits 
broad Congressional delegation of authority to the executive in war through sweeping 
statutory legislation. The theory of political constitutionalism described in chapter 
four puts the roles of the branches in the deliberative constitutional order for war in a 
different light, as it calls for the exercise of public power not only to be “authorized,” 
but also to be “justified” and “constrained.” American warmaking should not only be 
evaluated on whether the military operations commanded by the president received 
formal Congressional authorization, but also more broadly on the extent that a case 
for military conflict was publically made, publically deliberated, and whether another 
branch could realistically have frustrated a proposed or ongoing action to which it 
objects. Accordingly, a war president should be judged on whether he has offered a 
substantive justification for the use of force that permits, if not induces, the distinctive 
review and response of the other branches, and whether he reviews and responds to 
the distinctive perspectives of the other branches in kind.  
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But under what conditions will presidents reliably act in ways that contribute 
to systemic deliberation on war? One strand of thought looks toward the internal 
composition of the executive as a primary area whose alternative construction could 
yield considered decisions for war. This view begins from the fact that the 
organization and integration of the administrative agencies that comprise the national 
security apparatus, and in particular the access that their primaries have to the 
president, largely determine the range of actions considered in advance of a 
prospective military operation. This tact looks towards how the interagency process 
could be reordered to ensure that presidents receive as wide a spectrum of 
information and viewpoints on a prospective use of force as possible. One recent 
proposal along these lines argues that processes integral to the separation of powers 
be brought into the executive branch as a mechanism for deliberation and review that 
preserves the executive virtues of secrecy and speed.
412
 However, while alternative 
compositions of the internal structure of the executive branch might enable presidents 
to more fully develop their own perspective on a prospective use of force, ultimately 
it is the president who sits at the decisionary apex of a hierarchical branch of 
government. The unitary nature of the presidency inevitably engenders a propensity 
towards swift and decisive action, a particular propensity towards seeing an upside of 
warmaking,
413
 and a culture in which inferiors publically support presidential 
decisions. While the character of the executive represents virtues essential to a 
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government actively engaged in the pursuit of the public good, it also represents the 
potential for heedlessness, excess, and arbitrariness in the exercise of power that is 




An alternative strand of thought looks towards external political mechanisms 
to more reliably yield presidential participation in a deliberative constitutional order 
for war. One version along these lines leans heavily on the political process of 
election, asking the public to select statesmen who are guided by a deep 
understanding of the norms of a system of separated institutions sharing power. Jack 
Goldsmith, for example argues that “our constitutional democracy will not be 
preserved by better laws and institutional structures…in the permanent emergency we 
face, the best hope for preserving both our security and our liberty is to select leaders 
who will be beholden to constitutional values when they are forced to depart from 
constitutional traditions…who have checks and balances stitched to their breasts”
415
 
However, while ostensibly an external mechanism of constraint, such a view 
ultimately—and dubiously—depends upon on the internal character of the person 
chosen to inhabit the presidency remaining stable despite a new institutional context 
with unique powers and pressures. 
Ultimately, it can be safely said that presidents will most likely engage in 
public deliberations on the use of military force when it is in their own self-interest to 
do so. That is, the likelihood that presidents robustly develop and explicate their war 
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aims and plans is tied to the extent that the participation of the other branches, or at 
least an absence of their active resistance, is needed achieve executive purposes and 
garner the glory that accords with military success. Stephen Griffin’s recent study, for 
example, comes to the “surprising conclusion that a chief purpose of inter-branch 
deliberation is to ensure that the executive branch makes decision for war based on a 
sound interagency process.”
416
 Presidents are most likely to organize the national 
security elements of their administrations so as to facilitate deliberation within the 
executive when reliably subject to external oversight that compels it to express its 
views publically. However, while the most obvious mechanism for deliberatively 
disciplining executive propensity to independently initiate military force is through 
statutory framework legislation designed to set clear limits on the use of force without 
formal authorization and to require that presidential consultation occurs early and 
often, the history of the War Powers Resolution has shown that when such regulation 
relies primarily on juridical means to for enforcement it can work counter to its 
purported purposes. The next section discusses the role that the judiciary might have 
in promoting the rule of law as an element of a deliberative political process for war. 
The subsequent section engages with the role for Congress in a deliberative 
constitutional order, focusing on how its authority to provide the means upon which 
warmaking depends can be used to bolster its authority to regulate their use through 
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formal means and compel the executive to make its case for war. As we will see, the 
particular contours of these external political mechanisms matter greatly to their 
efficacy as deliberative constraints on the use of force—for Congressional regulation 
and supervision to truly influence presidential behavior, they must have real bite on 




 Under a thick conception of political constitutionalism, the judicial branch of 
government should express its distinctive institutional viewpoint on matters of war in 
distinctive institutional fashion. Where many treatments of the role of courts in 
wartime either ask judges to leave the question of the ambits of institutional authority 
regarding the use of force wholly as a political question to be decided by the 
interaction of Congress and presidents outside the Courts,
417
 or to settle it once and 
for all,
418
 a judiciary acting in accordance with the norms of political 
constitutionalism will instead actively promote the rule of law and the protection of 
individual liberties as an important constitutional principle while enforcing that 
perspective in its own circumscribed, legal, sphere of action. As the earlier discussion 
of the Korematsu case highlighted, when judges understand their rulings to be the last 
word on constitutionality, the security arguments from the executive branch can lead 
to precedents that are in stark tension with the principles of the rule of law and 
individual liberty at the core of its purpose as an institution. Instead of attempting to 
settle constitutional disputes relating to the proper institutional boundaries of power 
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in war, a task to which it is decidedly ill suited, when a relevant case or controversy 
comes before the bar the priority of the courts should be to make clear what the law 
is, to argue on behalf of the rule of law, and to enforce well-formed ordinary law on a 
case-by-case basis. The judicial role within the deliberative constitutional order 
would thus be to alert the other branches and the public when it becomes aware that 
government has acted in transgression or in the absence of ordinary law while also 




 In short, and to restate a central conclusion of chapter three, Congress will be 
more likely to pass clear and narrowly tailored laws if the courts reliably refrain from 
“cleaning up” those that are too ambiguous and instead chastise Congress by making 
clear to the public its view of the political stakes in the law, particularly for the rule of 
law and individual rights, while enforcing that view in its own legal sphere of action. 
Presidents will be more likely to seek formal Congressional authorization for the use 
of force and Congress is more likely to formally state (declare) its perspective on 
prospective or ongoing hostilities if the judiciary reliably takes up relevant disputes to 
make clear to the public whether the use of force has been legally authorized, while 
also emphasizing it is up to Congress and the public to judge and sanction lawless 
acts. While most treatments of the war powers debate that propose a role for the 
judiciary argue for the Court to be means to sound the alarm over actions by the 
executive, here the role of the Court expands to also signal Congressional 
malfeasance and to suggest that the legislature ought to clearly express itself through 
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law. Under the rubric of political constitutionalism, the court should thus engage in 
what has been called “deliberation-inducing judicial review”
420
 that can influence 
Congressional and presidential claims and behavior alike. But to function as such, 
juridical mechanisms must understood as merely one element of the ‘cycle of 
accountability’ around which a deliberative constitutional order for war turns. 
 
Congress 
From the lens of political constitutionalism, Congress at its best will have a 
view towards providing the material and legal basis only for those military actions it 
judges necessary to public protection as well, towards oversight to ensure the actual 
use of the military accords with the terms upon which such support began and might 
continue, and towards the frustration and sanction of military engagements to which it 
objects. A ‘cycle of accountability’ centered on Congress would begin with the 
expression of its perspective, through statutory framework legislation, of clear limits 
on the use of military force without its formal and specific authorization given the 
particularities of the contemporary security context. Such legislation should also 
clearly state that transgression of the limits on warmaking that it sets is only 
acceptable with specific additional authorization from Congress or in exceptional 
circumstances where the pursuit of prior authorization is wholly untenable.
421
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Congressional review ideally will begin when the executive seeks its formal 
authorization prior to the start of military conflict beyond which is outlined in the 
statutory framework legislation. During an ongoing military operation, Congressional 
review should center on hearings to investigate and judge whether the use of force 
was conducted in accordance with terms of the statutory framework and additional 
authorizing legislation, how well it is achieving the war aims and using the expected 
means articulated by the president while seeking authorization, and whether any 
transgression of either statutory restriction or appropriations was necessitated by 
exceptional circumstances. And to give the processes of authorization and review 
bite, the Congressional response to the use of military force should center on 
appropriations, and if necessary, impeachment.  
Though Congressional capacities for investigation, appropriation, and 
impeachment are constitutionally ascribed powers, their contours can be constructed 
to vary widely in terms of frequency and substance that have real consequence for the 
deliberative quality of the patterns of politics that comprise the warmaking order.
422
 
One area for further scholarly inquiry is into how Congress could restructure its 
internal committees to more directly connect its deliberations on foreign affairs, 
intelligence, armed services, and appropriations, and to ensure those deliberations are 
regular, robust, and visible.
423
 Reliable post-hoc investigations by Congress have the 
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potential to affect the deliberations and decisions of president before and during the 
course of conflict.
424
 Such inquiry should also include a consideration of how to 
ensure that Congressional intelligence capacities are developed so as to prevent 
presidents from monopolizing the information necessary to evaluate the 
contemporary national security context, any emerging threat, and the proper 
American response to them.
425
 The inherently periodic nature of appropriations has 
perhaps the greatest potential to serve as a deliberation-inducing or deliberation-
forcing element of the cycle of accountability on matter of war. As Banks and Raven 
Hansen put it, “The power of the purse supplemented the Declaration-of-War Clause 
by allowing Congress to control war powers by specifying spending objectives or 
otherwise restricting spending ex ante. It also compensated for the possible failure of 
antecedent controls by giving Congress the ex post power…to determine how long 
U.S. participation in war could continue….The annual cycle of appropriations [thus] 
affords regular opportunities for Congress to express its disapproval of executive 
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 However, presidents in the contemporary era have become adept at 
pressuring Congress to continue to fund uses of military force through “emergency” 
supplemental appropriations, and thus avoiding the deliberative political constraint 
that regular processes of appropriations can provide. To combat this, Bruce 
Ackerman and Oona Hathaway recently proposed a framework by which 
appropriations to continue an ongoing war would be directly tied to requirement for 
formal Congressional authorization. While such an ordering of appropriations would 
seemingly permit executive discretion to use existing appropriations to fund the use 
of force, its post-hoc bite would induce presidents to make a candid and convincing 
case for war to Congress and the public, both in advance and while war is underway, 
as it provides Congress with the capacity to compel presidents to wind down the war 
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Conclusion 
Reconstituting the war powers requires a full embrace of the inherently 
political nature of the question of the proper boundaries of institutional power on 
matters of war, a view towards leveraging and guiding the interminable war powers 
debate towards a more fully deliberative ends. While the executive is often said to be 
the prospective branch on matters of war while Congress and the judiciary are the 
retrospective branches,
428
 the view from political constitutionalism makes clear that 
all three branches help to construct the context—legal, structural, and rhetorical—in 
which the decision for war is made and in which it is judged politically. The 
construction of a deliberative and effective warmaking order in line with the norms of 
political constitutionalism must account for and address the institutional 
preconditions for achieving those standards over time, a view towards the capacities 
and motivation of the branches to reliably engage in forms of recurrent interactions to 
which it aspires. At its best, the political constitution is the framework for an ongoing 
inter-branch relationship that is a form of public deliberation on ends and means on 
multiple levels: the core values of democratic political order represented and weighed 
within a given decision on the use of military force as well as in the reconstruction of 
the warmaking order that structures such decisions in light of the contemporary 
security context. A broadened perspective on the political constitution points our view 
towards the political modes that help shape the behavior of the primary institutions of 
government both from the inside and the outside.
429
 Subsequent scholarship on the 
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war powers should thus look towards the underlying political foundations of a self-
reflective political order, where the exercise of power is reliably disciplined by 
principled deliberation within, about, and around the constitutional order. The project 
briefly explores such an expanded view towards the political foundations of a 















                                                
framework of government and how its major institutions are to work; it also requires 
a political sociology, a foundation in self-interest.” Elkin, Reconstructing the 
Commercial Republic, 38, 92. In a review of Stephen Griffin’s earlier work on 
American constitutional theory, Jeffrey Tulis states the point a bit differently: 
“constitution making includes the constitution of ‘society’ as well as of government.” 
Tulis, “On the State of Constitutional Theory,” 712; Griffin, American 




The Political Foundations of a Deliberative Constitutional System for 
War 
 
The constitutional theory of a republican regime focuses on a reflexive 
process: lawmakers aim at securing the constitutive institutions defined by the 
public interest; and, in doing so, they shape the political patterns that affect 
how they themselves make law.
430
 
Constitutional theory includes the politics that are given form by the workings 
of institutions including those that animate it, surround it, and operate within 
it…. It must also concern itself at a minimum with mores, virtues, social 
divisions, and statesmanship…. These modes are the means through which the 








Much, even most, of what determines whether the Constitution is respected 





Towards a Self-Reflective Deliberative System 
The preceding discussion sought to reconstitute the war powers debate, 
leading the conventional contemporary emphasis on the formal entrenchment of a 
particular interpretation of the written constitution back to a focus on the institutional 
forms called into being by the written constitution and the norms of constitutional 
politics that can be derived from them. This more political understanding of 
constitutionalism clarifies that though the distinctive characters and interrelationship 
of the legislature, executive, and judiciary are in many ways framed by the written 
                                                
430
 Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, 143. 
431
 Elkin, “Constituting the American Republic,” 224–225. 
432
 Murphy, Constitutional Democracy, 342, in reference to Aristotle's Politics. 
433
 Ceaser, “Restoring the Constitution,” 33. 
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constitution, their practical contours are not inherently fixed but are subject to 
variation through processes of constitutional construction or deterioration. The 
reliability and quality of institutional deliberation over particular uses of force, as 
well as the over the contours of the national security order within which such 
decisions are made, rest upon on the capacities and motivations of political actors 
working through the respective branches of government that can change over time. 
The conclusion pointed towards further research on intra-institutional and inter-
institutional design to more reliably yield distinctive prospective institutional 
perspectives and retrospective judgments on matters of war. Additional inquiry into 
the political constitution of the war powers should also extend the analysis of the 
constitutional development of the warmaking system beyond political changes 
internal to the system of separated institutions sharing power—that is, the elements 
that comprise the deliberative core of the constitutional order—and to the constitutive 
political modes that undergird it.
434
 A broadened perspective on the political 
constitution points our view towards the political modes that help shape the behavior 
of the primary institutions of government both from the inside and the outside.
435
 
                                                
434
 A view towards the constitutive political economy and political sociology of the 
warmaking order can be found throughout the history of constitutional thought and in 
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Additional research on constitutional war powers should thus integrate a view 
towards the underlying political foundations of a self-reflective political order, where 
the exercise of power is reliably disciplined by principled deliberation within, about, 
and around the constitutional order. This dissertation concludes with a brief sketch of 
two prospective lines of inquiry related to this expanded conception of a deliberative 
constitutional system for war. 
 
The International Security Context as Constitutive Foundation 
One notable element often missing in broad treatments of constitutional war 
powers worthy of further study and integration is the interrelationship of the political 
constitutions of the international political order and domestic political orders.
436
 
Security, the restraint of violent power, can be imposed by one of two means: the 
material context of the political regime, such as the presence of oceans for defense or 
technological superiority over adversaries, or by its political practices and structures, 
for example elections, the separation of powers, and the rule of law.
437
 These two 
sources of restraint on violence have always been in dynamic interaction, for as 
scientific and technological progress has improved human capabilities for violence, 
                                                
American constitutional theory, Jeffrey Tulis states the point a bit differently: 
“constitution making includes the constitution of ‘society’ as well as of government.” 
Tulis, “On the State of Constitutional Theory,” 712; Griffin, American 
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics. 
436
 For an essential analysis of the increasingly interdependent political constitutions 
of domestic and global security, see Deudney, Bounding Power. 
437
 Ibid., 27. This is where his term ‘bounding power’ comes from, as it highlights the 
increasing powers of destruction throughout history (bounding upwards), and the 
need to conceive of new political forms to restrain them (bounding down). 
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the political structures have had to adapt to restrain such emerging threats.
438
 The 
escalating threat of external harm pushes states to adopt hierarchical internal political 
forms wielding great power, which if unchecked may lead to domestic tyranny or 
imperial conquest.
439
 The worry then is that domestic republican political 
arrangements may become deformed when external security threats emerge. 
Increasingly powerful resources are developed and mobilized to create a favorable 
material security context while authority over them is centralized to provide the 
means for an efficient and effective defense; appearing an absolute necessity for the 
survival of the regime, such political developments may instead represent a 
fundamental change in the political regime. 
One response to this development is to understand it as one of the many 
problems associated with globalization whose solution requires a shift in focus away 
from the primacy of the state and toward international and even global forms of 
governance. Under this view the increased violence interdependence of the 
contemporary international context takes causal precedence in the development of the 
increasingly unrestrained capacity for military force characteristic of the national 
security state.
440
 Accordingly, the best and likely only means to address this 
development is to alleviate the security pressures that drive such domestic 
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439
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 It is important to note that while the problems inherent in globalization are often 
claimed to reveal the weakness, withering, and even future irrelevance of the state, it 
is particularly on questions of national security where states continue to reassert their 
strength and highlight their sovereignty. This is not to deny that inter-state 
cooperation on security matters is both a reality and a necessity, but rather to 
emphasize the concern at issue in this project—increasingly autonomous, and 
therefore deliberatively unconstrained, executive power of the state.  
 199 
constitutional degeneration in contemporary democratic republics, through a 
transformation the global political context via the creation of new international 
political forms.
441
 This version of republican security theory calls for the same logic 
present at the founding of the federal government of the United States to now require 
the formation of a federal-republican world government. This would entail higher 
levels of political restraints on violence that can provide a security milieu in which 
domestic republican forms could be securely reconstituted.  
However, such a widespread international arrangement would be a dramatic 
change unlikely in any foreseeable future. Indeed, a primary advocate for this vision 
laments the “tragedy of American global diplomacy” which highlights the 
unlikelihood of implementing such a global transformation. He writes, “[i]n amassing 
enough power to transform its international context, the United States has been 
transformed into a polity much less interested in changing its international 
context.”
442
 National security elites are unlikely to favor the creation of global forms 
of governance that would not only transfer their power but would also undermine the 
very reason for their elite status. The national security state, which is problematic 
according to republican security theory for its concentrated and autonomous power, is 
also a political regime that will inhibit the creation of an international political 
solution to the root causes of its development. Additionally, even if the United States 
did make the creation of a republican world government its top priority, the question 
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The Sinews of War: The Citizenry as Constitutive Foundation 
While contemporary treatments of constitutional war powers have rightly 
focused on the faltering of the rule of law and separation of powers as mechanisms of 
deliberative constraint and direction of the use of military force in the heightened 
international security environment that followed the Second World War,
444
 they have 
largely lacked an account of the citizenry in the constitutional politics of war essential 
to any analysis.
445
 A complete study of the political constitution of the war powers 
must include a view towards how developments in the political economy of warfare 
have had important consequences for the political sociology of warfare, impacting 
citizens and lawmakers in ways critical to the further political construction and 
functioning of the institutional warmaking order and the politics of the decision to use 
military force.  
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delineated in some early state constitutions they were not so expressly articulated in 
the Constitution of the United States. The underlying formalism of his approach to 
constitutional theory allows Yoo to elide an evaluation of the normative 
consequences of a changing democratic political economy of warfare for a well-
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The idea that the citizenry can and should be constituted to serve as a critical 
deliberative structural constraint on the use of martial power is firmly grounded in the 
history of political thought and can provide important leverage on the deliberative 
deficit in on matters of national security.
446
 For example, though advocating 
distinctive conceptions of the citizenry whose excellence must be understood in 
relation to the ordering of the regime as a whole, Aristotle and Machiavelli both 
argued that citizen service in the defense of the political order is a salutatory 
mechanism for disciplining the decision for war.
447
 When a regime depends on its 
own people for its defense it both empowers and constrains the political elites in 
whose hands the decisions to use of martial force resides while the politically 
empowering the citizenry. A citizenry that is well connected to the use of military 
force yields a greater likelihood of both prudent warmaking and a greater likelihood 
of having the means necessary to a successful military effort. These views towards 
the popular foundations of a well-functioning warmaking order were important 
antecedents to the attention given to the political economy of warmaking at the 
American founding by both proponents and critics of the new constitution.
448
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The emphasis on the constitutive implications of the relationship of the 
citizenry to war during the conception and infancy of the United States highlights a 
critical difference in the contemporary political constitution of the warmaking 
system—an attenuated connection between the citizenry and the use of military 
force—underemphasized in recent scholarship.
449
 Following the Second World War 
the United States moved away from a mass mobilization model of warmaking and 
instead has maintained a large standing professional military, increasingly reliant on 
technological prowess over manpower, whose exercise has been funded through 
international financing rather than contemporaneous taxation. These changes were the 
result of an interrelated mix of domestic choices by lawmakers, advances in military 
technology, and developments in the international security context,
450
 and they have 
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important consequences for the decision process for the use of force as well as for 
further reconstruction of the warmaking order. An attenuated connection between 
citizens and warmaking is a key change in a social force relied upon to animate the 
deliberative core—separated institutions sharing power—of the American 
constitutional warmaking order.
451
 As the provision of a public good like security 
becomes increasingly inconspicuous in a constitutional order, requiring diminishing 
participation and sacrifice of the citizenry and eliding popular awareness through 
covert operations and the capture of public discourse by experts,
452
 a key political 
foundation of the deliberative constitutional system for war—of the principled 
constraint of discretionary power—is eroded.
453
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 “The constitutional position of Congress has deteriorated for a number of reasons. 
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While one response might be to push for a return to military conscription to 
reestablish the important tie between the people and their defense,
454
 the professional 
and technological development of the military is likely essential to meeting the 
demands of the international security environment and their dramatic alteration would 
be resisted by the both the military establishment and the citizenry. Lawmakers are 
unlikely to have the incentive to increase the costs of warfare on their constituents for 
the sake of bolstering the spirit of the citizenry towards a greater demand for 
responsiveness from Congress and the executive alike on matters of war. Indeed, the 
transition to a professional, all-volunteer, military not only has direct consequences 
for the relationship of the general population to the use of force but also for the 
representatives in government themselves. In a recently published study of the 
political effects of the postwar military-industrial complex, Rebecca Thorpe shows 
that “many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector 
jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to 
press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances.”
455
 
Additionally, the likelihood that lawmakers will have previously served in the 
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military decreases, with a corresponding result on their interests, expertise, and 
perspective on matters of war.
456
  
One prospective avenue for addressing this change in the constitutive 
foundations of the deliberative system may be found in recent innovations in 
contemporary democratic theory. The ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory can be 
interrogated to see if it can offer an adequate political mechanism to balance the need 
for efficiency and execution on matters of national security with democratic 
deliberation and political participation required to politically constitute democratic 
responsibility for the actions of the government abroad. While many aspects of the 
debate over democratic deliberation remain firmly in the realm of the ideal, there 





and even more contestatory models in the vein of Machiavelli such as “accountability 
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 that may offer some prospect of connecting the public to warmaking in 
the contemporary era. While a complete study of the political constitution of the war 
powers would still begin with the perennial debate over constitutional interpretation, 
transform it into a debate over the institutional forms and norms of constitutional 
practices, it would conclude with a consideration of a necessarily constitutive element 


















                                                
459
 Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation; 
McCormick, “Machiavellian Democracy”; Blaug, “Direct Accountability at the End.” 
460





Ackerman, Bruce. “Obama’s Illegal War in Libya.” The New York Times, June 20, 
2011, sec. Opinion. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html?src=recg. 
———. “Obama’s Unconstitutional War.” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2011. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/24/obama_s_unconstitutional_
war. 
Ackerman, Bruce, and Oona Hathaway. “Death of the War Powers Act?” The 
Washington Post, May 17, 2011, sec. Opinions. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/death-of-the-war-powers-
act/2011/05/17/AF3Jh35G_story.html. 
———. “Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential 
Legality.” Michigan Law Review 109 (2011): 445–517. 
 
Adler, David Gray. “Constitution, Foreign Affairs and Presidential War-Making: A 
Response to Professor Powell.” Georgia State University Law Review 19 
(2003): 947. 
———. “The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking.” In The Constitution and the 
Conduct of American Foreign Policy, edited by Adler, David Gray and 
George, Larry N., 183–226. University Press of Kansas, 1996. 
———. “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs.” Richmond 
Journal of Law and the Public Interest 1, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 1–38. 
———. “Virtues of the War Clause.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 
(December 1, 2000): 777–782. 
Adler, David Gray, and Larry N. George. “Introduction.” In The Constitution and the 
Conduct of American Foreign Policy. University Press Of Kansas, 1996. 
 
Agresto, John. The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy. Cornell University 
Press, 1984. 
 
Alexander, Larry, and Frederick Schauer. “On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation.” Harvard Law Review 110, no. 7 (May 1997): 1359–1387. 
 
Allen, Jonathan, and Cogan. “Did Obama Lose Congress on Libya?” Politico, March 
21, 2011. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51687.html. 
 
Alterman, Eric. Who Speaks for America?: Why Democracy Matters in Foreign 
Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
 




Associated Press. “Libya Hit With 112 Cruise Missiles in First Phase of Allied 
Assault.” Chicago Sun-Times, March 19, 2011. 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/world/4405622-418/story.html. 
 
Auerswald, David P., and Peter F. Cowhey. “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers 
Resolution and the Use of Force.” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 
(September 1, 1997): 505–528. 
 
Baker III, James A., and Warren Christopher. National War Powers Commission 
Report, July 2008. http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers. 
Baker III, James A., and Lee H. Hamilton. “Breaking the War Powers Stalemate.” 




Banks, William C., and Peter Raven-Hansen. National Security Law and the Power of 
the Purse. Oxford University Press, USA, 1994. 
 
Beatty, David M. The Ultimate Rule of Law. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Bellamy, Richard. Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Bessette, Joseph M. “Confronting War: Rethinking Justice Jackson’s Concurrence in 
Youngstown V. Sawyer.” In The Limits of Constitutional Democracy, edited 
by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo, 194–216. Princeton University 
Press, 2010. 
Bessette, Joseph M., and Tulis, Jeffrey K. “On the Constitution, Politics, and the 
Presidency.” In The Constitutional Presidency, edited by Joseph M. Bessette 
and Jeffrey K. Tulis. 1st ed. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 
 
“Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.CON.RES.51 - 
THOMAS (Library of Congress).” Accessed November 24, 2012. 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:hc51: 
“Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.RES.292 - THOMAS 
(Library of Congress).” Accessed November 24, 2012. 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.res.292: 
 
Black, Charles. “The Working Balance of the American Political Departments.” 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 1 (Spring 1974): 13–20. 
 
Blaug, Ricardo. “Direct Accountability at the End.” In Building a Citizen Society: 
The Emerging Politics of Republican Democracy, edited by Stuart White and 
Daniel Leighton, 101–111. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 2008. 
 
 209 
Bobbitt, Philip. “Review: War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s ‘War and 
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath.’” 
Michigan Law Review 92, no. 6 (May 1, 1994): 1364–1400. 
———. The Shield of Achilles: The Long War and the Market State. New York: 
Knopf, 2002. 
 
Brandon, Mark E. “War and Constitutional Change.” In The Limits of Constitutional 
Democracy, edited by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo, 217–236. 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
———. “War and the American Constitutional Order.” In The Constitution in 
Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency, edited by Mark Tushnet. Duke 
University Press Books, 2005. 
 
Ceaser, James W. “Restoring the Constitution.” Claremont Review of Books, Spring 
2012. http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1936/article_detail.asp. 
 
Chafetz, Josh. “Congress’s Constitution.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
160 (2012): 715. Accessed March 3, 2012. 
 
Corwin, Edward. The President: Office and Powers, 5th Edition. 5th ed. NYU Press, 
1984. 
———. The President, Office and Powers: 1787-1948. New York University Press, 
1948. 
———. The President’s Control Of Foreign Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1917. 
———. Total War and the Constitution: Five Lectures, March 1946. Reprint edition. 
Knopf, 1947. 
 
Crovitz, L. Gordon, and Jeremy A. Rabkin, eds. The Fettered Presidency: Legal 
Constraints on the Executive Branch. American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1989. 
 
Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. “NATO’s Victory in Libya.” Foreign 
Affairs, March 1, 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-
daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. “Democracy Deficits and Foreign Policy.” Dissent, Winter 1999. 




David J. Barron, and Martin S. Lederman. “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb: A Constitutional History.” Harvard Law Review 121 (2008): 941. 
———. “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, 




Delahunty, Robert J. “Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy and 
Militia Clauses.” Georgia State University Law Review 19 (2003): 1021. 
Delahunty, Robert J, and John Yoo. “The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventative War Be 
Justified?” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 32, no. 3 (Summer 
2009): 843–866. 
 
Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to 
the Global Village. Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
Devins, Neal. “Bring Back the Draft?” Georgia State University Law Review 19 
(2003): 1107. 
Devins, Neal, and Louis Fisher. The Democratic Constitution. Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Diehl, Paul F, and Tom Ginsburg. “Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A 
Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo.” Michigan Journal of International 
Law 27 (2006): 1239. 
 
Doyle, Michael W. Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International 
Conflict. Edited by Stephen Macedo. Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Dyzenhaus, David. The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency. 1st ed. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Edling, Max M. A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Making of the American State. Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
 
Elkin, Stephen L. “Constituting the American Republic.” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 223–235. 
———. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design After 
Madison. University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility. Princeton University Press, 1995. 
 
Entin, Jonathan L. “Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won’t Resolve the War 
Powers Debate, The.” Case Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997): 1305. 
 
Eskridge Jr., William, and John Ferejohn. A Republic of Statutes: The New American 
Constitution. Yale University Press, 2010. 
 
Fahrenthold, David A. “House Passes Another Libya Rebuke of Obama.” The 




———. “House Rebukes Obama on Libya Mission, but Does Not Demand 





Farrand, Max, and David Maydole Matteson. The Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 
 
Feldman, Leonard C. “Judging Necessity: Democracy and Extra-Legalism.” Political 
Theory 36, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 550–577. 
 
Ferejohn, John, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. “Warlike Democracies.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 52, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 3 –38. 
 
Fisher, Louis. “A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs.” Georgia State 
University Law Review 19 (2003 2002): 1059. 
———. “Judicial Review of the War Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 
3 (September 2005): 466–495. 
———. Presidential War Power. 2 Revised. University Press of Kansas, 2004. 
———. “Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO.” Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997 1996): 1237. 
———. “The Law: Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2012): 176–189. 
———. “The Law: Scholarly Support for Presidential Wars.” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 590–607. 
———. “The Law: The Baker-Christopher War Powers Commission.” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (March 2009): 128–140. 
———. “Unchecked Presidential Wars.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
148, no. 5 (May 1, 2000): 1637–1672. 
Fisher, Louis, and David Gray Adler. “The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say 
Goodbye.” Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 1-20. 
 
Fishkin, James S. When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public 
Consultation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. “Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions.” Social Philosophy and Policy 
28, no. 1 (2011): 242–260. 
 
Flaherty, Martin S. “The Most Dangerous Branch.” The Yale Law Journal 105, no. 7 
(May 1, 1996): 1725–1839. 
 
Foley, Michael. The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, “Abeyances,” and Political 
Temperament in the Maintenance of Government. Routledge, 1989. 
 
Franck, Thomas M. “Declare War? Congress Can’t.” New York Times, December 11, 
1990, sec. A27. 
 212 
———. Political Questions Judicial Answers. Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Friedman, Barry. The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the 
Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. Macmillan, 
2009. 
 
Friedman, David S. “Waging War Against Checks and Balances - The Claim of an 
Unlimited Presidential War Power.” St. John’s Law Review 57 (1983): 213. 
 
Fung, Archon. “What the Snowden Affair Tells Us About American Democracy.” 
Boston Review, July 7, 2013. http://www.bostonreview.net/blog/what-
snowden-affair-tells-us-about-american-democracy. 
 
Gallie, W. B. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 56, no. 1 (1955): 167–198. 
 
Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter D. Feaver. Paying the Human Costs of War: American 
Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton University 
Press, 2009. 
 
Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney. “Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and 
Effective Governance.” In Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. 
Tollefson, 178–207. University of Texas Press, 2006. 
 
Goldsmith, Jack. Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11. 1st 
ed. W. W. Norton & Company, 2012. 
———. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration. 
Reprint. W. W. Norton & Company, 2009. 
 
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. 
Simon & Schuster, 2006. 
 
Graber, Mark. “‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary.’” American Political Development, 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35–73. 
———. A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism, 2013. 
———. “Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789.” Tulsa 
Law Review 38 (2002): 609. 
———. “Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and 
Neglected Relationship.” Law & Social Inquiry 27, no. 2 (April 2002): 309–
338. 
———. “Constructing Judicial Review.” Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 
(2005): 425–451. 
 
Griffin, Stephen M. American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics. Princeton 
University Press, 1998. 
 213 
———. Long Wars and the Constitution. Harvard University Press, 2013. 
 
Hallett, Brien. Declaring War: Congress, the President, and What the Constitution 
Does Not Say. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
———. The Lost Art of Declaring War. University of Illinois Press, 1998. 
 
Hamilton, Alexander, and James Madison. The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-
1794. New edition. Liberty Fund Inc., 2007. 
 
Holmes, Stephen. “Lineages of the Rule of Law.” In Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
edited by José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, 19–61. Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
———. Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy. University 
of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Hopkins, Nick. “Drones Can Be Used By NATO Forces in Libya, Says Obama.” The 




Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1957. 
 
Issacharoff, Samuel. “Political Safeguards in Democracies at War.” Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 29, no. 2 (June 20, 2009): 189–214. 
 
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Free 
Press. 
 
Jeanne Kinney Giraldo. “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons.” 
In Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 
edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 34–70. University of 
Texas Press, 2006. 
 




Katyal, Neal Kumar. “An Executive Branch ‘Drone Court’.” The New York Times, 
February 20, 2013, sec. Opinion. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/an-executive-branch-drone-
court.html. 
———. “Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
From Within.” Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 2314. 
 
 214 
Keynes, Edward. Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power. Penn 
State Press, 2010. 
 
Kleinerman, Benjamin A. “Can the Prince Really Be Tamed? Executive Prerogative, 
Popular Apathy, and the Constitutional Frame in Locke’s ‘Second Treatise.’” 
The American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 209–222. 
———. “‘The Court Will Clean It Up’: Executive Power, Constitutional 
Contestation, and War Powers.” In The Supreme Court and the Idea of 
Constitutionalism, edited by Steven Kautz, Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, 
and Richard Zinman. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
———. The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power. 
University Press of Kansas, 2009. 
———. “Separation of Powers and the National Security State.” In Getting to The 
Rile of Law (NOMOS L) edited by James E. Flemming. Ne York University 
Press, 2011. 
Kleinerman, Benjamin A., and Munoz, Vincent Phillip. “Weekly Standard: Did 




Knight, Jack. “Constitutionalism and Deliberative Democracy.” In Deliberative 
Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, edited by Stephen Macedo, 
159–169. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Koh, Harold Hongju. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the 
Iran-Contra Affair. Yale University Press, 1990. 
———. “Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya.” Transcript. 
Http://www.america.gov/articles/webcontent/2011/032/20110327160858su0.4
296992.xml, March 26, 2011. http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2011/March/20110327160858su0.4296992.html?CP.rss=true. 
 




Kramer, Larry D. The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review. Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Krauthammer, Charles. “Who Takes Us to War?” The Washington Post. June 24, 
2011, sec. A. 
 
Lazar, Nomi Claire. “Making Emergencies Safe for Democracy: The Roman 
Dictatorship and the Rule of Law in the Study of Crisis Government.” 
Constellations 13, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 506–521. 
 215 
———. “Why Rome Didn’t Bark in the Night: Some Thoughts on Crisis 
Government and Constitutional Flexibility.” Polity 45, no. 3 (July 2013): 422–
444. 
 
Levine, Peter, and Karol Edward Soltan, eds. Civic Studies. The Civic Series. 
Washington, D.C: Bringing Theory to Practice, 2014. 
http://www.aacu.org/bringing_theory/CivicSeries.cfm. 
 
Levinson, Sanford. “Still Complacent After All These Years: Some Rumination on 
the Continuing Need for a ‘New Political Science’ (Not to Mention a New 
Way of Teaching Law Students About What Is Truly Most Important About 
the Constitution).” Boston University Law Review 89, no. 2 (2009): 409. 
———. “Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why You 
Shouldn’t Either.” Wake Forest Law Review 38 (Summer 2003): 553. 
Levinson, Sanford, and Jack Balkin. “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its 
Design.” Minnesota Law Review 94 (2010): 1780–1866. 
 
Levy, Jacob T. “Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy. By Richard Bellamy.” Perspectives on 
Politics 9, no. 02 (June 2011): 403–405. 
 
Loader, Ian, and Neil Walker. Civilizing Security. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
 
Lofgren, Mike. “Anatomy of the Deep State | Blog, Perspectives.” BillMoyers.com. 
Accessed March 26, 2014. http://billmoyers.com/2014/02/21/anatomy-of-the-
deep-state/. 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolò. Art of War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
———. Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey Claflin Mansfield and Nathan 
Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
———. The Prince. Translated by Harvey Claflin Mansfield. Chicago, Ill.: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
Madison, James. “Universal Peace.” In Selected Writings of James Madison, edited 
by Ralph Ketcham, 216–218. Hackett Publishing. 
Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Penguin 
Classics, 1987. 
 
Manent, Pierre. A World Beyond Politics?: A Defense of the Nation-State, 2013. 
 
Mansbridge, Jane. “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System.” In Deliberative 
Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, edited by Stephen Macedo, 
211–240. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
 216 
Martin, Craig. “Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the 
Use of Force, in Compliance with International Law.” SSRN eLibrary. 
Accessed February 17, 2011. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737526. 
 
Mazzetti, Mark, and Eric Schmitt. “Clandestine C.I.A. Operatives Gather Information 
in Libya.” The New York Times, March 30, 2011, sec. World / Africa. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/africa/31intel.html. 
 
McCormick, John P. “Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious 
Populism.” American Political Science Review 95, no. 02 (2005): 297–313. 
 
McGinnis, John O. “Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and 
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of 
Powers.” Law and Contemporary Problems 56, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 293–
325. 
———. “The Spontaneous Order of War Powers.” Case Western Reserve Law 
Review 47 (1997 1996): 1317. 
 
McIlwain, Charles. Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. Revised. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1947. 
 
Mettler, Suzanne. The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies 
Undermine American Democracy. University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
 
Moe, Terry M., and William G. Howell. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A 
Theory.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 850–
872. 
 
Mueller, John E. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” The American 
Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (March 1, 1970): 18–34. 
 
Murphy, Walter F. Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just 
Political Order. JHU Press, 2006. 
 




Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. Revised edition. Free Press, 1991. 
 
Nzelibe, Jide O., and John C. Yoo. “Rational War and Constitutional Design.” Yale 
Law Journal 115, no. 9 (September 2006): 2512–2541. 
 
 217 
Obama, Barak. “Barak Obama’s Q&A.” Boston Globe, December 20, 2007. 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/
. 
———. “Letter from the President Regarding the Commencement of Operations in 
Libya,” March 21, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya. 
———. “President Obama’s Letter About Efforts in Libya.” The New York Times, 
May 20, 2011, sec. World / Africa. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/world/africa/21libya-text.html. 
 
Parkinson, John, and Jane Mansbridge, eds. Deliberative Systems: Deliberative 
Democracy at the Large Scale. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 
Paulsen, Michael Stokes. “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is.” Georgetown Law Journal 83 (1995): 217. 
 
POLITICO. “Kerry May Scrap Libya Resolution.” Seattlepi.com. Accessed 
November 24, 2012. http://www.seattlepi.com/national/politico/article/Kerry-
may-scrap-Libya-resolution-1415463.php#src=fb. 
 
Posner, Eric A., and Adrian Vermeule. “The Credible Executive.” University of 
Chicago Law Review 74 (2007): 865. 
———. The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic. 1st ed. Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
 
Powell, H. Jefferson. The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Essay in 
Constitutional Interpretation. Carolina Academic Press, 2002. 
 
Prakash, Saikrishna. “Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by 
Declare War.” Cornell Law Review 93 (2008): 45. 
 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Ramsey, Michael D. The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs. Harvard University 
Press, 2007. 
 
Rettig, Jessica. “End of NATO’s Libya Intervention Means Financial Relief for 




Reveley, W. Taylor. War Powers of the President and Congress: Who Holds the 
Arrows and Olive Branch? University Press of Virginia, 1981. 
 
 218 
Rostow, Eugene V. “Once More Unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution 
Revisited.” Valparaiso University Law Review 21 (1987 1986): 1. 
 
Russett, Bruce M. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National 
Security. Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
Sagar, Rahul. Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, 2013. 
———. “Whistle-blowers and Democracy: A Reply to Fung.” Boston Review, July 
15, 2013. https://bostonreview.net/blog/rahul-sagar-whiste-blowers-and-
democracy-reply-fung. 
———. “Who Holds the Balance? A Missing Detail in the Debate over Balancing 
Security and Liberty.” Polity 41, no. 2 (January 19, 2009): 166–188. 
 
Sarlin, Benjy. “Dennis Kucinich: Obama’s Libya Attack An Impeachable Offense.” 




Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Exceptions That Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency 
Government in Everyday Constitutional Life.” In The Limits of Constitutional 
Democracy, edited by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo, 124–154. 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Schoenberg, Tom. “Libyan War Lawsuit Against Obama by 10 U.S. Lawmakers 




Schwartzberg, Melissa. Democracy and Legal Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Seidman, Louis Michael. “The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine.” John 
Marshall Law Review 37 (2004). 
 
Shane, Peter M. “Learning McNamara’s Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution 
Advances the Rule of Law.” Case Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997): 
1281. 
———. “The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion.” Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 36, no. 1 (2013): 21–28. 
 
Sheffer, Martin S. The Judicial Development of Presidential War Powers. Praeger, 
1999. 
 




Sidak, J. Gregory. “To Declare War.” Duke Law Journal 41, no. 1 (1991): 27–121. 
 
Silverstein, Gordon. “Constitutional Contortion? Making Unfettered War Powers 
Compatible With Limited Government.” Constitutional Commentary 22 
(2005): 349–382. 
———. Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of 
American Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press, 1996. 
———. Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
———. “U.S. War and Emergency Powers: The Virtues of Constitutional 
Ambiguity.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 7, no. 1 (2011): 237–
267. 
 
Sofaer, Abraham D. War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power. First edition. 
Ballinger Pub. Co, 1976. 
 
Soltan, Karol. “Delegation to Courts and Legitimacy.” Maryland Law Review 65, no. 
1 (October 23, 2012): 115. 
 
Steinhauer, Jennifer. “House Rebukes Obama for Continuing Libyan Mission 
Without Its Consent.” The New York Times, June 3, 2011, sec. World / Africa. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/africa/04policy.html. 
———. “House Spurns Obama on Libya, but Does Not Cut Funds.” The New York 
Times, June 24, 2011, sec. U.S. / Politics. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/us/politics/25powers.html. 
 
Storing, Herbert J. What the Anti-Federalist Were For: The Political Thought of the 
Opponents of the Constitution. The University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
 
Tamanaha, Brian Z. On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory. Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
“The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents, and the Rule of Law: 
A Symposium on Executive Power.” Yale Law Journal 115, no. 9 (September 
2006): 2212–2651. 
 
Thomas, George. “Recovering the Political Constitution: The Madisonian Vision.” 
The Review of Politics 66, no. 02 (2004): 233–256. 
———. The Madisonian Constitution. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. 
 
Thorpe, Rebecca U. The American Warfare State. University Of Chicago Press, 2014. 
———. The Welfare-Warfare State: Perpetuating the U.S. Military Economy. 
University of Maryland Dissertation, 2010. 
 
Treanor, William Michael. “Fame the Founding and the Power to Declare War.” 
Cornell Law Review 82 (1997): 695. 
 220 
———. “The War Powers Outside the Courts.” Indiana Law Journal 81 (2006): 
1333. 
 
Tulis, Jeffrey K. “On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility.” Boston University 
Law Review 89 (2009): 515. 
———. “Constitutional Decay and the Politics of Deference.” presented at the 10th 
Annual Walter F. Murphy Lecture in American Ideals and Institutions, 
Princeton University, April 4, 2011. 
http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/calendar/flash/Tulis.html. 
———. “Deliberation Between Institutions.” In Debating Deliberative Democracy, 
edited by James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett, 200–211. Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2003. 
———. “On the State of Constitutional Theory.” Law and Social Inquiry 16 (1991): 
711. 
———. “The Two Constitutional Presidencies.” In The Presidency and the Political 
System, edited by Michael Nelson, 91–123. 5th edition. CQ Press, 1997. 
———. “Impeachment in the Constitutional Order.” In The Constitutional 
Presidency, edited by Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey K. Tulis. 1st ed. The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 
 
Turner, Robert F. Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law 
in U.S. Foreign Policy. Brassey’s, Inc., 1991. 
 
Tushnet, Mark. “Congressional Constitutional Interpretation.” In Congress and the 
Constitution, edited by Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington. Duke 
University Press, 2005. 
———. “Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism.” Harvard Law 
Review 118 (2005): 2673. 
———. “Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution.” 
Boston University Law Review 89, no. 2 (2009): 499. 
———, ed. The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency. Duke 
University Press Books, 2005. 
———. “The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and 
Separation-of-Powers Regulation.” International Journal of Law in Context 3, 
no. 04 (March 2008). 
———. “The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from 
Hamdan.” Minnesota Law Review 91 (2007): 1451–1472. 
———. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton University Press, 
1999. 
———. Why the Constitution Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. 
 
Ullman, Harlan K., and James P. Wade. Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid 
Dominance. Forgotten Books, 2008. 
 




Vermeule, Adrian. “Review: ‘A Republic Of Statutes: The New American 
Constitution’.” The New Republic, October 26, 2010. 
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/superstatutes. 
———. “The Glorious Commander in Chief.” In The Limits of Constitutional 
Democracy, edited by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo, 157–167. 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Walzer, Michael. Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical 
Illustrations. 4th ed. Basic Books, 2006. 
 
Wang, Marian. “Whatever Happened to the War Powers Act Controversy?” 




Warren, Mark E., and Hilary Pearse, eds. Designing Deliberative Democracy: The 
British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly. Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 




Weinberger, Seth. Restoring the Balance: War Powers in an Age of Terror. Praeger, 
2009. 
 
“White House Report to Congress on Libya.” Council on Foreign Relations. 
Accessed November 23, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/libya/white-house-report-
congress-libya/p25313. 
 
Whittington, Keith E. Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning. Harvard University Press, 2001. 
———. Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme. 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Wilson, Scott. “Obama Administration: Libya Action Does Not Require 




Yoo, John C.. The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs 
After 9/11. University Of Chicago Press, 2006. 




———. “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations 
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them,” September 25, 2001. 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm. 
 
Zeisberg, Mariah. “The Relational Concept of War Powers.” In Limits of 
Constitutional Democracy, edited by Jeffrey K. Tulis and Stephen Macedo, 
186–193. Princeton University Press, 2010. 
———. War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority. Princeton University 
Press, 2013. 
 
